Threat Assessment and Management in K-12 Settings
Nassau County BOCES
September 23rd and October 13th, 2022

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Outline of Presentation

1. Affective and Predatory Modes of Violence
2. Biopsychosocial Factors Associated with Violence in Juveniles
3. Differences between Risk and Threat Assessment
4. Warning Behaviors for Targeted Violence
5. Implementation of Threat Assessment Management Team
6. Risk Assessment – Structured Professional Judgment
7. Case Practice/Samples

There is no “profile” of a student attacker

National Institute of Justice • Strengthen Science • Advance Justice
August 2022 NCJ 305045

1. Most people who commit a mass shooting are in crisis leading up to it and are likely to leak their plans to others, presenting opportunities for intervention.
2. Everyone can help prevent school mass shootings.
3. Threat assessment is a promising prevention strategy to assess and respond to mass shooting threats, as well as other threats of violence by students.
4. Individuals who commit a school shooting are most likely to obtain a weapon by theft from a family member, indicating a need for more secure firearm storage practices.
5. The overwhelming majority of individuals who commit K-12 mass shootings struggle with various aspects of mental well-being.

New Jersey

- Bill A4075/3229 AcsAaAca (ACS/2R)
- Session 2022 – 2023 (signed into law 8/1/22 – unanimous passage in legislature)
- Requires all public school districts to create school-based threat assessment teams to help identify and assess students at risk of committing violent acts or other harmful activity.
  - Need to be in place by the start of the 2023-24 school year.
- TAT required to multidisciplinary and include to the extent possible a school psychologist, counselor or social worker, a teacher, an administrator, and a school resource officer or school employee who serves as a liaison to law enforcement.
- Training must ensure that threat assessments don't have a disparate impact on students based on their race, ethnicity, homelessness status, religious belief, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation and socioeconomic status.

Which states require in-school threat assessment teams?

According to the National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE)'s State Policy Database, threat assessment is required by law in:


- 18 states
- encouraged in five states
- non-codified policy in 16 states

New York, 2022

- Executive Order 18 (signed on or about 8/18/22)
- 10 million dollars to Requiring Each County and the City of New York to Develop Plans to Confront Domestic Terrorism, Including Racially and Ethnically-Motivated Violence
  - Does not include K-12 settings

Incident Statistics


Active Shooter Incidents 2017–2021



FBI Active Shooter Criteria


1. **Shootings occurring at more than one location**
2. **Shootings where the shooter's actions were not the result of another criminal act**
3. **Shootings resulting in a mass illing4**
4. **Shootings indicating apparent spontaneity by the shooter**
5. **Shootings where the shooter appeared to methodically search for potential victims**
6. **Shootings that appeared focused on injury to people, not buildings or objects**

Active Shooter Incidents in the United States, 2021, United States Department of Justice, FBI



Active Shooter Incidents in the United States, 2021, United States Department of Justice, FBI

Active Shooter Incidents 2017–2021 Total Killed and Wounded



By the Numbers, a Comparison of 2020 vs. 2021 Statistics

2020		2021
40 in 19 states	Total Incidents	61 in 30 states*
164 38 killed 126 wounded	Casualties (Excluding Shooters)	243 103 killed 140 wounded
1	Law Enforcement Officers Killed	2
11	Law Enforcement Officers Wounded	5
5	Met "Mass Killing" Definition	12
8	Incidents Where Law Enforcement Engaged Shooters	17
42 35 male 3 female 4 unspecified	Shooters / Gender	61 60 male 1 female
1	Shooters Wore Body Armor	2
7	Shooters Committed Suicide	11
4	Shooters Killed by Law Enforcement	14
2	Shooters Killed by Citizen	4
24 5 at large	Shooters Apprehended by Law Enforcement	30** 1 at large

= *Decreased metrics*
= *Increased metrics*

** Two incidents occurred in two states*
***One shooter was killed in a vehicle crash and does not fit into any other shooter-resolution categories*

PROTECTING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS: A U.S. SECRET SERVICE ANALYSIS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE (2019)
U.S. Department of Homeland Security UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
National Threat Assessment Center

- 2008 to 2017 (*Targeted school violence) N=41 (January 2008 – December 2017)*

(i) a current or recently former K-12 school student

(ii) purposefully used a weapon

(iii) to cause physical injury to, or the death of, at least one other student and/or school employee


(iv) in or on the immediate property of the school (v) while targeting in advance one or more specific and/or random student(s) and/or employee(s).

Excluded: perpetrator could not be identified, incidents related to gang violence, drug violence, or other incidents with a strong suggestion of a separate criminal nexus, violence from the surrounding community that spilled onto school property by happenstance, spontaneous acts, such as those that were the immediate result of an unplanned fight or other sudden confrontation.

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
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Timing of the Attacks

Before School	10 (24%)
Morning Classroom Hours	20 (51%)
During Lunch	3 (7%)
Afternoon Classroom Hours	6 (15%)
Outside School Hours	1 (2%)

DURATION OF THE ATTACKS




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
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
- 41 incidents of targeted school violence 1/08 – 12/17


	School Officer Response Time*	Outside LE Notification	Outside LE Response Time
1 min or less	12 (29%)	16 (39%)	1 (2%)
>1 to 5 min	3 (7%)	12 (29%)	13 (32%)
>5 to 10 min	2 (5%)	4 (10%)	11 (27%)
>10 to 15 min	—	5 (12%)	4 (10%)
>15 min	—	—	3 (7%)
Not Applicable	21 (51%)**	—	—
Not Found	3 (7%)	4 (10%)	9 (22%)

*Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding
** Includes those schools without officers assingned, assigned officers off duty at the time, or cases in which the SROs were targeted.



