

UNISMUNC XI



Committee: Commission on Narcotic
Drugs (CND)

Topic: Synthetic Drugs and Dark Web
Trafficking: A New Age of Narcotics

Committee Type:
General Assembly

December 7, 2025



Chair: Madeleine Tyndale

Dias: Mar Pizarro

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Conference Schedule:

<i>Registration</i>	<i>8:00 am - 9:00 am</i>
<i>Opening Ceremonies</i>	<i>9:00 am - 10:00 am</i>
<i>Committee Session I</i>	<i>10:00 am - 12:00 pm</i>
<i>Lunch Break I</i>	<i>12:00 pm - 1:15 pm</i>
<i>Lunch Break II</i>	<i>1:15 pm - 2:30 pm</i>
<i>Committee Session II</i>	<i>2:30 pm - 5:30 pm</i>
<i>Closing Ceremonies</i>	<i>5:30 pm - 6:30 pm</i>

All times are in EST.

**Lunch may be staggered*

Conference Policies:

UNISMUNC XI aims to foster debate, bringing students the opportunity to explore a range of topics and encourage collaboration and teamwork between delegates. Be that as it may, UNIS stresses the importance of respectful language as UNISMUNC XI will see delegates debating topics that, at times, may be heated or passionate. MUNEX encourages you to remember to stay respectful and mindful of the other students around you. We are so excited about this conference and trust that no issues will arise. The following expectations and policies are designed so that every delegate gets the most out of UNISMUNC.

Attire: The Dress Code for UNISMUNC is formal Western business attire, and all delegates are expected to comply with this. Exceptions can be made for character purposes in crisis committees at the discretion of the chair. If you have an idea for an outfit for a crisis committee that does not fall into the parameters of traditional Western business attire, please ask your chair for permission before wearing the outfit.

Committee Assignments: Committee assignments will be made on a first-come-first-served basis based on preference as communicated by the delegation's advisors (or individual delegates in the case of independent delegates), in order of receipt of preference. Before being assigned to a committee, payment must be received. If payment is not submitted in a timely manner, delegations face the risk of not receiving committee assignments of their choice.

Expectations in Committee:

As you engage in debates, we ask that delegates maintain politeness and respect at all times. While we recognize that you are representing your country's views, it is essential to express these perspectives without crossing the line into disrespectful or confrontational behavior.

Please respect one another when delegates are giving speeches. Only one delegate may speak at a time during moderated caucuses. To speak during a moderated caucus, you must raise your placard and wait to be recognized by the chair. During speeches, no ad hominem attacks will be allowed, should they occur, the subject will have the right to reply. Remember to be cognizant of your words and actions, and to listen to everyone's views and positions.

The Committee Chairs and Secretariat members are responsible for determining disruptive behavior.

Examples of disrespectful behavior may include but are not limited to:

- Speaking without being recognized,
- Use of cell phones,
- Note-passing unrelated to the committee,
- Use of technology when not allowed,
- Verbal, physical, or sexual harassment of other delegates.

The pre-writing of any resolution/directive clauses, crisis notes, or speeches is strictly forbidden and will be penalized. This does not include opening remarks. This does not include any writing during the lunch break, as UNISMUNC committees standardly operate with ‘working lunches’.

UNISMUNC has a zero-tolerance policy for any plagiarism. This includes position papers, speeches, and resolutions. Improper citation of quotes and references may result in disqualification from awards or further disciplinary action at the discretion of the chairs.

Pricing: Please see the registration section for more information. Details on committee assignments are below.

Spectators: Please be aware that UNISMUNC XI does not allow unregistered spectators. Student spectators are strictly prohibited. All advisors and delegates must be registered and pay the required fee(s). Non-compliance with this policy will result in exclusion from future invitations. We expect all participating delegations to respect this policy. The Secretariat reserves the right to have any unregistered spectators removed from committee chambers and escorted off of the premises if necessary, as they see fit.

Technology: All crisis committees are strictly no-tech. Neither laptops nor cell phones will be permitted during committee sessions in crisis committees.

General Assembly (GA) committees allow technology exclusively for the purpose of resolution writing. Delegates will be permitted to use their laptops to work on resolutions during unmoderated caucuses and outside of the committee chamber when allowed by the chair. It is, however, not permitted to use technology when a fellow delegate is speaking or during committee chambers during moderated caucuses. This includes your own speeches, so please write any notes by hand or have your opening remarks printed before the conference.

