UNISMUNC XI

Committee: Yugoslavia 1991
Topic: Dissolution and Diplomacy in the Balkans

Committee Type: Crisis

December 7, 2025

Chair: Naomi Abiy

Director: Dora Dulge

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Conference Schedule

Registration	*8:00 am - 9:00 am*
Opening Ceremonies	*9:00 am - 10:00 am*
Committee Session I	*10:00 am - 12:00 pm*
Lunch Break I	*12:00 pm - 1:15 pm*
Lunch Break II	*1:15 pm - 2:30 pm*
Committee Session II	*2:30 pm - 5:30 pm*
Closing Ceremonies	*5:30 pm - 6:30 pm*

Conference Policies

UNISMUNC XI aims to foster debate, bringing students the opportunity to explore a range of topics and encourage collaboration and teamwork between delegates. Be that as it may, UNIS stresses the importance of respectful language as UNISMUNC XI will see delegates debating topics that, at times, may be heated or passionate. MUNEX encourages you to remember to stay respectful and mindful of the other students around you. We are so excited about this conference and trust that no issues will arise. The following expectations and policies are designed so that every delegate gets the most out of UNISMUNC.

Attire:

The Dress Code for UNISMUNC is formal Western business attire, and all delegates are expected to comply with this. Exceptions can be made for character purposes in crisis committees at the discretion of the chair. If you have an idea for an outfit for a crisis committee that does not fall into the parameters of traditional Western business attire, please ask your chair for permission before wearing the outfit.

Committee Assignments:

Committee assignments will be made on a first-come-first-served basis based on preference as communicated by the delegation's advisors (or individual delegates in the case of independent delegates), in order of receipt of preference. Before being assigned to a committee, payment must be received. If payment is not submitted in a timely manner, delegations face the risk of not receiving committee assignments of their choice.

Expectations in Committee:

As you engage in debates, we ask that delegates maintain politeness and respect at all times. While we recognize that you are representing your country's views, it is essential to express these perspectives without crossing the line into disrespectful or confrontational behavior.

Please respect one another when delegates are giving speeches. Only one delegate may speak at a time during moderated caucuses. To speak during a moderated caucus, you must raise your placard and wait to be recognized by the chair. During speeches, no ad hominem attacks will be allowed, should they occur, the subject will have the right to reply. Remember to be cognizant of your words and actions, and to listen to everyone's views and positions.

The Committee Chairs and Secretariat members are responsible for determining disruptive behavior.

Examples of disrespectful behavior may include but are not limited to:

- Speaking without being recognized,
- Use of cell phones,
- Note-passing unrelated to the committee,
- Use of technology when not allowed,
- Verbal, physical, or sexual harassment of other delegates.

The pre-writing of any resolution/directive clauses, crisis notes, or speeches is strictly forbidden and will be penalized. This does not include opening remarks. This does not include any writing during the lunch break, as UNISMUNC committees standardly operate with 'working lunches'.

UNISMUNC has a zero-tolerance policy for any plagiarism. This includes position papers, speeches, and resolutions. Improper citation of quotes and references may result in disqualification from awards or further disciplinary action at the discretion of the chairs.

Pricing:

Please see the registration section for more information. Details on committee assignments are below.

Spectators:

Please be aware that UNISMUNC XI does not allow unregistered spectators. Student spectators are strictly prohibited. All advisors and delegates must be registered and pay the required fee(s). Non-compliance with this policy will result in exclusion from future invitations. We expect all

participating delegations to respect this policy. The Secretariat reserves the right to have any unregistered spectators removed from committee chambers and escorted off of the premises if necessary, as they see fit.

Technology:

All crisis committees are strictly no-tech. Neither laptops nor cell phones will be permitted during committee sessions in crisis committees.

General Assembly (GA) committees allow technology exclusively for the purpose of resolution writing. Delegates will be permitted to use their laptops to work on resolutions during unmoderated caucuses and outside of the committee chamber when allowed by the chair. It is, however, not permitted to use technology when a fellow delegate is speaking or during committee chambers during moderated caucuses. This includes your own speeches, so please write any notes by hand or have your opening remarks printed before the conference.

Awards Criteria:

UNISMUNC Chairs, Diases, and, in the case of crisis committees, Crisis Directors will work together to holistically evaluate delegates based on their performance throughout the entire day of debate. This includes:

- speeches given during moderated caucuses,
- performance during unmoderated caucuses (not only making one's voice heard but also including everyone in the discussion),
- writing/presenting resolutions/directions, especially those that pass,
- in crisis committees, as well as the detail and sophistication of crisis arcs.