Quick Look: 220 Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 - 2016
Casualties Per Year
250
200
150
100
50
0
7
43
29
51
20
51
46
126
63
143
86
84
208
86
97
134
212
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017


Active Shooter Incidents 2016-2020
Total Casualty Count
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
734*
214
225
258
164
Average 2016-2019:
358 per year
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
*2017 includes the Route 91 Harvest Festival in Las Vegas, Nevada (56 killed, 489 wounded)


Quick Look: 220 Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 - 2016
Casualty Breakdown Per Year
2000 7 Total: 7
2001 12 31 43
2002 11 18 29
2003 29 22 51
2004 14 6 20
2005 24 27 51
2006 23 23 46
2007 69 57 126
2008 29 34 63
2009 65 78 143
2010 37 49 86
2011 32 52 84
2012 90 118 208
2013 44 42 86
2014 36 61 97
2015 56 78 134
2016 83 129 212
0 50 100 150 200 250
Key
Killed: 661
Wounded: 825
Total: 1,486
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017



Nassau County, BOCES 9/23/22 & 10/13/22


Quick Look: 220 Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 - 2016
Location Categories
EDUCATION
Schools (Pre-K to 12), 15% (33)
Institutions of Higher Education, 6.8% (15)
GOVERNMENT
Other Government Properties, 7.3% (16)
Military, 3.2% (7)
EDUCATION, 21.8% (48)
COMMERCE, 43.2% (95)
OPEN SPACE, 13.2% (29)
GOVERNMENT, 10.5% (23)
RESIDENCES, 5% (11)
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, 2.7% (6)
HOUSES OF WORSHIP, 3.6% (8)
COMMERCE
Businesses, Open to pedestrian traffic, 25.5% (56)
Malls, 4.5% (10)
Businesses, Closed to pedestrian traffic, 13.2% (29)
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017

School Settings
School Shooters, O'Toole, 2000

- Subjects demonstrate some type of warning behaviors
- Threats, innuendoes, journal entries, videotaping
- Attempted to persuade family or others to help with preparations
- Common themes include:
  - Violence
  - Hopelessness
  - Despair
  - Hatred

Affective and Predatory Modes of Violence

What is violence?

- An intentional act of aggression toward another human being that physically injures, or is likely to physically injure, that human being.

Affective & Predatory Modes of Violence

- Intense ANS arousal
- Subjective experience of emotion
- Reactive and immediate violence
- Internal or External threat
- Goal is threat reduction

- Minimal or no ANS
- No conscious emotion
- Planned and purposeful
- No or minimal threat
- Many goals

Affective and Predatory (continued)

- Rapid displacement of target
- Time-limited behavior
- Preceded by public posturing
- Primarily emotional
- Heightened and diffuse awareness

- No target displacement
- No time limit to behavior
- Preceded by private ritual
- Primarily cognitive-conative
- Focused awareness

Categorizing Aggressive Acts

- Affective: "hot, short fuse"
  - Impulsive, unplanned, reactive
  - Purpose: to reduce a perceived immediate "threat" (of abandonment, rejection, etc.)
- Predatory: "cold blooded"
  - Premeditated, controlled, instrumental, targeted, intended
  - Purpose: power, dominance, gratification, revenge, notoriety, control, etc.

Biopsychosocial Factors Associated with Violence among Juveniles

Key #1

- Violence/Aggression and Development
  - Very common
  - Rates of criminal activity during adolescence are so high that it is statistically normative.
  - A small portion of juveniles are responsible for a majority of violent offenses

Key #2


- Early Onset >>>> Chronic Course
  - Fifty percent of youth continued violent behavior into adulthood when the onset was prior to 11 years of age.
  - Serious persistent delinquency begins early in childhood.
  - Thirty percent of youth continued violent behavior into adulthood when the onset was between 11 – 13 years of age.
  - An estimated 10% of youth continued violent behavior into adulthood when the onset was during adolescence.

Key #3

- Psychological maturity ≠ age, physical maturity, seriousness of crime.


Key #4

- Less stable personality patterns and traits.
  - Remorse and empathy limitations



Key #5

- Current offense ≠ prediction of recidivism


Dynamic
risk factors that can change
change rapidly
remain unchanged for years
Acute
Stable
Alcohol Intoxication
Recent Loss of Job
Cognitive Distortions
Sexual Deviancy
can't change with any intervention
Static Factors
Gender
Age
Head Injury
Hx of violence
Victim Type

Relevant Diagnoses

- Conduct Disorder
  - Psychiatry base rate 2% – 16%
  - Convicted adolescents base rate 75% - 90%
- Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
  - Combination of ADHD and serious delinquent behavior are at a high risk for developing serious criminal careers into adulthood.
  - When conduct problems are controlled, hyperactivity not a good predictor of delinquent behavior.

Psychological Individual Correlates of Violence

- Male
- Childhood fighting
- Hyperactivity, withdrawn, aggressive
- Risk Taking/Impulsivity
- Substance Use Difficulties
- Anger Management problems
- Diverse criminal acts
- Lack of guilt or low capacity for empathy, Frick, et al., 2003
- Callous – unemotional traits, Frick, et al., 2003

Sociological Correlates of Violence

- Childhood history of maltreatment in home
- Early caregiver disruption
- Poor school achievement
- Harsh parenting
- Exposure to violence in home
- Poverty and social class/community disorganization
- Peer group endorsement of violence
- Peer rejection
- Media – small moderate effect
- Early antisocial influences
  - Drug availability
  - Criminogenic attitudes

Biological Correlates of Violence

- Left hemisphere damage
  - Verbal functioning
- Frontal lobe trauma
  - Self-control functions of the brain – frontal and prefrontal

Executive Functioning Deficits

- Self-control functions of the brain – frontal and prefrontal in particular is responsible for executive functioning
- Deficits in executive functioning and aggression have been found

Pathways of Juvenile Offending

- Life Course Persistent
- Adolescent Limited

Differences and Similarities between Threat and Risk Assessment

Threat Assessment, Goodrum et al., 2018

"The threat assessment process seeks to evaluate the likelihood a person will perpetrate "targeted violence" (i.e., toward a specific person or group), such as an assassination or a school shooting. In schools, threat assessment procedures seek to evaluate a student's risk of targeted violence and build a safety plan to support the student." (pp. 123).

Risk Assessment, Goodrum et al., 2018

"A risk assessment evaluates the risk and protective factors present in a person and evaluates the risk for general and specific forms of violence (e.g., intimate partner violence, stalking)." (pp. 123).

Risk v. Threat Assessment (Meloy, et al., 2011)

- Violence risk assessment has older provenance
- Risk assessment focuses on probability of violence and estimated for an individual based upon his/her comparison to a known group
- Typically a history of violence
- Classification of low, medium or high risk

Risk v. Threat Assessment (Meloy, et al., 2011)

- Threat assessment focuses on targeted violence by a subject of concern and encompasses a behavioral and profiling focus.
- Person of focus may have no history of violence.

