

MS Security Council

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Introduction from the Chairs

Hello delegates,

We are your chairs, Jonga, Beatriz and Gabriel, for the MS Security Council for GMUN XI! We are so excited to see you debate Reforming UN Peacekeeping Operations to Address Modern Conflict Environments: Lessons from MINUSMA and Addressing Nuclear Proliferation, Humanitarian Risks, and Regional Instability on the Korean Peninsula – both topics of the utmost importance. As chairs, we will monitor the flow of debate and support you in any way we can. We understand that this may be the first Model UN conference for some of you, and we are so thrilled that we get to be a part of this learning experience with you. This topic guide is the first way through which we help you; we have compiled some background information that we hope you will utilize to learn more about your topic in addition to your individual research. For more experienced delegates, we hope you take this opportunity to improve your skills and take on challenges. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to reach out to any of us. We are here to help and look forward to watching you debate!

Kind regards,

Jonga, Beatriz and Gabriel

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Guide to Researching

The following information will serve to guide you in your research.

The first thing you should do is find the basics about your country. The sources you use should be reliable— meaning that the writer (whether that be an organization, a well-known author, an expert in the field, or a governmental organization) are credible and trusted by most. Sources such as Google Scholar and some websites that end with (examplewebsite.edu) are also great tools since they are both for educational purposes. Below are some questions you should answer and [this document](#) contains many sources that you can use to do external research.

1. Where is my country situated?
2. Who is the leader of my country? (President, Prime Minister, etc)
3. What are some major cities in my country?
4. What are the major news stories out of my country currently? (ex. Google: _____ news)
5. What is the standard of living? (Economic, political, social, humanitarian issues, Global-South country?)
6. Is my country part of any major alliance? If so, who are my allies?

Continue reading and understanding the information within the topic guide, and extend your knowledge by asking yourself more questions and search for the answers! Your chairs have worked very hard to make sure this topic guide gives you foundational knowledge on what you will be discussing, but don't be afraid to take your learning further!

Good luck and please reach out to us if anything is needed,

Jonga, Beatriz and Gabriel

Introduction to the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council is the primary body in the United Nations, tasked with the responsibility of the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council has 5 nations with a permanent seat. These nations: France, Russia, China, United States of America and the United Kingdom have veto power. Furthermore, in this conference, the extent to which GMUN models the Security Council extends to its very ability to determine the functionality of the United Nations and its missions. In particular, the articles in the UN charter which clearly define the tools of which GMUN delegates may utilize lie below:

Article 24, “in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.

Article 39, “the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”.

Article 29, “the Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”.

Article 30, “the Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President”.

Article 25, “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”

Topic A: Reforming UN Peacekeeping Operations to Address Modern Conflict Environments: Lessons from MINUSMA



Background Information

On the 25th of April 2013, the resolution 2100 established MINUSMA in order to aid the destabilizing situation within Mali. In essence, in 2012, the Tuareg separatist group, seeking Azawad independence (a region of northern Mali consisting of Kidal, Tombouctou, and Gao) from Mali, rebelled against the government. The initial movement led by the separatist groups majorly destabilized the Malian military in key northern regions. Although the separatists then declared independence, this independence was never nationally nor internationally recognized; thus, formally, Azawad still remained

within the territorial integrity of Mali. Simultaneously, terrorist groups, primarily jihadist groups, sought to implement their Islamist (Sharia) rule, different from that of the Malian government and the separatists. Hence, the jihadist groups took advantage of the regional instability and consolidated their presence in northern Mali by seizing major cities and imposing their militant rule. Following the loss of stability in the northern region, the Malian government struggled in maintaining autonomy and administration amongst the territory. This inability to sustain security by the government led to a growing sense of public discontent and eventually a military coup that overthrew the civilian regime, causing political chaos in Bamako.

While the terrorist groups initially cooperated with the separatists, they eventually took solitary control of the northern region. Correspondingly, when the jihadists began to push southward into central Mali, in January of 2013 international intervention commenced with France intervening and the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Later, in July, AFISMA was incorporated into MINUSMA as the UN began intervention with the mandate of stabilizing “key population centres, especially in the north, deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas”, as well as to aid in re-establishing “State administration throughout the country” (United Nations, 2013).