Awards Criteria: UNISMUNC Chairs, Diases, and, in the case of crisis committees, Crisis Directors will work together to holistically evaluate delegates based on their performance throughout the entire day of debate. This includes:

- speeches given during moderated caucuses,
- performance during unmoderated caucuses (not only making one's voice heard but also including everyone in the discussion),
- writing/presenting resolutions/directions, especially those that pass,
- in crisis committees, as well as the detail and sophistication of crisis arcs.

Letter From the Chair

Dear Delegates,

We are so excited to welcome you to the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (UNCND) Committee at UNISMUNC XI! Our names are Madeleine Tyndale and Mar Pizarro, and we are looking forward to serving as your chair and dias for this debate! We look forward to hearing your fruitful discussion on the courses of action to undertake the black market of synthetic drug production and dark web trafficking, along with the humanitarian implications of those actions.

My name is Madeleine Tyndale, and I will be your chair for this committee. I've been living in New York my whole life, and I'm a senior at UNIS, hosting my last UNISMUNC this year. I've participated in MUN for 4 years now, having gone to many conferences at Yale, Columbia and a few high school ones as well. I became deeply interested in the topic of synthetic drug production after presenting the economic implications of the market in Syria. Outside of MUN, I enjoy playing the guitar, crocheting, listening to music, watching F1, and traveling, having been to 27 countries now. I am very excited to chair this committee and feel free to reach out if you have any questions or music recommendations.

My name is Mar Pizarro, and I will be your dias for this committee. I've lived in Panama, Jordan, and now New York, where I'm a Senior at UNIS, hosting my first UNISMUNC this year. My MUN journey began in 4th grade in Panama, and I've since participated in conferences across the globe. While living in Jordan, which shares a border with Syria, I closely followed the news on synthetic drug trafficking, including drone strikes targeting smuggling routes and the broader impact. Witnessing these challenges firsthand deepened my interest in the humanitarian and security dimensions of this issue. Outside of MUN, I have been a passionate advocate for Syrian refugee education, an artist, an avid reader (Jane Austen forever!) and also an active member of the UNIS Debate Team. I'm looking forward to vibrant debates and innovative ideas. Feel free to chat with me about MUN, art, or your favorite books, I'd love to connect!

Best wishes,

Madeleine Tyndale (Chair)

26mtyndale@unis.org

Mar Pizarro (Dias)

26mpizarro@unis.org

A Brief Overview of the Committee

The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), established in 1946, serves as the primary policymaking body within the UN system for international drug control. It operates under the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), overseeing the implementation of global drug treaties and developing coordinated international responses to drug-related challenges. The CND is composed of 40 member states elected by ECOSOC for four-year terms, with balanced regional representation based on both geopolitical significance and the scale of drug issues faced in each region.

The CND was created when drug trafficking and addiction grew beyond what any single country could handle. As markets expanded across borders, nations required a central body to establish laws, enforce treaties, and coordinate efforts. Early on, the CND focused on plant-based drugs like opium, coca, and cannabis. Over time, its role expanded to cover chemical precursors, synthetic substances, and international cooperation on enforcement, prevention, and treatment. The Commission created the key agreements that still shape global drug policy: the 1961 Single Convention, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic. In recent years, the CND has focused more on synthetic drugs, chemical diversion, and online trafficking.

While the CND's early focus was on plant-based drugs like opium, cannabis, and coca, the emergence of synthetic drugs has shifted the Commission's work toward new challenges. It now plays a critical role in regulating precursor chemicals, scheduling emerging synthetic substances, and guiding cooperation on enforcement, public health, and treatment strategies. Its ability to coordinate real-time information sharing, establish global chemical controls, and update scheduling frameworks remains central to international efforts to combat rapidly evolving synthetic drug threats.

The March 2022 emergency session has been called as overdose deaths surge, synthetic production expands, and transnational trafficking adapts to new digital platforms. The scale of the crisis demands coordinated global action, making the CND's legal authority and diplomatic mechanisms essential for this session's work.

Committee Procedure

Moderated Caucuses are structured discussions where delegates sign themselves up to give short, regulated speeches. The speaking time and topic of discussion are set when the motion is proposed, and delegates take turns to speak.