Letter From Chair/Director

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to UNISMUNC IX! It is our pleasure to host yet another Crisis, set against the backdrop of one of the most complex and consequential political disintegrations of the late 20th century: the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. This moment in history challenges us to confront nationalism, diplomacy, peacekeeping, and the failures of international systems. All themes that remain deeply relevant today.

I'm Dora, and I'll be your Director. I am a senior at UNIS and have been deeply involved in MUN since my freshman year, after first beginning my MUN journey in Istanbul in eighth grade. I currently lead the Business team for the UNIS MUN executive. Outside of MUN, I am a professional pianist and recently performed at Carnegie Hall. I'm fluent in Turkish, English, and French, and I study both French and Spanish at UNIS. I am Albanian, and my background has deepened my interest in the history and complexity of the Balkans. I've spent the past year researching this region in depth, writing my History study on the Kosovo Crisis, and I'm passionate about making this committee both immersive and intellectually challenging.

Naomi Abiy will serve as the Chair for this crisis committee. She is also a senior at UNIS and joined MUN two years ago. She is the business ASG on the UNIS MUN executive team. Outside of MUN, Naomi plays competitive soccer for DUSC's academy team and is involved in various extracurricular activities centered on social justice. She is a cofounder of the UNIS Mock Trial team and currently studies Global Politics (GP), which has deepened her interest in international affairs and legal systems. Naomi is fluent in English and studies French at UNIS. She is eager to help guide delegates through one of the most complex geopolitical crises of the late 20th century.

Make sure to prepare, and please reach out to either of the following email addresses if you have any questions. Mine is 26nabiy@unis.org, and Dora's is 26ddulge@unis.org. We are all excited to see where this committee will go and how each of you will interpret your roles, navigate conflicting agendas, and collaborate to respond to the unfolding crisis. Whether through negotiation, strategy, or intervention, your choices will shape the fate of a nation… and possibly avert war.

The fate of the federation is in your hands.

Sincerely,

Dora Dulge

Director, Yugoslavia 1991 Crisis Committee

UNISMUNC XI

A Brief Overview of the Committee

This 1991 Yugoslavia Crisis Committee places delegates in the midst of the federations collapse. Each character faces competing pressures of nationalism, diplomacy, and war. Delegates must balance personal portfolio powers with commitee-wide directives to shape the fate of the Balkans. The goal is not only to secure survival for your character's interests, but also to influence whether Yugoslavia fragments, unifies, or finds an alternative path…

Committee Procedure:

Moderated Caucuses are structured discussions where delegates sign themselves up to give short, regulated speeches. The speaking time and topic of discussion are set when the motion is proposed, and delegates take turns to speak.

Unmoderated Caucuses are divided between a regular unmoderated caucus and a gentleman's unmoderated caucus where everybody remains seated. A regular unmod entails a period free of structured, regulated debate, where delegates can mill about the committee and work with their blocs.

Some actions that are carried over from the usual committee procedure:

- Point of Order
- Point of Information
- Appeal to the Chair
- Suspension of Debate
- Adjournment of Debate
- Closure of Debate
- Roll Call Vote
- Set the Speaker's Time
- Call a guest speaker

Instead of resolutions, the crisis will debate and pass **directives**. Directives are actions or communications undertaken by the entire committee as a group and are passed by a simple majority. Unlike resolutions, which may only be entertained at the end of a session, directives should be created and debated on as much as possible. The different types of papers used in crisis committees are explained in detail in the next section.

The Committee may call for external speakers to address the body. To do so, a committee member must move to invite the guest; that motion requires a majority vote to pass.

The goal of the crisis committee has two aspects-- firstly to work as a group to solve or influence the crisis in the interest of the group, and secondly to act in your character's best interests. In this committee, many of the characters are charged by different motives and have their individual goals; for instance, Darth Maul will have vastly different goals from Lott Dod.

Written Papers

Crisis Notes: Crisis notes are notes used in order to take personal action from a delegate, without the need for committee approval. Crisis notes are therefore bound by a character's individual portfolio power. There are a myriad of ways to write Crisis notes, but be sure to sign your character's name at the end and address it to CRISIS on the front of your folded note.

Directives: A directive is a formal written instruction or order given by a delegate or a group of delegates to the chair or to other delegates. Directives are used to propose specific actions or solutions to address the crisis at hand. They can range from proposing specific policies or strategies to calling for specific actions by other delegates or bodies within the simulation. Directives are passed frequently throughout debate, and are a lot shorter than most resolutions. They are not restrained by a specific format, and while they do need signatories and sponsors, they do not require a distinction between preambulatory and operative clauses.

Communiqués: Communiqués are committee documents used to communicate with people outside of the committee. For example, Communiqués could be used when surrender terms or ultimatums are sent to the opponent or when the committee requests aid, advice or arms from their allies. Similar to Directives, they will require a minimum of four people on the document, with two sponsors and two signatories.