Differences between TA and RA

- Operational context
- Dynamic emphasis
- Idiographic (case-driven) approach
- Very low base rates
- Risk management rather than prediction
- Subject and potential victim
- Predatory (instrumental, intended) violence
- Likely urgency

Threat Assessment Model

- We don't focus on *predicting* what the subject will do in the future. We focus on *managing risk* for what subject is **doing now.**
- We are not able to anticipate threats with certainty (Meloy, et al., 2014).
- We attempt to implement sound practices to identify and intervene with subjects as early as possible on the path toward violence (Cornell, 2010).

Threat Assessment Model

- Generally posits that targeted violence is deliberate, planned and well thought out versus expressive/reactive violence

- The progress occurs from ideation >> planning >> acquisition>> implementation (Deisinger et al., 2008).

Threat Assessment Model

- Pathway to violence is not linear
- Iterative such that the person can cycle between the pathway, contingent upon information gathered, increased desperation and monitoring.

Threat Assessment Model

- De-emphasizes:
  - Psychiatric Diagnoses
  - Static variables
  - Communicated threats

Implication for Threat Assessment, (Vossekuil, Fein and Berglund, 2015)

1. Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and often time discernible, process of thinking and behavior.
2. Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the individual, the situation, the setting, and the target.
3. An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mind-set is critical to successful threat assessment.

Implication for Threat Assessment, (Vossekuil, Fein and Berglund, 2015)

4. Effective threat assessment is based on facts rather than on characteristics or "traits."
5. An integrated systems approach should guide threat assessment inquires and investigations
6. The central question in a threat assessment investigation or inquiry is whether her person of interest poses a threat, not whether the person of interest made a threat.

What are vulnerabilities within threat assessment?

- Inductive (abductive) reasoning
  - One moves from particular facts about a case to a general principal
- Availability bias
  - Importance is judged by ease and emotional charge with which it comes to mind, not actual probability
- Predictable world bias
  - Tendency to see events as more predictable than they were (hindsight bias) or are (foresight bias)

Confirmatory Bias—how we seek to protect our beliefs

- We *notice* facts to support our beliefs
- We *overlook* facts that don't
- We *seek* information to support our beliefs
- We give *greater weight* to such information
- We *accept at face value* such information
- We are better able to *remember* such information

Additional Biases

- Google Bias
  - Tendency to not remember information is easily found online – (cell phones)
- Ikea Effect
  - Tendency to overvalue something that we put together
- Cheerleader Effect
  - Perception that people look more attractive in a group that in isolation

The low base rate dilemma

- **Predictive attempts will result in too many false positives due to low base rate for targeted violence**
- ***The Paradox: we will never know the violent acts we prevented***

Dynamic Factors for Targeted Violence

Warning Behaviors (Meloy, Hoffmann, Guldimann & James, BS&L, 2012; 30:256-279

1. Pathway
2. Fixation
3. Identification
4. Novel aggression
5. Energy burst
6. Leakage
7. Directly communicated threat
8. Last resort behavior

Warning Behaviors


- They are *accelerants*—focus on accelerating change
- Patterns of behavior rather than individual risk factors: *pattern analysis*
- Appear to correlate with targeted violence, but do they predict?

Pathway warning behavior

Any behavior that is part of research, planning, preparation, or implementation of an attack (Fein & Vossekuil, 1998, 1999; Calhoun & Weston, 2003)

Pathway to Targeted or Intended Violence

Adapted with permission from F.S. Calhoun and S.W. Weston (2003). Contemporary threat management: A practical guide for identifying, assessing and managing individuals of violent intent. © 2003 F.S. Calhoun and S.W. Weston. All rights reserved.



Grievance

- Loss
- Humiliation
- Anger
- Blame

Fixation warning behavior

Any behavior that indicates an increasingly pathological preoccupation with a person or a cause (Mullen et al., 2009). It is measured by: a) increasing perseveration on the person or cause; b) increasingly strident opinion; c) increasingly negative characterization of the object of fixation; d) impact on the family of the object of fixation, if present and aware; e) angry emotional undertone. It typically causes deterioration of social and occupational functioning.

Identification warning behavior

Any behavior that indicates a psychological desire to be a "pseudocommando" (Dietz, 1986; Knoll, 2010), have a "warrior mentality" (Hempel et al., 1999), closely associate with weapons or other military or law enforcement paraphernalia, identify with previous attackers or assassins, or to identify oneself as an agent to advance a particular cause or belief system.

"A fanatic is never discouraged by the impossibility of his righteous mission."

Characteristics of Identification
Meloy, Mohandie, Knoll & Hoffman, 2015

1. Pseudo-commando
2. Warrior mentality
3. Close association with weaponry, law enforcement, military paraphernalia
4. Identify with other attackers or assassins
5. Become an agent to advance a particular cause or belief system

Weapon Access and Background

- What is the subject's familiarity with weapons?
- Do they possess weapons?
- Do they seek out weapons?
- Frequency of attending gun shows
- Do they collect/stockpile ammunition
- Do they carry/conceal weapons?
- Have they made recent purchases?

Weapon Access and Background

- Internet searches for weapons?
- Does the subject of interest purchase parts from internet sites "swap meet" sites; etc., craigslist
- Is the person purchasing attire/clothing related to identification or "pseudo-commando" goals
- Does the subject of interest have relatives who possess guns?

Novel aggression warning behavior

An act of violence which appears unrelated to any targeted violence pathway warning behavior which is committed for the first time. Such behaviors may be utilized to test the *ability* (de Becker, JACA) of the subject to actually do a violent act, may be a measure of *response tendency*, the motivation to act on the environment (Hull, 1952), a *behavioral tryout* (MacCulloch, Snowden, Wood & Mills, 1983), or *proof of kill* (G. Deisinger, personal communication, 2011).

Elliot Rodger, July 2011
Novel Aggression Possible

July 2011 (quotes from Manifesto, "My Twisted World")

While in line at Starbucks he views a couple "kissing passionately."

Described himself as "livid with envious hatred."

Follows them to their car and splashed coffee all over them.

Quickly ran away in fear/drove off, "shaking with rage-fueled excitement . . ." (p. 87).