Unmoderated Caucuses are divided between a regular unmoderated caucus and a gentleman's unmoderated caucus where everybody remains seated. A regular unmod entails a period free of structured, regulated debate, where delegates can mill about the committee and work with their blocs.

Some actions that are carried over from the usual committee procedure:

- Point of Order
- Point of Information
- Appeal to the Chair
- Suspension of Debate
- Adjournment of Debate
- Closure of Debate
- Roll Call Vote
- Set the Speaker's Time

Written Papers

Resolutions: A piece of writing that outlines possible solutions to a problem and allows the committee to take action. Hopefully towards the end of the committee blocs will work together to write a resolution that can be debated and possibly passed.

Working Papers: The drafts of resolutions, i.e. resolutions before they are voted on by the committee – committee blocs work together to write these, brainstorming and fully outlining detailed solutions to the issues at hand. Then, they are voted on and formally become resolutions.

Topic Background

Global Trends in Synthetic Drug Production:

Synthetic drugs have become one of the most significant challenges facing international drug control. Unlike plant-based narcotics, synthetic drugs do not require farmland or specific climates and can be produced almost anywhere with the necessary chemicals. This flexibility has allowed producers to expand quickly, adapting to enforcement efforts and shifting production as regulations change.

In recent years, the global supply of synthetic drugs has grown at an unprecedented rate. Fentanyl and its analogs have fueled a dramatic surge in overdose deaths, particularly in North America, where over 100,000 people died from drug overdoses in a single year between 2020 and 2021, with synthetic opioids driving the majority of fatalities. Precursor chemicals used to manufacture fentanyl, methamphetamine, and other synthetic substances are widely produced in chemical industries based in countries such as China and India. Criminal organizations operating in Mexico have become key players, using these precursors to manufacture fentanyl and methamphetamine on an industrial scale for distribution across the United States.

In Europe, domestic production of synthetic drugs continues to expand, especially in the Netherlands and Belgium, which have become major centers for MDMA and amphetamine manufacturing. These substances increasingly appear mixed with other street drugs, raising public health risks across the region. Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle remains one of the largest methamphetamine production zones, with output growing year after year. In Africa, both West and East African states are playing a growing role as transit hubs and consumer markets for synthetic drugs such as tramadol and methamphetamine. Meanwhile, countries like Brazil are experiencing a rise in domestic consumption and emerging production, while Syria has become a major producer of Captagon, which is now trafficked throughout the Middle East and Europe.

The global synthetic drug market continues to expand faster than international enforcement can respond. The ability to move production, alter chemical formulas, and quickly adapt to new restrictions has made synthetic drugs far more difficult to control than earlier generations of narcotics. As production grows in both scale and variety, and as trafficking networks reach new regions, synthetic drugs have become a global crisis requiring urgent international coordination.

Role of Dark Web and Digital Trafficking:

The growth of digital platforms has fundamentally changed how synthetic drugs are trafficked worldwide. Darknet markets, encrypted messaging apps, and cryptocurrency payments have made it easier for traffickers to reach global buyers while avoiding law enforcement. These tools allow drug sales to operate across borders with limited physical risk and fewer traditional trafficking routes.

From 2020 to 2022, Hydra Market has become the largest darknet marketplace for synthetic drugs in Eastern Europe and Russia. It offered a wide range of substances, including fentanyl analogs, mephedrone, counterfeit pills, and forged documents. Hydra relied on a dead-drop system that eliminated direct contact between buyers and sellers, while cryptocurrency payments made transactions harder to trace. By 2022, Hydra controlled the overwhelming majority of darknet-related crypto transactions globally.

After major Western markets like Silk Road, AlphaBay, and White House Market were dismantled, many vendors shifted to encrypted apps like Telegram, Signal, and peer-to-peer forums. This allowed smaller groups to continue selling synthetic opioids, novel psychoactive substances, counterfeit medications, and chemical variants that regularly change to stay ahead of regulation. In regions like Brazil, Colombia, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia, domestic darknet networks expanded to support both local sales and international exports. In Africa and the Middle East, emerging digital networks have been used to distribute tramadol, Captagon, and counterfeit pharmaceuticals, especially in areas with weak governance and ongoing conflict.