Press Releases: As the name says, press releases are committee documents addressed to the public. They can be used to inform or even misinform the public according to the desires of the committee. Similar to Directives and Comuniqués, Press Releases will require a minimum of three people on the document, with one sponsor and two signatories.

Topic Background

Origin of Yugoslavia:

The concept of Yugoslavia emerged in the 19th century among South Slavs advocating for unity among Slavic peoples. Following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was established in 1918, uniting various South Slavic groups under a single monarchy. In 1929, it was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After World War II, Josip Broz Tito led the formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1945, establishing a federal socialist system that was independent of Soviet control.

Federal Structure and Key Actors:

Slovenia:

Slovenia has become the most economically advanced and Western-oriented republic in Yugoslavia. It contributes disproportionately to the federal budget, generating approximately 16% of GDP with only 8% of the population, and has the highest per capita income. Its trade is more aligned with Austria and Italy than the other republics, creating resentment over economic redistribution. Politically, Slovenia broke off from the League of Communists in 1989 and rapidly moved toward pluralism, culminating in a free election in 1990 that brought the DEMOS coalition to power. In December of that year, an independence referendum passed with over 88% in favor. Throughout early 1991, Slovenia quietly prepared for secession by establishing control over customs, borders, and internal policing. Its Territorial Defense

Forces were reinforced under Defense Minister Janez Janša. Slovenia is the first to declare independence on June 25, 1991. It faces direct intervention threats from the Yugoslav People's Army.

Serbia:

Serbia has become the political and military heart of Yugoslavia. Economically, it is less prosperous than Slovenia or Croatia, but it still controls a substantial industrial base centered in Belgrade and northern Serbia. Inflation is rising, and unemployment is widespread, particularly in rural areas. Slobodan Milošević, having risen to power through the Serbian Communist Party, has centralized control, dismantling the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and installing loyalists in Montenegro. With four effective votes in the eight-member federal presidency by 1990, Milošević could block any decision. His official stance was federal unity, but his actual goal was maintaining Serb dominance, including protecting Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. The JNA, now largely Serb-led, follows his strategic aims. Serbia supports the JNA's moves against Slovenia and is preparing for broader military operations to prevent the federation's collapse.

Bosnia Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most ethnically mixed and geopolitically fragile republic in Yugoslavia. Economically, it is middle-tier, with a diversified base in mining, steel, and agriculture, though unemployment was rising sharply in the 1980s. Politically, Bosnia is governed by a rotating coalition of Muslim (Bosniak), Serb, and Croat leaders, reflecting its demographic breakdown: approximately 43% Bosniak, 31% Serb, and 17% Croat. The 1990 elections produced no single majority, and President Alija Izetbegović faced the impossible task of keeping the republic neutral while neighboring states fragmented. Bosnian Serbs, supported by Belgrade, have begun organizing politically and militarily to resist any move toward independence. Bosnian Croats increasingly looked to Zagreb. Though Bosnia has not yet declared independence, militias are forming and ethnic polarization is intensifying. By June 26, Bosnia remains in the federation but braced for external pressures and internal breakdown.

Croatia

By June 1991, Croatia is deeply divided. Economically, it is second only to Slovenia in development, contributing over 25% of federal exports, and has a growing tourism and industrial sector. However, the rising cost of subsidizing poorer republics has led to nationalist discontent. Politically, the April–May 1990 elections swept Franjo Tuđman's Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to power. Tuđman advocated for Croatian statehood, historical rehabilitation of World War II-era nationalists, and a break with

Belgrade. This rhetoric alienated Croatia's Serb minority, concentrated in Krajina and eastern Slavonia, who feared marginalization. Backed by Serbia and the JNA, Serb leaders in Croatia declared autonomous regions and formed militias. The Croatian government created the Croatian National Guard as a proto-army. On June 25, 1991, Croatia declares independence, joining Slovenia, but it immediately is at risk of facing blockades, skirmishes, and threats of large-scale conflict. The republic stands on the brink of war internally and with federal forces.

Montenegro:

Montenegro in 1991 is a small, mountainous republic with strong historical ties to Serbia and a population of around 600,000. Its economy is among the least developed in Yugoslavia, heavily reliant on agriculture, fishing, and modest industrial output. By the early 1990s, Montenegro had a high unemployment rate and depended significantly on federal subsidies. Politically, President Momir Bulatović (an ally of Milošević) had aligned Montenegro closely with Serbia. As a result, Montenegro voted in lockstep with Serbia in the federal presidency, helping Milošević block Slovenian and Croatian independence. The JNA maintains bases in Montenegro, and its leadership supported federal military responses to secessionist moves. Though some Montenegrins are uneasy about deepening ties with Belgrade, political opposition remains marginal. As of June 26, Montenegro is firmly pro-federation, playing a supportive but secondary role in the escalating crisis.