"I had never struck back at my enemies before, and I felt a small sense of spiteful gratification for doing so . . . I wanted to do horrible things to that couple. I wanted to inflict pain on all young couples. It was around this point in my life that I realized I was capable of doing such things. I would happily do such things. I was capable of killing them, and I wanted to. I wanted to kill them slowly, to strip the skins off their flesh. . . . They deserve it." (p. 87)

Energy burst warning behavior

An increase in the frequency or variety of any noted activities related to the target, even if the activities themselves are relatively innocuous, usually in the days or weeks before the attack (Odgers et al., 2009).

Energy Burst Warning Behavior, January 7-8, 2011

- Drops off 35 mm film at Walgreen's evening of Jan. 7 before midnight
- Checks into Motel 6 shortly after midnight
- Searches web for "assassins" and "lethal injection"
- 0219 picks up photos, makes a purchase
- Leaves telephone message with friend
- 0412 posts to Myspace page photo of Glock 19 and words, "Goodbye friends."
- 0600 visits Walmart and Circle K stores

Energy Burst (cont'd)

- Unable to purchase ammunition at first Walmart, purchases 9 mm full metal jacket ammo and diaper bag at 0727
- Stopped by police officer for running a red light
- Confronted by father at home, runs away
- Returns to Circle K, gets a cab, goes to supermarket where he insists on getting correct change for cab ride

Energy Burst (cont.)

- Sixteen minutes later, opens fire at 10:10, killing 6 and wounding 13 people
- Tackled by 3 senior citizens when he attempts to reload
- Two photos released are Loughner holding a 9 mm Glock next to his crotch and buttocks while wearing a red G string
- Came to mass murder with 31 rounds in pistol, two 15 round magazines in pocket, buck knife, and his driver's license, credit card, and money in a plastic bag

Leakage warning behavior

The communication to a third party of an intent to do harm to a target through an attack (Meloy & O'Toole, Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 29:513-527, 2011).


Leakage Warning Behaviors (Hendrix, et al., 2022)

- Tip lines
- Information collected over 43 months by a state-operated tip (N = 6,006).
- Tips were accounted for by 126 Oregon schools (approximately 11% of all schools in the state).
- Main focus was on 228 tips reporting one or more persons for mass school violence leakage or for an individual's direct or indirect communication of an intent or desire to kill multiple individuals at school.

Leakage Warning Behaviors (Hendrix, et al., 2022)

Figure 1

Percentage of Leakage Events by Timeslot



Leakage Warning Behaviors (Hendrix, et al., 2022)

Table 3

Locations of Where Leakage Events Occurred

Leakage locations	% of all leakage
At school	55
In a virtual setting	31
Not specified	6
At the bus stop or on the school bus	5
Somewhere outside of school	3
If leakage occurred in a virtual environment ($N = 71$)	
Snapchat	38
Instagram	23
Text	14
Facebook	13
All other virtual environments	12

Leakage Warning Behaviors (Hendrix, et al., 2022)

Table 4

Percentage of Tips by Leakage Category

Leakage type	% of all leakage
Directly communicated threat	57
Rumored threat	19
Symbolic threat	9
Desire to harm	7
Veiled threat	5
Publicly written threat	3

Leakage Warning Behaviors (Hendrix, et al., 2022)

Table 5
Details Offered in Symbolic Threat Tips (N = 21)

Details offered	% of all symbolic threats
School shooter ideation: Telling jokes about a school shooting	48
School shooter ideation: Celebrating or sympathizing with school shooters	43
Celebrating or glorifying other types of violence	29
Fighting or other forms of violence	19
Problems with peers	14
Self-harm/suicide ideation	14
Firearm access	14
Suspected mental illness	14
Fascination/interest in firearms	10
Family issues	10
Hates school	5
Drugs and alcohol use	5
Suspicious behavior	5

Leakage Warning Behaviors (Hendrix, et al., 2022)

Table 6
Details About the Person Being Reported, Method of Violence, and Aggravating Factors

Details	% of all leakage
Single or multiple persons by gender	
Single male student	61
Single student, gender not specified	15
Not specified or unknown	13
Single female student	6
Multiple students, gender not specified	3
Multiple male students	2
Known or knowable to reporter	75
Method of violence threatened or implied	
Bring firearm/shoot individuals/"shoot up" the school	82
Attack the school (method unspecified)	13
Blow up or bomb the school	6
Set the school on fire	2
Aggravating factors	
Specific date mentioned	35
Has made the threat more than once	29
Believed to have access to a firearm	17
History of violent or aggressive behavior	11
Hitlist or targeted individuals mentioned	9
Other details about the plan mentioned	8
Alleged mental illness or mental health issues	6
Suicide ideation or self-harm	5
Specific time mentioned	4
Has been bullied	3

Leakage Warning Behaviors (Hendrix, et al., 2022)

Table 8

School Responses to the Leakage

School response	% of all leakage
Police called	42
Student met with an administrator	26
Parents called for student who leaked	21
Ongoing investigation	20
Suspension of student	10
Student met with school psychologist/social worker/counselor	7
Discipline action taken (unspecified)	6
Parents are called for students who were threatened	5
Referral Written	3
Referral to Disciplinary Panel	2
Expulsion of student	1

Leakage Warning Behaviors

- 1990 to 2014, 58% engaged in some form of leakage (Silver, Horgan, & Gill, 2018)
- 2000 to 2013 FBI study of active shooters, 56% openly expressed their violent thoughts or intent prior to attacking (Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018)

Leakage Warning Behaviors

- Research suggests - people are often hesitant to report potential mass shooters to law enforcement, even if they observe concerning behavior (Madfis, 2014a; Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018)
- "bystander intervention" increases sense of responbility on self
- Reporting of stranger is easier than known persons

Lankford, 2019

- N=15 (3/98 – 2/18)
- Examined leakage, reports to law enforcement (LE) and weapon acquisition
  1. leakage of violent thoughts/intent in general
  2. leakage of specific interest in mass killing
  3. whether the mass shooter's concerning behavior reported to LE prior to attack
  4. whether concerns about the mass shooter's specific interest in homicide (i.e., killing people) had been reported to LE

Lankford, 2019

- Leakage of violent thoughts/intent (87%)
- Leakage of specific interest in mass killing (80%)
- Concerning behavior reported to LE (80%)
- Concerning interest in homicide reported LE (47%)
- Firearms in mass shooting acquired legally (80%)

Leakage and Reports to LE Lankford, 2019

1. Prevention appears possible in the vast majority of cases
2. Public should be educated, encouraged, and pressured to report leakage and warning signs to LE
3. LE needs to be educated and trained on how to more effectively investigate potential threats
4. Individuals who have admitted homicidal or suicidal thoughts or interest in committing mass shootings should be prohibited from purchasing or possessing firearms

Last resort warning behavior

Evidence of a violent "time/action imperative" (Mohandie & Duffy, 1999). Increasing desperation or distress through declaration in word or deed, forcing the individual into a position of last resort. There is no alternative other than violence, and the consequences are justified (de Becker, 1997). The subject feels trapped (S. White, personal communication).