However, the UN found little peace to actually “keep” in their peacekeeping mission. In particular, the environment in Mali became increasingly asymmetrical in terms of warfare. Notably, with the Algiers peace process and the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, there was a relative mediation in attempting to maintain peace within the nation. Nevertheless, this effort was criticized as it was not inclusive to civil society nor the terrorist groups. Rather, it focused on reaching an agreement with the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) - the Tuareg rebels and separatists. Thus, the asymmetry continued to destabilize as terrorist groups frequently targeted the UN troops. The following insecurity in central Mali and the increased attacks

by the terrorists ultimately hindered MINUSMA's capability to protect civilians. This was followed by an expansion of its mandate in 2019 to "support the stabilization of central Mali 'within existing resources'" (IPI, 2024). However, as the environment continuously required that the mandate be stretched beyond its original implications, and only a few resources were provided to allocate for the expansion of the mission, MINUSMA's effectiveness was doubted.

In the end, as doubt grew throughout civil society and the Malian government of the mission's ability to succeed, the government requested the immediate withdrawal of MINUSMA from Mali. In response, with then little to no consent to continue operating, the UN withdrew. The situation in Mali was left without full stabilization of peace; the UN suffered various fatalities, particularly to the terrorist warfare, numbering at 311 peacekeepers killed, and 700 injured; the northern region of Mali continued to have little to no governmental authority; and terrorist attacks continued.

Areas of Consideration

MINUSMA received various criticisms, and in particular by Mali civilians themselves. Although some argue that the environment that MINUSMA had to operate within was considerably challenging, it still remains the UN's mission to learn and adapt to differing scenarios. Hence, delegates must now consider how the UN's failure in Mali might reflect the diminishing ability of UN peacekeeping missions, an aspect that Adam Roberts highlighted even in 1994.

Firstly, delegates should consider the particularity of peacekeeping mandates and their alterations. With MINUSMA, its initial mandate was altered consistently, and at times, without completion of the previous. Further, its mandate expanded in manners which then began to seemingly include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and counter-terrorism, then reflecting a mission more aligned with peace enforcement rather than simply peace keeping. Notably, this expansion was required as it

was in response to the increasing terrorist violence, which particularly sought to target the UN peacekeepers. Once again, that then tends to indicate a discrepancy within the belonging of a peacekeeping mission in asymmetrical warfare or unpeaceful environments. As mentioned before, another area of concern lies within the lack of resource reinforcement despite the constant alteration of the mandate.

Secondly, another aspect to consider is the UN's effectiveness in reaching a political consensus on peacekeeping missions. Notably, the final years of MINUSMA, after the coup d'etats, were marked by non-unanimous resolutions, where China and Russia abstained, and deteriorating relations with France and Mali. Thus, in part, due to diplomatic differences within the United Nations, the effectiveness of peacekeeping was hindered. In addition, these differences influence matters such as troop and fund allocations, partly defining the effectiveness of certain nations' peacekeeping troops in culturally and politically different nations. Specifically, it appears that Western nations considerably seem to be the greater allocator of funds, whereas African nations were the greater contributor of troops, which in turn heightens the possibilities of a neo-colonial divide. Evidently in Mali, a certain skeleton of a power dynamic was reflected in the manner in which Sweden and Netherland troops orchestrated the militaristic intelligence aspect of the mission and the Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Senegal troops were stationed in the warfare active areas.

This points to another area of consideration, this being the ability of UN peacekeeping missions to adapt correspondingly to the cultures, societies, and politics of their host countries. Raising the question of what attitude the United Nations should adopt towards the host civilization. Should they remain impartial, maintaining at their best ability their claim to neutrality? Or to what extent should peacekeeping missions be specified for each society?

Notably, this question of the public perception of the UN's neutrality was significant in MINUSMA as well. IPI highlights how civilians were critical of the

sighting of UN peacekeepers participating in the celebration of the unrecognized declaration of Azawad independence, doubting their loyalty to the claim of maintaining Mali's initial territorial integrity.

Nevertheless, MINUSMA also was implemented in an environment that appeared to have relatively questionable cooperation with all parties involved. In which the new governments appeared to have less recognition in the original 2015 peace agreement. Further, the unique characteristic of terrorist groups particularly targeting UN officials. Overall, there are various reports that represent MINUSMA's difficulty in executing their mandate given their environmental conditions. These extend to host-government restrictions where the UN's air surveillance was significantly restricted, making mobilization in the nation considerably difficult.

In conclusion, with MINUSMA, a UN peacekeeping mission, there lies various points in which the Security Council may reconsider the UN diplomatic and peacekeeping dynamics. However, these reconsiderations will not be unanimous throughout all nations..