Macedonia:

Macedonia is economically underdeveloped, with high unemployment and limited industry, relying on agriculture and foreign aid. It has one of the lowest GDPs per capita in the federation. Politically, Macedonia pursues neutrality in the growing crisis, avoiding alignment with either Belgrade or the secessionist republics. Its leadership, under President Kiro Gligorov, seeks a peaceful exit from Yugoslavia but is cautious due to Macedonia's internal ethnic dynamics, especially its large Albanian minority. The Macedonian parliament declares the intention to hold an independence referendum, but as of June 26, no formal secession has occurred. In the federal presidency, Vasil Tupurkovski represents the republic's moderate stance, favoring negotiation and legal process. Though militarily weak and lacking ethnic militias, Macedonia is quietly preparing to distance itself from the impending conflict.

MAP OF THE 6 REPUBLICS

The 2 Autonomous Regions

Kosovo:

Kosovo has become one of the most politically volatile and repressed regions within Yugoslavia. Comprising a population of roughly 90% ethnic Albanians, Kosovo had held autonomous status within Serbia since the 1974 Constitution, with its assembly and institutions. However, beginning in 1989, Slobodan Milošević launched a systematic rollback of this autonomy, citing concerns over Albanian separatism and anti-Serb discrimination. Through constitutional revisions and mass purges, Kosovo's local government was dissolved and replaced by Serb-controlled administrators. Protests, strikes, and civil disobedience by Albanians were met with police brutality and increasing militarization. While Kosovo had no standing army, many young men were being conscripted into the JNA against their will, and underground resistance networks had begun to form. Economically, Kosovo is the poorest region in Yugoslavia; the unemployment is estimated to be over 50%. As of June 1991, it is under de facto martial law, heavily policed, and excluded from meaningful political participation. Though Kosovo has not declared any formal move toward independence, tensions are high, and the population remains firmly opposed to Milošević's rule. The region is viewed internationally as a potential future flashpoint, but as of June 1991, it remains a suppressed and silenced actor within the federation.

Vojvodina:

Vojvodina, a northern province of Serbia bordering Hungary, remains quieter than Kosovo and is a hidden asset in Serbia's consolidation of power. Like Kosovo, Vojvodina had been granted autonomous status under the 1974 Constitution, largely due to its ethnic diversity, including sizable Hungarian, Croat, Slovak, and Ruthenian minorities. However, in 1988, Milošević orchestrated what came to be known as the "Yogurt Revolution," a mass protest movement that culminated in the ousting of the provincial leadership and its replacement with loyalists. By 1990, Vojvodina's autonomy had been stripped in practice, and it was effectively governed directly from Belgrade. Economically, Vojvodina is one of Serbia's most productive regions, with fertile agricultural land, strong infrastructure, and important oil and food-processing industries. Its loss of political autonomy enhanced Serbia's bloc control of the federal presidency (Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro voting as a unit), allowing Milošević to dominate federal decisions. Though Vojvodina remains politically quiet, other republics widely interpret its forcible reintegration into Serbia as a calculated demonstration of Milošević's broader authoritarian ambitions.

Political Parties:

Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ): Founded and led by Franjo Tuđman, the HDZ won the 1990 elections on a platform of Croatian nationalism, historical rehabilitation of pre-communist symbols, and independence. The party is based in Croatia and alienated many ethnic Serbs within Croatia and was seen by Belgrade as a threat to Serb rights.

Serbian Socialist Party (SPS): A successor to the League of Communists of Serbia, the SPS was led by Slobodan Milošević. The party merged authoritarian populism with Serbian nationalism, promoting centralization, protecting Serbs outside Serbia, and resisting the breakup of Yugoslavia, though often by force.

Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS): A broad anti-communist coalition that won Slovenia's 1990 elections, DEMOS was committed to market reform, democratization, and a peaceful secession from Yugoslavia. Its leaders, like Milan Kučan and Lojze Peterle, sought international recognition while avoiding war.

Party of Democratic Action (SDA): Led by Alija Izetbegović, the SDA represented the Bosniak Muslim population and favored a unified, sovereign Bosnia with equal rights for all groups. The SDA rejected ethnic partition but faced opposition from both Serb and Croat nationalist parties.

Serb Democratic Party (SDS): Founded by Radovan Karadžić and Jovan Rašković, the SDS promoted Serb unity and opposed secession from Yugoslavia. It called for territorial autonomy or union with Serbia for Serb-majority areas in Croatia and Bosnia, often aligning with paramilitary groups.