Last resort warning behavior

Evidence of a violent "time/action imperative" (Mohandie & Duffy, 1999). Increasing desperation or distress through declaration in word or deed, forcing the individual into a position of last resort. There is no alternative other than violence, and the consequences are justified (de Becker, 1997). The subject feels trapped (S. White, personal communication).

Directly communicated threat warning behavior

The communication of a direct threat to the target or law enforcement beforehand. A threat is a written or oral communication that implicitly or explicitly states a wish or intent to damage, injure, or kill the target, or individuals symbolically or actually associated with the target.

Developing Scenarios
Douglas, et al., 2013



Implementation of Threat Assessment and Management

Nassau County, BOCES 9/23/22 & 10/13/22

There is no cook-book approach!

Threat Assessment and Management

Goals include:

1. Piece together information
2. Redirect subject of interest's motion away from the path toward violence.
3. Engage in a non-adversarial manner.
4. Involves engaging subject of interest.
5. Casts a wide net.
6. Behavior of team does not exacerbate the situation.

Threat Management Team Make-Up

1. Case Manager/Team Leader
2. Administrative Staff
3. Teachers/Counselors
4. Law Enforcement - Community
5. Security
   - Liaison with Police

Threat Management Team Make-Up

6. External referral sources for Threat Assessment
7. Mental Health Professional
8. Attorney
   - In-House/Retained externally if needed
9. Ad-hoc members, as needed

Threat Assessment Team

(Van der Meer and & Diekhuis, 2014)

- ✓ Each person/member on the team should have an identified task/role
- ✓ Documentation guidelines
- ✓ Legal issues
- ✓ Developing timelines
  - ✓ Constantly monitored and logged/altered with specific dates/times
- ✓ Managing information
  - ✓ Ensure validity, reliability
  - ✓ Maintain position of healthy skepticism
- ✓ Referral source educated about providing all information
  - ✓ silo effect

Threat Assessment/Interview

(Van der Meer and & Diekhuis, 2014)

- Interview – Tool for Gathering Information
  - Reasons for interviewing
    - Collect reliable information on risk and protective factors
    - Substantiate or contradict prior identified risk and protective factors
    - Finding collateral information from interviewee; examine other sources
    - Gather understanding of what is driving the interviewee's behavior
    - Provide information on what the interviewee can and cannot do – violate law
    - Most persons appear willing to talk

Threat Assessment/Interview

(Van der Meer and & Diekhuis, 2014)

- Interview – Tool for Gathering Information
  - Understanding the Interviewee
    - Explain at the outset the reason and importance for the interview
    - Utilize objective, neutral, non-judgmental stance
    - See the situation through their eyes
    - Persons who demonstrate paranoid delusions or have paranoid personality traits – reluctant to participate in interview process
    - Home visit, or within their environment, if safe and permissible

Threat Assessment/Interview

(Van der Meer and & Diekhuis, 2014)

- Interview – Tool for Gathering Information
  - Preparing for the interview
    - Detailed knowledge of facts, case and timeline
    - Identification of relevant behavioral and personality features of interviewee
    - Cultural implications for assessment (Hart, 2016; Olver, 2016; Weiss and Rosenfeld, 2012)
    - Ensure personal safety during interview
    - Awareness that personal safety is vulnerable if questions are aimed at their personal frustration, stressors and other negative matters
    - Possibly have two interviewers, if available
    - Tape recording to ensure accuracy – can be explained that it is to prevent confusion about what they said, although most persons are very reluctant to consent to recording

Threat Assessment
Cultural Considerations (Hart, 2016)

1. Identify potential diversity issues that may bias evaluator.
2. When potential diversity issues exist, evaluator is responsible for education about impact the diversity will have on assessment process (lit. review, colleagues).
3. Decline case if do not have requisite skills; decline to use instrument/assessment procedures, cautionary statements, identifying limitations.

Threat Assessment-Cultural Considerations (Weiss and Rosenfeld, 2012)

1. Consider one's own cultural competence prior to accepting a referral.
2. Level of acculturation should be considered when administering psychological tests to an individual from another culture.
3. If interpreters are used, they must be objective, well trained, and provide a verbatim translation of the evaluatee's responses.

Threat Assessment-Cultural Considerations (Weiss and Rosenfeld, 2012)

4. Evaluators must consider the reliability and validity of measures used with respect to an evaluatee's group membership.


5. The evaluator must acknowledge when the psychometric challenges for use of a measure are insurmountable. If the lack of reliability and validity data prohibit the use of a measure, the evaluator may be forced to rely on other sources (e.g., clinical and collateral interviews, medical and criminal justice records).

Assessment → Identify risk and threat factors
How they manifest in person
How each is relevant

Communication → Low, moderate, high
Intensity of Management
Tailored interventions based on risk and threat factors

Management & Treatment → Application of risk and threat management strategies
Reassessment on regular intervals

Strategy Planning



Scenario Planning, Douglas, et al., 2013

- Develop scenarios
- What are the "possible futures?"

- Evaluate scenarios
- Which "possible futures" most deserve attention?

- Use scenarios to plan
- Which strategies, tactics, and logistics are needed?

Ongoing Training

Technical vs. Adaptive Solutions
Goodrum, et al., 2018

- Technical solutions are addressed with few small adjustments by one authority and within organizational boundaries (e.g., metal detector, video surveillance system).

Ongoing Training

Technical vs. Adaptive Solutions
Goodrum, et al., 2018

- Adaptive solutions include number ongoing TA trainings, assessing more students for threats, and increasing the number of indicators on the TAT screener.