Suggested questions for further research

- How did MINUSMA's mandate evolve from 2013–2023, and what specific mandate expansions (e.g., central Mali stabilization, DDR, protection of civilians) created gaps between goals and available resources?
- What operational limits do UN peacekeeping missions face when dealing with jihadist/terrorist groups that *actively target* peacekeepers, and what reforms (rules of engagement, intelligence, mobility, force protection) are debated to address this?
- How did Mali's political changes (coups, shifting leadership, rising anti-UN sentiment) affect host-state consent, and what does MINUSMA teach about maintaining legitimacy and cooperation with governments and civilian populations?

- How do divisions among major powers (P5 dynamics) and unequal burden-sharing (funding vs. troop contributions) shape mission effectiveness—and what realistic reforms could reduce political deadlock and improve accountability?

Bloc Positions

<p>United States of America</p>	<p>The United States of America plays a crucial role in UN peacekeeping missions. It is the largest financial contributor, responsible for 26.95% of the UN peacekeeping budget. The US has contributed significantly to MINUSMA with \$ 1.8 billion. However, once the transitional government in place withdrew its consent, the US worried about a potential political and humanitarian aid vacuum in the area. After the lessons learned in MINUSMA the US supports clear, achievable mandates with accountability frameworks to improve mission performance. It advocates for mandate reviews and transitions when missions have met their objectives, including planning for locally led security and political solutions post-mission. It is however crucial to note that in the past year the US has severely cut down its budget for the UN. It has decreased its contributions from \$1 billion last year to \$680 million this year. This forces the UN to reconsider the scale, structure and feasibility of certain missions.</p>
<p>The People's Republic of China</p>	<p>The People's Republic of China is the second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, providing 18.69% of their budget. Their participation in MINUSMA marked a turning point for China. For the first time it sent out a separate protection unit with infantry and additional forces to a UN mission. This guaranteed the safety not only of the personnel but international personnel on the grounds. This demonstrates China's focus towards peacekeeper safety in future UN missions. Additionally, China is committed to providing a standby peacekeeping force composed of 8,000 soldiers in order to quickly deploy situational awareness,</p>

	<p>high-tech explosive ordnance disposal and counter-unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities. This encourages a future where peacekeeping is now more than ever equipped with high end technology. China therefore supports reforms that emphasize sovereignty and mandate clarity while promoting peacekeeper safety and technology.</p>
<p>United Kingdom</p>	<p>The United Kingdom is a large financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget. However, it plays a more relevant political agenda, ensuring the establishment of precise mandates, and providing overseeing mechanisms. After the lessons learned in MINUSMA the United Kingdom has moved towards advocating more focus, planning and achievement in the UN peacekeeping missions. The nation aims to ensure that future missions are guided by clear political strategies with mandates that are realistic, achievable and comprehensible. Additionally, new exit strategies with viable transition plans are essential. The UK has therefore moved towards a new approach named “The 3 Ps”: Planning, Pledges, and Performance. Lastly the UK has just committed new funding, approximately £150k-£200k in late 2024/2025, specifically to help the UN monitor how fake news and Wagner Group-led propaganda target peacekeepers.</p>
<p>The Republic of India</p>	<p>Unlike nations like the US and China, The Republic of India contributes to the peacekeeping missions not with additions to the budget but by sending personnel. India has sent more than 290 000 troops and personnel across 50 missions. This is more than any other nation in history. In future missions India defends a “4 Cs” approach: Consultation, Cooperation, Coordination and Capacity Building. Additionally, India advocates for Gender parity, supporting women peacekeepers as a valuable addition to UN missions. As the largest contributor in troops India also encourages the development of measures focused on ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers. This includes high end technology such as drones, and humanitarian measures such as field hospitals.</p>

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Topic B: Addressing Nuclear Proliferation, Humanitarian Risks, and Regional Instability on the Korean Peninsula



Background Information

The Korean Peninsula is the clearest example of a geopolitical wound that was paused, and never healed. An armistice was signed in 1953, but peace was never signed, and a ceasefire does not stabilize civilizations, it merely delays the next crisis. Today, the DPRK's nuclear development is not stagnating, it is accelerating, and once again, accelerating. The UN, alongside global diplomatic institutions, continues to struggle in forming a unified strategy that halts proliferation while maintaining humanitarian stability. As delegates of the Security Council, your role is not to narrate this fracture, but to arbitrate its reconstruction. The responsibility of reaching consensus in how nuclear diplomacy must evolve, in how deterrence should be balanced with ethics, and in how humanitarian fragility should influence coercive policy, lies with each of you. The peninsula forces a new kind of question upon the UN: not simply whether nuclear weapons destabilize, but whether the global frameworks meant to stop them are themselves unstable. Ultimately, this council must reflect on whether alliances, pressure, engagement, or phased negotiation reduces long-term existential risk while minimizing civilian externalities.