Military Groups:

Yugoslav People's Army (JNA): The JNA was the official military of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Established as a pan-Yugoslav force, it was originally envisioned as a multi-ethnic army loyal to the federation. However, by 1991, the JNA was dominated by ethnic Serbs, especially in its senior ranks, and increasingly seen as a vehicle for Serbian state interests. With approximately 180,000 troops, heavy artillery, tanks, and an air force, it was the most powerful armed body in the region. Yet loyalty was fracturing. Draft evasion and desertion were common in Slovenia and Croatia, and internal dissent grew as republics questioned its neutrality. Though still under federal command in principle, its effective control had shifted toward Belgrade, making it a major actor in the power struggle over Yugoslavia's future.

Territorial Defense Forces (TO): Each Yugoslav republic operated its own Territorial Defense Forces under the 1974 Constitution. Originally conceived as a civilian-military home guard in case of foreign invasion, the TO became essential as republics moved toward independence. These forces were controlled locally and operated in parallel to the JNA. In 1991, they began transforming into national armies. Slovenia's TO, under the Ministry of Defense, had been training and stockpiling weapons in preparation for conflict, while Croatia began building the Croatian National Guard from its TO. Though under-equipped compared to the JNA, the TO units had strong local support, knowledge of terrain, and were politically committed to defending their republics' sovereignty.

Serbian Ministry of Interior (MUP): Special Units Serbia's MUP special forces functioned as elite internal security troops, formally tasked with maintaining public order but often used to suppress dissent and influence conflicts in neighboring republics. These forces were separate from the JNA and directly loyal to Slobodan Milošević's government. Their unofficial operations included disarmament of rival militias, intelligence gathering, and intimidation of non-Serb populations in contested areas. While small in number, these units were highly trained and operated with near-complete impunity within Serbia and Serbian-controlled areas.

Serb Paramilitary and Volunteer Militias: By early 1991, unofficial Serb paramilitary groups had begun forming in Serb-majority areas of Croatia and Bosnia. These groups—typically comprised of police, reservists, and radical nationalists—were arming themselves with JNA surplus and Serbian political support. Though not formally recognized, they were preparing to resist Croatian and Bosnian

independence efforts and had already begun establishing checkpoints and shadow administrations in places like Krajina. Their decentralized structure and unofficial status made them a potent and unpredictable force.

Croatian Arms Smuggling Networks Blocked from accessing federal weaponry, Croatian leaders established secret arms procurement routes through Hungary, Austria, and diaspora communities. These illicit networks were coordinated through the Ministry of Defense and external supporters, with funds often coming from Croatians abroad. By mid-1991, these arms were being funneled to the new Croatian National Guard and TO units. Though fragile, this covert infrastructure was crucial in balancing Croatia's military asymmetry with the JNA

International Actors:

The European Community (EC); The EC (precursor to the EU) closely monitors Yugoslavia's political unraveling but remains cautious about intervening. Member states such as Germany and Italy express growing sympathy for Slovenia and Croatia's independence movements, particularly due to historical and economic ties. However, the EC is divided, with France and others favoring Yugoslav unity. A delegation has been dispatched for diplomatic mediation, but the EC has not yet recognized any republic's independence nor developed a coordinated policy for intervention.

The United Nations (UN): The UN has not formally intervened in Yugoslavia, as the rising conflict is still largely viewed as an internal matter. However, several member states have begun expressing concern over the rising violence and potential refugee flows. As tensions escalate, discussions are underway in diplomatic circles about possible observer missions or humanitarian support, though no resolution has yet passed in the Security Council.

The United States: The U.S. has taken a cautious stance toward the Yugoslav crisis, urging dialogue and a peaceful resolution while publicly supporting territorial integrity. Privately, Washington is skeptical of Milošević's consolidation of power and concerned about human rights abuses. While the U.S. State Department has warned of the dangers of ethnic violence, there is no active American military or diplomatic intervention planned as of June 25. The U.S. continues to maintain relations with the federal government while quietly opening channels with Slovenian and Croatian officials.

The Soviet Union Preoccupied with its own internal disintegration, the Soviet Union is largely disengaged from Yugoslavia's crisis. However, it continues to officially support the preservation of existing international borders and views secessionist movements with suspicion. Moscow's limited attention to Yugoslavia at this moment allows greater space for regional actors and Western governments to shape the unfolding response.

The Vatican Though not a traditional geopolitical actor, the Vatican plays a quiet but significant role, especially in advocating for Croatian independence. Pope John Paul II, a Pole and vocal anti-communist, is sympathetic to Catholic-majority Croatia and Slovenia. While not formally recognizing either state by June 1991, Vatican diplomacy holds the hope to build moral legitimacy for their cause, particularly within Catholic states like Italy and Germany.