Technical vs. Adaptive Solutions Goodrum, et al., 2018

- Adaptive solutions require multiple authorities, crossover organizational boundaries (e.g., schools, mental health, and criminal justice) but elicit emotional responses, and face resistance.

- Adaptive solutions require that school officials share information to promote a "culture of safety," adopt continuous improvements to threat assessment, monitor quality of threat assessment and engage in safety planning implementation process.

1. There is no profile of a student attacker, nor is there a profile for the type of school that has been targeted.
2. Attackers usually had multiple motives, the most common involving a grievance with classmates.
    1. 83% male; 17% female

3. **Most attackers used firearms, and firearms were most often acquired from the home.**
4. **Most attackers had experienced psychological, behavioral, or developmental symptoms.**

5. Half of the attackers had interests in violent topics.
6. All attackers experienced social stressors involving their relationships with peers and/or romantic partners.

7. **Nearly every attacker experienced negative home life factors.**
8. **Most attackers had a history of school disciplinary actions, and many had prior contact with law enforcement.**

9. **All attackers exhibited concerning behaviors.**
   - **Most elicited concern from others, and most communicated their intent to attack.**

Comprehensive Student Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG)

- Step 1:

1. TAT evaluates the threat by interviewing subject of interest
2. Document/note exact content of the threat
3. What have others observed regarding nature of threat and behavior
4. Gather information on the circumstances in which the threat was made
5. What are the circumstances in which threat was made – situational context
6. Is there communication of intent to harm or behavior suggesting intent to harm
7. In most cases, the threatening student is interviewed and given an opportunity to explain what he or she meant by the threatening statement or behavior.

Comprehensive Student Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG)

- Step 2:

1. All available information is used by the school teams to consider the credibility and seriousness of the threat.
2. Humor, rhetoric, frustration, reactive situation that can be easily resolved
3. Does person retract and then apologize for behavior with consistent de-escalation

Comprehensive Student Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG)

- **Step 3: TAT respond to a substantive threat**
  1. Take precaution to protect individual
  2. Warn intended victim and family
  3. Explore manners to resolve conflict
  4. Disciplinary procedures, when necessary

Comprehensive Student Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG

- **Step 4: Serious substantive threats.**
  1. Student screened for mental health services or counseling.
  2. Potential law enforcement investigation of the case
  3. Closer examination of probing/planning behavior
  4. Develop safety plan
  5. Potential target hardening

Comprehensive Student Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG)

- Step 5: Implementation/monitoring safety plan formulated
  1. Documentation
  2. Monitoring/surveillance of students
  3. Assess effectiveness of plan/tactics

Threat Assessment
School Violence Prevention (Cornell, 2020)

Limitations in Predicting Violence in School

1. Low base rate of ordinary acts of violence - extraordinarily lower base rate of mass violence makes the target even smaller "If the bullseye for homicide is miniscule, the bullseye for mass violence is microscopic." (pp. 239)

Threat Assessment
School Violence Prevention (Cornell, 2020)

Limitations in Predicting Violence in School

2. Perpetrators of mass violence are heterogeneous

Threat Assessment
School Violence Prevention (Cornell, 2020)

Limitations in Predicting Violence in School

3. Identification of reliable risk factors unlikely unless one subdivides the small group into even smaller groups. The microscopic bullseye must be fragmented into pieces that are placed on different targets

Threat Assessment
School Violence Prevention (Cornell, 2020)

Limitations in Predicting Violence in School

4. Barrier to research is that efforts to validate the accuracy of violence predictions are ethically constrained. It is not permissible to conduct a prospective study to test the accuracy

School Security Measures Post-Columbine

- King & Bracy, 2019
  - School Security Personnel – staff, teachers, aides, administrators – remained relatively stable from 1999 (85.4%) to 2015 (89.5%)
  - School Based Law Enforcement – including SRO – 1996/1997 (22%) to 2015/2016 (57%)
  - CCTV – in 1999 (19.4%) to 2015/2016 (80.6%)
    - Unless cameras monitored-less utility
  - Emergency Preparedness – 2015/2016 (94.6%) have drills on lock-down procedures
  - Active Shooter Drills - 2015/2016 (92%)

School Security Measures Post-Columbine

- Addington, 2018
  - Empirical support is lacking that any of these tactics alone or in combination is effective to prevent school shootings

School Security Measures Post-Columbine

- Jonson, 2017
- Belief that presence of an armed police officer on campus serves as a deterrent to a potential school shooter - neutralize the threat of a school shooter
- As of 2019; little empirical evidence supports the assumption that armed police officers serve as a deterrent to potential school shooters
  - School shootings in U.S. with highest casualties Columbine (13), Sandy Hook (26), Santa Fe (10), and Marjory Stoneman Douglas HS – 75% of them had a police or armed security officer assigned to campus

School Security Measures Post-Columbine

- Safety Drills – Utility
- Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, Evacuate (ALICE) Institute provide training with no empirical evidence to support their effectiveness (Krisch, 2018)
- Potential for negative impact on children and school climate (Krisch, 2018; Magliozzi, 2018; Peterson et al., 2015).
- Are students retain and implement what they have learned in a training, especially for students suffering with anxiety or previous exposure to violence (McCoy, Raver, & Sharkey, 2015)

Target Hardening

1. Ecological and situational controls
    1. Reduce opportunity for strangers or subject of interest to access location.
    2. Availability to access/exits.
    3. Communication device accessibility.
    4. Law enforcement presence.
    5. CCTV systems/monitoring.

Hierarchy of Threat Management (Palarea & Van Horn, 2010)

- Incarceration/Jail
- Arrest
- Hospitalization
- Restraining Order/Protection Order
- Refer for outpatient mental health counseling
- Administrative actions
- Ecological/physical measures
- Leverage subject of interest's social network
- Notify subject of interest boundaries/consequence
- Notify subject of interest about safety measures

Documentation

http://www.studentthreatassessment.org/

STUDENT THREAT ASSESSMENT & MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (LEVEL 1 PROTOCOL)

STUDENT THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Plan to Protect Targeted or Victimized Student

Student Name: _____ **Today's Date:** _____

DOB: _____ **Student #:** _____ **School** _____ **Date(s) of Incident:** _____

INCIDENT

The following is the plan to protect (student's name) _____ from harm.
Attach copy to Level 1 and place in confidential folder.