The decentralized nature of digital trafficking has made synthetic drug markets more resilient. As production expands, online networks have allowed synthetic drugs to reach more regions at lower risk, complicating enforcement and requiring new forms of international cooperation.

Economic and Social Reliances:

Many national economies have become increasingly tied to drug production and trafficking, especially during financial crises. In some regions, the drug trade has provided both formal and informal income where legal economies have struggled. In Mexico, cartels have directly employed hundreds of thousands, with millions more indirectly reliant. In certain northern areas, up to 60 percent of local economic activity is linked to the trade. In Colombia,

cocaine once made up 7 to 10 percent of national GDP in the 1980s, supporting farmers, armed groups, and rural communities. Government crackdowns led to major economic disruption as income vanished. Peru faced similar issues in the 1990s, when coca eradication displaced around 200,000 farming families, forcing many deeper into poverty and child labor.

During the 2008 global financial crisis, an estimated \$350 billion in drug profits were laundered into legitimate banks while legal credit markets froze, showing how deeply drug revenues are embedded in global finance. Economic downturns often fuel both drug production and consumption as unemployment drives more people into trafficking and drug use. Attempts to disrupt trafficking through darknet market shutdowns, such as operations Onymous, Silk Road, and Bayonet, have only caused temporary setbacks. Vendors quickly shift to encrypted platforms and decentralized networks that are harder to dismantle. As a result, takedowns rarely have long-term impacts on criminal organizations. In regions dependent on trafficking, enforcement campaigns have sometimes triggered unemployment, rising crime, and instability. Despite repeated enforcement, synthetic drug markets for fentanyl, methamphetamine, and other opioids continue to thrive and generate large profits.

The Narcostate Perspective:

A narcostate refers to a country where the government either directly profits from, protects, or turns a blind eye to significant portions of the economy driven by drug production, trafficking or related illicit activity. In these states, the line between state institutions and drug production or trafficking organizations is often blurred, with corruption, bribery and state complicity, enabling the drug trade to function with relative impunity. Narcostates are most commonly located in parts of South America, West Africa and increasingly parts of the Middle East. Some Southeast Asian nations have also experienced narco-infiltration, particularly in border regions tied to the Golden Triangle.

Many narcostate governments support international drug control publicly but see crackdowns on synthetic production and dark web markets as threats to economic and political stability. Synthetic drugs generate foreign currency, create jobs, and support certain parts of the economy during crises. Leaders argue that enforcement unfairly targets developing states, while consumer nations continue to fuel demand. They resist outside interventions that could expose corruption or disrupt internal power structures. While narcostates may endorse dark web

shutdowns diplomatically, their focus remains on physical production, adapting as enforcement changes.

The Producer State Perspective:

A producer state is a country where drug production plays a major role in the economy through cultivation, synthesis, or manufacturing, though the government does not directly profit or protect the trade. Unlike narcostates, producer states see drug production as a threat to national authority and stability. Weak enforcement, poverty, and limited state control allow these industries to operate. Producer states are found in Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, parts of South America, and Asian superpowers like China, India, and Iran.

Producer state governments continuously back international drug control but worry that crackdowns harm communities that rely on drug production. They argue that enforcement must be paired with development, jobs, and infrastructure. Poverty, weak governance, and foreign demand drive production, while consumer states fail to address their own consumption. Producer states support precursor regulation and dark web shutdowns, but view them as limited without addressing root causes. Though they endorse cooperation publicly, most struggle to fully eliminate production, allowing operations to adapt.

The Transit State Perspective:

A transit state signifies a country that serves as a corridor where drugs pass through on their way to consumer markets. These countries are not major producers or end consumers, but their location makes them essential links in global trafficking routes. Criminal groups exploit these states because of their weak borders, limited enforcement, corruption, and geographic advantage. Many transit states are located in Central America, parts of West and East Africa, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and North Africa.

Transit states generally support international drug control since trafficking fuels violence and corruption. Many lack the resources to enforce anti-trafficking efforts and call for international aid to improve border security and governance. While some acknowledge the economic role trafficking plays, they remain concerned about its long-term impact. Transit states stress that drug control must include development and poverty reduction. Though less involved in dark web markets, most support shutdowns to disrupt global networks.