Timeline of Events (leading up to June 26, 1991)

January 1990 – The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the ruling federal party, collapses after a walkout by Slovenian and Croatian delegates, ending the political monopoly and opening the way for multi-party elections.

April–May 1990 – *Multi-party elections* are held in Slovenia and Croatia. Nationalist and pro-independence parties win in both republics: the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS) and Franjo Tuđman's Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

July 1990 – Serb minority leaders in Croatia declare the "Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina," rejecting the authority of the Croatian government.

August 1990 – *Log Revolution*: Croatian Serbs begin blockading roads and infrastructure in Krajina, escalating tensions and asserting de facto control over the region.

September 1990 – New constitutions are passed in Slovenia and Croatia, asserting republican sovereignty over federal laws.

November–December 1990 – Slovenia and Croatia hold referendums on independence. In Slovenia, 88.5% voted in favor. In Croatia, over 93% voted for independence (excluding boycotting Serb areas).

March 1991 – Plitvice Lakes Incident: The first armed clash between Croatian police and Serb rebels. Two Croatian officers were killed. The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) intervenes, claiming neutrality.

April 1991 – The Krajina region in Croatia declares secession and seeks union with Serbia, with backing from the JNA and Serbian authorities.

May 1991 – The federal presidency deadlocks. Serbia and its allies block Slovenia and Croatia's calls for independence. Croatia begins forming the Croatian National Guard as its own armed force.

June 19, 1991 – The final negotiations between the Slovenian, Croatian, and federal authorities collapse. The EC urges a moratorium on independence declarations, but no agreement is reached.

June 25, 1991 – Slovenia and Croatia both officially declare independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, triggering the start of the federal crisis.

Key Themes to Evaluate

National sovereignty vs. federal integrity:

At the heart of the Yugoslav crisis is the question of who holds ultimate authority: the republics or the federation. Slovenia and Croatia claim the right to self-governance, asserting that their democratic mandates justify secession. In contrast, Serbia and federal loyalists argue that the survival of Yugoslavia as a unified state must take precedence over the ambitions of individual republics. This clash between competing interpretations of sovereignty (republican versus federal) pits the legal framework of the 1974 Constitution against shifting political realities and nationalist agendas. Delegates must consider whether national self-rule can coexist with federal cohesion or if the very structure of Yugoslavia has become irreparably fractured.

The role of the military in politics

The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) still claims to defend the federation, yet its leadership and deployments are widely seen as favoring Serbia. At the same time, the republican Territorial Defense units and the new Croatian forces are organizing, while local police and revolting groups blur the line between security and politics. When civilian leaders are divided, commanders can shape events by moving troops, seizing posts, or reusing orders. Each movement signals either de-escalation or intent to fight. Delegates must weigh how to restore clear civilian control, evaluate the army's impact on deciding political outcomes, and keep outside forces from dragging the region into wider war… all while preserving enough security to make the talks possible.

The international community's role in a regional crisis

Outside actors can calm a crisis or make it worse. The EC is mediating and weighing recognition. The UN debates observation and humanitarian support. The CSCE offers forums and field missions. Each external influence can reduce violence if evaluated strategically and verified thoroughly. Yet early recognition of intervention may harden certain countries' positions, while strict "neutrality" can reward force if violations go unpunished. The core dilemma is whether outsiders should prioritize territorial integrity and existing internal borders or accept self-determination when backed by clear democratic mandates and safeguards for minorities. Delegates must judge when international pressure and monitoring help parties compromise, and when the risk of choosing winners before negotiations have truly begun.

Current Situation

It’s June 26, 1991.

On June 25, 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). These declarations triggered a major political and military crisis. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) has mobilized forces in Slovenia to reassert federal control, marking the beginning of open conflict.

The federal presidency is in disarray. Stjepan Mesić, the newly appointed President of the Presidency, faces strong resistance from Serbian leadership, especially from Slobodan Milošević, who refuses to recognize the secessionist republics. The army, backed largely by Serbian leadership, is acting independently of civilian oversight.

Other republics, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the autonomous province of Kosovo, are closely watching the situation. Ethnic tensions are rising. Minorities in Croatia fear retaliation, while Serbian nationalists push to protect Serbian populations beyond Serbia’s borders.

The European Community and the United States have issued cautious calls for de-escalation. The Soviet Union, facing its internal turmoil, has remained mostly silent. Diplomatic channels are open but fragile.

Delegates now gather at a pivotal moment. Will Yugoslavia remain united? Can violence be avoided? Or is full-scale war inevitable?

Commitee begins at a moment where every decision—diplomatic or military—can tip the balance between fragile peace and all-out war.