SAFETY CONCERNS

The safety issues of concern are: _____

SUPPORT PLAN

After meeting with: ☐ Administration ☐ CDS/Counselor ☐ School Resource Officer ☐ Guardian/Parent ☐ Security ☐ Special Education Team ☐ Other (_____), the following was or will be implemented:

☐ Law enforcement has been notified. (date)

☐ Further assessment will be pursued through the Student Threat Assessment Team.

The student will aid in his/her own protection by: _____

The student will receive the following support from the school: _____

The student will receive the following support from the community: _____

The student will receive the following support from home: _____

The student will receive the following support from law enforcement: _____

_____ _____

Administrator, Plan Supervisor, Date:
(Will maintain responsibility until reassigned or modified)

CDS/Counselor, Date:

_____ _____

Liaison Officer, Date:

Parent/Guardian, Date:

_____ _____

Student, Date:

Other, Date:

Revised by John Van Dreal, Courtenay McCarthy, and Clem Spenner 10-19

STUDENT THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Notification Log

(Use as documentation for notification to legal guardians of threatened or victimized students - See ORS 339.327 and District Policy.)

☐ An interpreter was used for non-English communication

School: _____ **Student Name:** _____ **Student #:** _____

Date /Time of Incident: _____ **Name of administrator completing this form:** _____

Parent/Guardian Name: _____ Home #: _____ Work #: _____

Parent/Guardian Name: _____ Home #: _____ Work #: _____

****#1 Emergency Name:** _____ **Home #:** _____ **Work #:** _____

****#2 Emergency Name:** _____ **Home #:** _____ **Work #:** _____

****NO INFORMATION REGARDING INCIDENT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE EMERGENCY CONTACT PERSON, ONLY TO PARENT/GUARDIAN.**

DOCUMENT CONTACT OR ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT IN LOG BELOW

Name	Number Used	Attempted Date and Time	Message Left

NOTIFICATION CHECK-LIST

☐ Described incident to parent/guardian — parent/guardian's comments (attach additional sheet if necessary):
_____
_____

☐ Informed the parent/guardian that school personnel, law enforcement, and other agencies as necessary are investigating the validity of this threat.

☐ Described to parent/guardian any immediate safety measures that have been taken — parent/guardian's comments (attach additional comment sheet if necessary): _____
_____

☐ Notified parent/guardian that a follow-up letter to this conversation will be arriving within a couple of days, as required by Oregon Revised Statutes.

☐ Identified myself as the contact person regarding the school's investigation of this incident and provided the name of the school resource Officer for the law enforcement portion of the investigation and the officer's contact information.

☐ Notified parent/guardian of meeting scheduled on _____ (date) to develop a plan to protect their student from harm.

Student Threat Assessment and Management System
Student-Witness Interview - Level 1

Step 1: Directions for Case Manager:

This interview is only to be conducted by an administrator, SRO, or school counselor as a supplement to the Level 1 Assessment Protocol. Address the following questions through an interview or open-ended inquiry with the student or students of concern (who is/are in a situation that poses a threat).

Do NOT ask the student to read and complete the questions by themselves.

Although the student can provide crucial information regarding a situation, do not delay the Level 1 Assessment if the student is not available or is unwilling to participate.

The following is an examination of current circumstances, and as these circumstances change, so too does concern for aggression; therefore, review the results of this interview while being mindful of supervision, intervention, and the passage of time. Each question is a prompt for exploration of circumstances that may involve the escalation of violence.

Student's Name: _____ **Date:** _____

Administrator/Case Manager's Name: _____

Interviewer's Name: _____

Address the student and describe the perceived threat, dangerous situation, or violent action that has brought this situation to your attention. Explain our obligation and responsibility to investigate and assess all situations that may be dangerous for the student and others. (ORS 339-250).

Step 2: Ask the following questions through conversation or direct inquiry.

1. It has been reported that you witnessed a threat. Tell me what happened._____

2. When did this happen? Who is/are involved in the threat/situation? How are they involved?

3. What exactly was said (or written, posted, drawn, filmed, or otherwise communicated)?

Attach copy with Level 1 Protocol.
Place copy in envelope marked "Confidential Record."

4. Who was threatened? Who do they want to harm? _____

5. What reasons, if any, were given for the threatened behavior? _____

6. Is there a plan to hurt anyone?

7. Do any of the students who are involved with the threat have weapons or have access to weapons (including knives, swords, bats, explosives, etc.)? _____

8. Have any of the students involved done anything that would make you think they are practicing or preparing to follow through on the threat and harm someone? _____

9. Who is in control of the situation? Is there a leader? _____

10. What do you think of this situation? _____

11. Is there anything else we should know about this situation? _____

12. What can we do to help? _____

Step 3:

1. **What is interviewer's relationship with student:**
   ☐ **Difficult** ☐ **Neutral** ☐ **Positive**
2. **In your opinion, was the student:**
   ☐ **Guarded** ☐ **Defensive** ☐ **Communicative in a manner appearing open and honest**

Attach copy with Level 1 Protocol.
Place copy in envelope marked "Confidential Record."

Extreme Risk Protection Orders "Red Flag Laws," NYS, 8/24/2019

- Goal to keep guns away from persons deemed "high risk" of using against self/others
  - Not have (possess) a firearm, rifle or shotgun
  - Not buy a firearm, rifle or shotgun
  - Not attempt to have or buy a firearm, rifle or shotgun
  - Give up any firearms, rifles or shotguns

- Petitioners include:
  - Police officers
  - District Attorneys
  - Family or household members
  - School administrators; including persons chosen by the school – teachers; guidance counselors, school psychologist, school nurse and coaches

Extreme Risk Protection Orders
"Red Flag Laws," NYS, 8/24/2019

- Filed to NYS Supreme Court Judge
- Turn-around time rapid; hearing held within 3 - 10 days after the application is filed
  - https://ww2.nycourts.gov/erpo
  - Outside normal business hours, contact 1-800-430-8457 or emergency@nycourts.gov
- Both sides get a chance to tell their side of the story to the judge
- ERPO will say the expiration date (up to 1 year)
- ERPO must be followed in every state
- If the judge decides that a final ERPO is not needed, the case is over

Extreme Risk Protection Orders "Red Flag Laws," NYS, 8/24/2019

- **ERPO DOES NOT ORDER PERSON AT RISK TO STAY AWAY FROM TARGET**
- **ERPO can't order a person to:**
  - Stop threatening or committing abuse
  - Stay away from your home, job, or school
  - Have no contact with you or others
  - Follow custody orders
  - Pay child or spousal support
- **An ERPO has no criminal charges or penalties.**

NY Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement (SAFE) Act; Mental Hygiene Law, 9.49 (1/15/13)

- NYS SAFE Act stops criminals and the dangerously mentally ill from buying a gun by requiring universal background checks on gun purchases
- Increases penalties for people who use illegal guns
- Mandates life in prison without parole for anyone who murders a first responder
- Office of National Instant Criminal Background System (NICS) and SAFE Act provides the guidance to mental health professionals on reporting requirements.
- Resource for clinicians on the NY SAFE Act and Section 9.46 of the Mental Health Law.