North Korea is estimated to possess 50 nuclear warheads, with the potential to expand production toward 90, supported by four operating uranium enrichment facilities

that increase manufacturing capacity faster than ever before. The DPRK's nuclear arsenal is not merely strategic, it is constitutional. The state has codified nuclear weapons as "essential and irreversible," embedding militaristic permanence into governance itself. In June 2024, the DPRK signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with Russia, initiating a transactional alliance that exchanges artillery shells for military support and deploys DPRK troops to aid Russia in Ukraine, signaling a new militaristic interdependence. Simultaneously, South Korea balances diplomacy with structured militarization, advocating for humanitarian and cultural exchange under the END strategy (Exchanges, Neutralization, Demilitarization) while preserving the legitimacy of two independent states, pushing toward long-term denuclearization. However, engagement is not pursued without deterrence. Thus, the ROK has expanded its military doctrine through the Three Axis Defense System, which prioritizes early missile detection, preemptive destruction before launch, layered interception shields, and leadership-targeting contingency frameworks in response to nuclear aggression. Japan maintains a historically rigid nuclear stance, grounded in lived trauma, defending the Three Non-Nuclear Principles: not possessing, not producing, and not permitting nuclear weapons on its territory. Recently, Japan has also begun shifting toward long-range counter-strike capacity, developing missiles capable of reaching deep into the DPRK if necessary, while prioritizing humanitarian concerns such as famine mitigation, disaster resilience, and the unresolved return of Japanese citizens abducted in the 1970s and 1980s. China plays an indispensable diplomatic role without formally joining the DPRK-Russia military alignment. China supplies North Korea with economic lifelines, including food, fuel, and consumer goods, ensuring regime continuity without endorsing Russia's nuclear partnership, while proposing a conditional dual-freeze approach, halting DPRK nuclear expansion if the ROK halts large-scale military exercises. Lastly, the United States remains aligned with Japan and the ROK, reinforcing nuclear deterrence through shared submarine technologies, encouraging trilateral alliances, and using the promise of sanctions relief and food aid as negotiation leverage to draw the DPRK away from Russia and back toward diplomatic engagement. This diplomatic structure is alliance-based, deterrence-based, and conditional in humanitarian strategy, demonstrating once again that diplomacy and pressure are interdependent on the peninsula.

Areas of Consideration

The DPRK argues its arsenal is essential for sovereignty and survival, yet survival framed only militaristically is still fragility, fragility deferred, fragility disguised.

Delegates must first evaluate the proportionality of UN sanctions. Sanctions restrict fuel, dual-use technology, and economic mobility, but when maximalist, they also risk civilian collapse, systemic famine, medical scarcity, and disaster vulnerability. The moral dilemma remains whether sanctions should remain maximalist, proportional, or dynamically adjusted to humanitarian thresholds, without enabling constitutional nuclear permanence. Another critical concern is diplomatic fragmentation. Historically, disarmament negotiations collapse primarily due to verification disputes, ideological fracture, and strategic distrust among major powers, most notably between pressure-based diplomacy advocated by Western and East Asian allies and sanction-relief diplomacy advocated by China and Russia. The absence of consensus weakens verification credibility, delays escalation-guardrails, fractures negotiation legitimacy, and increases the probability of accidental nuclear aggression. Public legitimacy must also be deliberated. The UN has minimal operational presence inside the DPRK, and humanitarian NGOs frequently face surveillance barriers, border restrictions, digital blackouts, and transparency gaps that weaken both aid delivery and diplomatic trust. Neutrality cannot simply be claimed, it must be perceived as legitimate by the host civilization. Military asymmetry also carries moral implications. Western and East Asian nations fund layered deterrence and preemptive defense infrastructure, while civilians and militaries on the peninsula bear existential escalation risk. This council must evaluate whether nuclear diplomacy should be shaped primarily by funding, by risk, or by shared civilized vulnerability. Lastly, delegates must assess tailored paths toward a nuclear-free peninsula. Should diplomacy evolve through alliance-centered deterrence, phased disarmament, legally binding security guarantees, dual freezes, or humanitarian infrastructure oriented programming? Or is the peninsula proof that diplomatic frameworks must be redesigned entirely for nuclear conflict environments? In sum, delegates must reflect not on whether diplomacy fails, but where it must adapt, constitutionalize safeguards, and be negotiated differently for civilizations living under nuclear coercion.