Characters

Stjepan Mesic is a sharp-tongued Croatian politician who now holds the rotating presidency of Yugoslavia: an institution he no longer believes in. Once a loyal communist, Mesić transformed into a fierce advocate for Croatian independence after rising tensions with Serbian leadership. His confirmation to the presidency was blocked for weeks, exposing the collapse of federal cooperation. Mesić walks a tightrope: nominally a head of state for all Yugoslavia, but increasingly seen as a nationalist insurgent from within. His presence at the heart of the crumbling federation makes him both a threat and a liability to every side.

Ante Marković is Yugoslavia's last prime minister and its last federalist idealist. A Croatian by birth but a Yugoslav by identity, he rose on the promise of reform, liberalizing the economy, attracting Western support, and holding the state together. But as nationalism surged, Marković was left politically isolated, admired abroad but ignored at home. He remains one of the few figures trusted by international organizations and Western powers like the US, though his grip on power is slipping fast. In a country breaking apart, he is a technocrat without an army.

Portfolio Powers: Controls international economic channels and foreign goodwill, and can grant or withhold crucial economic support.

General Veljko Kadijević is the steely and secretive Minister of Defense, long regarded as the guardian of Yugoslavia's military strength. Though officially loyal to the federation, his silence in the face of rising Serbian influence has fueled speculation about his true sympathies. As JNA troops deploy into breakaway republics, Kadijević holds the power to turn back secession, or ignite civil war. He believes deeply in order, unity, and the necessity of strength. His loyalty is not to politicians, but to the idea of Yugoslavia.

Portfolio Powers: Controls the deployment of JNA forces and all military operations, and can escalate or suppress conflict with relative precision.

Borisav Jović is the bureaucratic architect of Serbia's silent takeover of the federation. Acting as Milošević's strategist in the federal presidency, Jović has blocked key appointments, stalled compromise, and maneuvered federal levers to strengthen Serbia's position. Cold and calculating, he does not speak in ultimatums…but his paperwork can paralyze nations. He is more dangerous in silence than most are in war.

Portfolio Powers: Controls procedural levers in the federal presidency, and can approve, stall, or sabotage executive actions.

Janez Drnovšek is the quiet strategist behind Slovenia's smooth exit from Yugoslavia. A former economist with IMF ties, he built Slovenia's legal and political case for independence while avoiding open provocation. He speaks little but plans everything. As war threatens the border, he must balance diplomacy with defense, hoping that legality and restraint will win Slovenia its sovereignty.

Portfolio Powers: Can negotiate directly with foreign envoys and EC officials, and influences diplomatic responses to secession.

Milan Kučan is the public face of Slovenian independence: a reformer who speaks in moderation but acts decisively. He led the 1990 independence referendum and declared sovereignty a year later, forcing the hand of the federation. He claims to want a peaceful separation, but prepares his defense forces for the worst. To his people, he is a statesman. To his opponents, he is a traitor in a president's suit.

Portfolio Powers: Directs Slovenian political and military decisions, and can mobilize regional defense and coordinate international recognition.

Slobodan Milošević is the iron-willed President of Serbia and the most feared man in Yugoslavia. Once a cold-blooded bureaucrat, he rose to power by fanning the flames of Serbian nationalism and crushing Kosovo's autonomy. He presents himself as the protector of all Serbs, even those beyond Serbia's borders. Critics call him a manipulator of institutions and a threat to peace. His allies see him as the savior of a fragmented people.

Portfolio Powers: Controls the Serbian state apparatus, media, and de facto influence over the JNA, and can incite, escalate, or stabilize conflict depending on his aims.

Franjo Tuđman is the fiery President of Croatia and the intellectual force behind its independence. A former general and historian, he blends nationalism with strategic calculation, pushing for statehood while preparing for war. Tuđman rejects federal unity and sees the JNA as an occupying force. To Croats, he is a liberator; to Serbs, a threat. Every speech he gives sends shockwaves through the fragile federation.

*Portfolio Powers: C*ommands Croatian state apparatus and political messaging, and can authorize military mobilization and pursue foreign recognition.

Gojko Šušak is Tuđman's shadow operator: an exile turned powerbroker who channels diaspora funds and international arms to Croatia's defense. Quiet, ruthless, and well-connected, he is building the skeleton of a future Croatian military. His hands rarely appear in public, but his fingerprints are on every shipment and every backroom deal.

Portfolio Powers: Controls foreign arms procurement and diaspora financing, and can covertly supply forces or strike unofficial deals.



Jovan Rašković is the intellectual voice of the Croatian Serbs, torn between loyalty to Yugoslavia and fear of Croatian nationalism. A psychiatrist turned political leader, he has called for autonomy within Croatia and warned of renewed persecution. Though softer spoken than others, his speeches have radicalized his followers and sparked demands for Serb enclaves. If ignored, he may become a bridge to violence.