The Consumer State Perspective:

A consumer state describes a country where drug consumption plays the central role in its involvement in the global drug trade. These countries are the final destination for both synthetic and plant-based drugs, often facing severe public health problems, addiction crises, and rising overdose deaths. Consumer states usually have large populations, high purchasing power, and advanced healthcare systems that allow the drug market to thrive. Most consumer states are located in North America, Western Europe, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and other developed economies in East Asia.

Consumer states strongly support crackdowns on synthetic production, precursors, and darknet markets. In places like the U.S., fentanyl overdoses fuel political pressure to target supply abroad. They push for stricter export controls, crypto tracking, and cross-border cooperation, while also expanding harm reduction and treatment programs. Producer and transit states criticize them for focusing on supply while failing to lower domestic demand, which remains high despite enforcement.

Current Situation

In March of 2022, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs gathered in an emergency session in response to the staggering escalation of synthetic drug production and distribution, and the resultant overdose deaths worldwide. Synthetic opioids, particularly fentanyl, now account for a majority of the 100,000 overdose deaths recorded in the United States over a 12-month period, marking the deadliest drug crisis in modern history. From 2020 to 2022, HydraNet, an Eastern European-based black market platform, was the largest drug-distributing platform, selling an estimated 66,000 kilograms of drugs, resulting in \$2 billion of revenue, remaining operational for the past 7 years. All of these contributors have aggregated and resulted in the deadliest drug crisis, especially considering that past frameworks, such as the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Trade, were designed for plant-based drugs and have yet to adapt to this new age of synthetic drug production and supply chain agility.

As CND delegates are culminating in the height of synthetic opioid distribution, they find themselves in a critical era of imperative decision-making: which processes and operations should be mandated to crack down on the production of drugs, but also what economic consequences will this hold for narcostates in the Global South that rely on this industry to keep their economy afloat.

In historical reality, on April 5th, 2022, the aforementioned epicenter of dark web trafficking of narcotics, Hydra Market, was taken down by American and German authorities, seizing website servers and cryptocurrency assets. While this tanked darknet drug distribution, primarily in Eurasian markets relying on Hydra Market, the long-term impact was null. The takedown of this darknet platform created a vacuum in the dark web field for drug distribution, but many competitors to Hydra filled this gap by mid-2022. Additionally, in recent months, countries like Syria, Nigeria and Honduras have begun to be more strict regarding cracking down on drug production and transit facilities; however, this has also hurt their economies.

However, as a reminder, this committee will take place in March 2022, before the recent advancements regarding the topic. As a result, this information should not be used directly in committee, but countries in the Eurasian region involved may use the information in decision-making.

Bloc Positions

Western Bloc

Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States

The Western Bloc includes a mix of countries that face both large-scale synthetic drug consumption and growing involvement in global trafficking networks. Many of these states have advanced healthcare systems and strong enforcement, which allows them to lead international efforts on precursor control, darknet monitoring, and harm reduction. Despite these resources, high domestic demand, evolving online trafficking, and increasing drug potency continue to strain their systems.

The United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy have each faced serious public health consequences from rising use of fentanyl, MDMA, and other synthetic substances. The United States and Canada have seen record overdose deaths, while European countries report steady increases in recreational use alongside growing darknet sales. Governments in these states have strengthened chemical regulations, expanded treatment programs, and invested in shutting down darknet markets. Even with these efforts, domestic demand continues to fuel production abroad.

Poland and Ukraine serve as transit routes for drugs moving between production centers and consumer markets. Poland has expanded border controls and regional cooperation to slow trafficking. Ukraine's conflict has weakened state control, making it easier for trafficking groups to exploit border gaps and move drugs using both physical and digital methods.

The Netherlands is the main producer state in the bloc and remains one of the largest sources of MDMA and amphetamines in Europe. Dutch labs supply both physical trafficking routes and darknet sales platforms. Enforcement efforts in the Netherlands have focused on controlling precursor chemicals, dismantling production labs, and cooperating with international partners to limit exports.

Latin American Bloc

Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Venezuela

The Latin American Bloc includes countries heavily involved in synthetic drug production, trafficking, and increasingly, digital drug markets. Many have long-standing ties to the drug trade, with some economies partially dependent on illicit revenues, while others continue to face challenges with corruption, enforcement gaps, and organized crime. The spread of darknet platforms and encrypted apps has allowed some groups to expand operations beyond traditional trafficking routes, blending physical smuggling with online distribution.