Conclusion

The Korean Peninsula demonstrates that nuclear proliferation destabilizes not only militaries, but also humanitarian matter-cycling, public trust, and diplomatic legitimacy. The Security Council must now decide whether peace is pursued through calibrated pressure, structured engagement, constitutional security guarantees, or alliance-centered deterrence frameworks that do not enable constitutional nuclear expansion. Ultimately,

the success of diplomacy on the peninsula depends not on unanimity, but on negotiation, credibility, and humanitarian resilience. Negotiation, credibility, humanitarian resilience. I repeat, negotiation, credibility, humanitarian resilience.

Suggested questions for further research

- How have UN sanctions affected the DPRK’s nuclear/missile progress *versus* civilian well-being, and what policy options exist to adjust sanctions while preserving humanitarian protections and aid access?
- What are the main obstacles to verification in North Korea (monitoring, inspections, transparency), and what models (phased steps, third-party monitoring, freezes, capped production) have been proposed to make compliance measurable?
- How does the DPRK–Russia partnership (and broader great-power rivalry) affect the likelihood of escalation, negotiation leverage, and Security Council unity?
- How do strategies like the ROK’s “Three Axis” system, U.S.-ROK extended deterrence, Japan’s evolving strike capability, and China’s “dual-freeze” proposal shape stability—and which combination most plausibly reduces long-term nuclear risk?

Bloc Positions

<p>Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea</p>	<p>North Korea is estimated to have 50 nuclear warheads with the potential to potentially produce around 90 warheads. North Korea currently has four operating uranium enrichment facilities demonstrating their commitment to continue the production and manufacturing of nuclear technologies. The number of sites indicates that material may now be produced at a faster rate than ever. This nation views their arsenal as an essential means of survival, stability and sovereignty. It is even included in the constitution that nuclear weapons are “essential and irreversible”. Lastly, North Korea signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with Russia in June 2024, indicating the start</p>
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	<p>of a new partnership that supplies North Korea with artillery shells and Russia with troops to fight in Ukraine.</p>
Republic of Korea	<p>South Korea is developing an approach that balances both diplomatic actions, and potential olive branches, with an increase in military capacity. South Korea has developed the END strategy: Exchanges, Neutralization and Demilitarization. It focuses on providing humanitarian and cultural exchange between South and North Korea while aiming for diplomatic negotiations and the preservation of two independent states. The ultimate goal is to ensure a nuclear free Korean peninsula. However, while South Korea maintains diplomatic actions it has been strengthening its military with potential nuclear capacities. It is developing a Three Axis defense strategy, aimed at the capacity to detect and destroy North Korean missiles before they are launched. It would also develop a multi-layer shield to intercept missiles and a plan to target leadership directly if a nuclear attack does occur.</p>
Japan	<p>Japan has a strict position on nuclear weapons, as the only nation that has suffered the consequences of a nuclear attack Japan stands firmly in three negatives: not possessing, not producing, and not permitting nuclear weapons. In terms of military strategy, Japan is moving from simply defense to a strike back approach. Instead of simply preparing to defend itself, it has also begun to develop long range missiles capable of reaching deep inside North Korea if necessary. Japan has had a main focus on humanitarian aid, not only for the situation in North Korea but has made the return of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea in the 70s and 80s its top priority.</p>
People's Republic of China	<p>China occupies a nuanced position in this conflict. While it is not joining the North Korean and Russian alliance it does provide economic support to North Korea. China provides essential items for life support like food, fuel and consumer goods. This ensures the regime can maintain itself without collapse. China also</p>

	<p>proposes that North Korea should stop their nuclear developments if South Korea stops its large-scale military defense. China has also become the broker between North and South Korea as the United States stopped engaging with North Korea, China becomes the only nation that can maintain diplomatic ties with both countries. This makes China an indispensable member of the conflict resolution.</p>
<p>The United States of America</p>	<p>The United States stands firmly with South Korea in this conflict. The US has increased its nuclear shares with South Korea, enabling the creation of nuclear powered submarines. The US has also shifted its view on humanitarian aid. The U.S. is using the promise of sanctions relief and food aid as a "carrot" to pull Kim Jong Un away from his alliance with Russia and back to the negotiating table. The US is also encouraging the alliance between Japan and South Korea. The US therefore views alliances and protective defense strategies as the best path forward, to ensure South Korea is protected and North Korea weakened and open to negotiations.</p>

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