Portfolio Powers: Commands loyalty from Croatian Serb communities, and can inflame separatism or negotiate de-escalation.

Radovan Karadžić is a rather poetic politician, now the rising leader of the Bosnian Serbs. With charisma and cunning, he warns that Bosnia cannot survive without partition. Karadžić paints himself as a defender of the Serb people, but his rhetoric veers dangerously close to war. He is building parallel institutions, armed factions, and alliances with Belgrade, all while denying secessionist intent.

Portfolio Powers: Leads Bosnian Serb political and militia networks, and can destabilize Bosnia from within or entrench Serb enclaves.

Vojislav Šešelj is a loud, dangerous nationalist who commands no official army but leads an army of the willing. Head of the Serbian Radical Party, he recruits paramilitaries and agitates for a "Greater Serbia" through violence and fear. To many, he's a thug. To others, a patriot willing to say what others won't. Chaos is his currency.

Portfolio Powers: Commands irregular militias and public fear, and can conduct sabotage, intimidation, and false flag operations.



Alija Izetbegović is the philosophical President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, trying to hold his multi-ethnic republic together as the region unravels. A devout Muslim and former political prisoner, he champions pluralism, sovereignty, and peace but is surrounded by enemies and doubted by allies. As Bosnia inches toward an independence vote, he must choose between survival and idealism.

Portfolio Powers: Represents Bosniak interests and controls central government levers, and can propose national referenda or seek international backing.

Biljana Plavšić is a Bosnian Serb academic turned radical. Once a quiet professor, she now speaks in absolutes about ethnic destiny and Serb defense. She believes coexistence in Bosnia is a fantasy, and is prepared to prove it with action. Her transformation has shocked the international community, but has gained her a growing base.

Portfolio Powers: Shapes Bosnian Serb public opinion and mobilization, and can justify partition, incite resistance, or fuel propaganda.

Stjepan Kljuić is the leader of the Bosnian Croats and a crucial bridge between Sarajevo and Zagreb. He supports Bosnia's independence, but with strong cultural and political ties to Croatia. In public, he calls for unity. In private, he prepares for scenarios where that unity may shatter. He is both a potential peacemaker and a wildcard.

Portfolio Powers: Mediates Croat-Muslim relations and coordinates with Tuđman, and can form coalitions or fracture Bosnia's unity.

Lord Peter Carrington is the British diplomat tasked by the European Community with brokering peace in Yugoslavia. A veteran of complex negotiations, he approaches the crisis with cautious optimism and diplomatic patience. But time is not on his side, and the republics are slipping beyond the EC's influence. His mission is to find a settlement... before war does.

Portfolio Powers: Can convene peace talks and propose international solutions, and holds sway with European capitals and soft diplomatic pressure.

Cyrus Vance is the calm and seasoned UN Special Envoy assigned to observe and de-escalate the Yugoslav conflict. He brings with him the weight of the United Nations, but not yet its troops. His reports will shape the debate in New York, and his judgments will influence international opinion. Neutral in principle, decisive in practice.

Portfolio Powers:
Can initiate UN proposals, draft ceasefires, or pressure sides through diplomacy, and represents global eyes on the Balkans.

Oleg Grinevsky is the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, watching the crisis unfold as his own superpower crumbles. Once proud and powerful, his embassy now operates with limited instructions and uncertain authority. Grinevsky sees the Balkans as both a historic ally and a dangerous distraction. He chooses his words carefully, but listens to everything.

Portfolio Powers: Holds backchannel ties to Yugoslav leaders and intelligence services, and can influence arms flows or signal Soviet intentions.

Warren Zimmerman is the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, walking the line between diplomacy and disillusionment. He advocates for democratic reform and peaceful resolution, but privately sees the federation's collapse as inevitable. He must decide how—and when—the U.S. should recognize new states or intervene. The world is watching Washington.

Portfolio Powers: Channels U.S. diplomatic weight and press influence, and can offer recognition, sanctions, or subtle leverage.

Questions to Consider

- Should Slovenia and Croatia accept the European Community agreements or keep taking control (customs, borders, territorial defense)? If agreeing to pause, what clear steps will make the truce feasible and real?
- How do we protect Serbs in Croatia, all groups in Bosnia, and Albanians in Kosovo during this transition? Which tools fit the 1974 Yugoslav policies?
- How can we keep the conflict from moving to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia? Which methods work best (sanctions, border checks, peace treaties)?
- What limits on the Yugoslav People's Army and each republic's forces would stop the fighting? Who should help enforce this (The EC - European Community?) (The CSCE - Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) or (The UN)?
- What is important in intervention? Will it improve or worsen the current state? What factors affect the success of an intervention?

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