The narcostates, Mexico and Venezuela, remain deeply tied to synthetic drug networks. In Mexico, cartels produce fentanyl and methamphetamine at industrial scale using imported precursors, while growing involvement in darknet markets allows for global sales and financial laundering. In Venezuela, drug trafficking networks have become embedded in political and military institutions, with synthetic operations expanding as the state faces ongoing collapse and sanctions.

Transit states such as Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Cuba, Colombia, and Argentina serve as key corridors for moving synthetic drugs to North America and Europe. Limited border control, unstable governance, and high poverty levels allow criminal networks to manage cross-border movement while experimenting with digital payment systems and encrypted communications to facilitate trafficking.

Brazil acts as the bloc's stand alone producer state, with São Paulo developing as a hub for both synthetic drug manufacturing and darknet-based exports. Authorities continue efforts to dismantle domestic labs and tighten precursor controls, though online sales and export operations have steadily grown.

Asian Bloc

Afghanistan, China, India, Japan, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam

The Asian Bloc brings together a wide range of countries deeply involved in both synthetic drug production and digital trafficking networks. Several states supply chemical precursors, others serve as emerging consumer markets or trafficking routes, and many are seeing rapid growth in darknet activity through encrypted platforms and cryptocurrency

transactions. The mix of physical manufacturing, chemical diversion, and evolving online trade has made the region central to the global synthetic drug crisis, while enforcement capacity and regulatory approaches vary widely.

Afghanistan is a narcostate where synthetic drug trafficking has expanded alongside opium networks, fueled by political instability. China remains the leading producer of chemical precursors for synthetic opioids and methamphetamine, while India continues to supply large volumes of precursor chemicals, facing ongoing diversion challenges. Thailand produces significant methamphetamine quantities in the Golden Triangle for both regional and international markets. Pakistan and the Philippines have both seen growing synthetic drug production, with the Philippines increasingly tied to darknet exports.

Vietnam functions as a transit state moving synthetic drugs through Southeast Asia into broader global networks. Russia faces widespread domestic use of synthetic opioids, mephedrone, and NPS, previously supported by large-scale darknet platforms. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are consumer states seeing rising stimulant and NPS use, while also participating in international cooperation on digital enforcement and precursor regulation.

African and Middle Eastern Bloc

Egypt, Ghana, Iran, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates

This region hosts countries involved in varying parts of the synthetic drug trade. Many of these states have become important hubs for production, transit, or financial flows, while others face growing challenges linked to political instability, weak enforcement, and the rise of digital trafficking networks. The expansion of darknet platforms, encrypted communication, and crypto-based payments has allowed trafficking groups in the region to strengthen their operations while avoiding traditional enforcement methods.

Syria and Nigeria function as narcostates where synthetic drug networks have become deeply embedded within political and criminal structures. In Syria, Captagon production has grown rapidly, with large volumes smuggled into the Gulf and Europe. Nigeria has become a key site for the production and trafficking of synthetic opioids, tramadol, and other substances, with drug profits contributing to both organized crime and corruption.

Iran serves as a producer state in this committee, where synthetic drug production has increased in recent years, particularly for methamphetamine. While authorities have conducted

enforcement operations and targeted production sites, chemical diversion and illicit manufacturing continue to supply both regional and international markets.

Transit states such as the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and Ghana serve as important routes for moving synthetic drugs into Europe, the Middle East, and global markets. These countries face ongoing challenges with border enforcement, maritime trafficking, and financial oversight. Trafficking groups often use advanced digital payment systems, online marketplaces, and encrypted platforms to move both drugs and money across borders with limited risk.

Questions to Consider:

1. How can international enforcement adapt to the growing overlap between physical trafficking routes and decentralized digital platforms like darknet markets and encrypted apps?
2. To what extent should global drug control efforts balance supply-side crackdowns with addressing persistent consumer demand that continues to fuel synthetic drug production?
3. How can narcostates and economically vulnerable regions be engaged in meaningful cooperation when their political or financial interests may directly depend on synthetic drug revenues?
4. What international frameworks or new mechanisms are needed to improve real-time information sharing on precursor chemical diversion, darknet market activity, and emerging synthetic substances?
5. How can global financial regulations be strengthened to disrupt the role of cryptocurrencies, money laundering, and digital payment systems that enable synthetic drug trafficking at scale?

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