NY Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement (SAFE) Act; Mental Hygiene Law, 9.49 (1/15/13)

- MHL, 9.46 (A) - Reporting Requirements for Mental Health Professionals:

- "requires four groups of mental health professionals (i.e., physicians, psychologists, registered nurses, and licensed clinical social workers), in the exercise of their reasonable professional judgment, to make a report as soon as practical to county mental health officials if an individual for whom they are providing mental health treatment is "likely to engage in conduct that will cause serious harm to self or others."

NY Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement (SAFE) Act; Mental Hygiene Law, 9.49 (1/15/13)

- MHL, 9.49 (B) Reporting Standard:

- "the reporting standard is "likely to engage in conduct that will cause serious harm to self or others." This standard is consistent with the "likely to result in serious harm to self or others"

- "As such, decision making with respect to a Section 9.46 report requires a clinical determination that a person's clinical state creates either: "(a) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person, as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that the person is dangerous to himself or herself, or (b) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior which places others in reasonable fear of serious physical harm1."

NY Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement (SAFE) Act; Mental Hygiene Law, 9.49 (1/15/13)

- MHL, 9.49 (C) Confidentiality and Liability Concerns:

- "With any mandatory reporting requirement, concerns regarding confidentiality and liability (for making a report or, conversely, failing to make a report) may be raised."

- "These concerns are addressed as follows: The law specifically provides that mental health professionals will not be subject to any civil or criminal liability if the professional's decision with respect to whether or not to report was made "reasonably and in good faith."

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
[20 U.S.C. § 1232g – 34 C.F.R. Part 99]

- Applies to all educational agencies (i.e., school districts) and institutions (i.e., schools) that receive funds under any program administered by the U.S. Secretary of Education. In K–12, FERPA applies to most public schools.
- In postsecondary, FERPA applies to nearly all postsecondary institutions.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
[20 U.S.C. § 1232g – 34 C.F.R. Part 99]

- Gives parents the right to access the student's education records (and to seek to amend any information in the student's education record that is inaccurate, misleading, or in violation of the student's right of privacy).

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
[20 U.S.C. § 1232g – 34 C.F.R. Part 99]

- Requires written parental consent before personally identifiable information (PII) from the student's education record may be disclosed, subject to certain exceptions.
- When a student turns 18 years of age, or enrolls in a postsecondary institution (at any age), the student becomes an "eligible student" and all parental rights transfer to the student.

FERPA – Protect?

- Education records are generally defined as those records that are directly related to the student and maintained by (or on behalf of) an educational agency or institution.

FERPA – Protect?

- FERPA excludes certain types of records from this definition, including, but not limited to: Records created and maintained by the educational agency's or institution's law enforcement unit for law enforcement purposes;

FERPA – Protect?

- Records made or maintained by a professional or paraprofessional (e.g., physician, psychologist, etc.) that are made, maintained, or used only in connection with treatment of an eligible student, if certain conditions are met.

FERPA –Key Exceptions

1. **Health and Safety Emergencies. Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records without consent to appropriate parties (e.g., law enforcement, emergency responders) in connection with an articulable and significant health or safety emergency, if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(a)(10) and 99.36;**

FERPA –Key Exceptions

2. **School Officials. Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records without consent to school officials (including School Resource Officers), provided they meet the school's criteria for "school officials" with "legitimate educational interests." 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1);**

FERPA –Key Exceptions

3. **Judicial Orders/Subpoenas. Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records without consent in order to comply with judicial orders and lawfully issued subpoenas if the conditions set forth at 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9) are met;**

FERPA –Key Exceptions

4. **Parents of Dependent Students. Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from the education records of an "eligible student" without consent to the parents of that student if the parents claim the student as a dependent for federal tax purposes. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(8).**

FERPA –Key Exceptions

5. Juvenile Justice System. Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records to state and local officials or other authorities if the disclosure is allowed by a state law adopted after November 19, 1974, and if the disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and its ability to serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are disclosed. The officials and authorities to whom such information is disclosed must certify in writing to the school that the information will not be provided to any other party without written consent, except as provided for under state law. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(a)(5) and 99.38.

Structured Professional Judgment Risk Assessment

Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)

Structured Assessment for Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)

Borum, R., Bartel, P., & Forth, A. (2006). *Structured Risk Assessment in Youth: Professional Manual.* Lutz, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc.

- **Focus is on General Risk Assessment**
  - Structured Professional Judgment
  - Systematic
  - Empirically Grounded
  - Developmentally Informed
  - Treatment-Oriented
  - Flexible
  - Practical

What does the SAVRY measure?

1. Juvenile risk for violence
2. Not designed for threat assessment

Why was the SAVRY developed?

- To assist in structuring risk assessment
- Useful in intervention planning/monitoring
  Resource Management
- Considers developmental factors

SAVRY- Population of Use

- 12-18 years old
- Males and females
- Juvenile justice system
- Psychiatric inpatient/outpatient
- Educational settings
- Minority youth

SAVRY-General Principles

- Administered by trained probation officers, psychologists, social workers, and psychiatrists.
- Structured interviews, family reports, criminal records, probation reports, and other relevant records from the juvenile.
- Coded/scored by hand on the SAVRY Rating Form.

Considerations/Limitations

- Might not be appropriate for assessing targeted violence
- Important to re-assess at regular intervals
- Use additional sources to rate items
- Most research has been done with males
- User qualifications are important

SAVRY Structure - Items

- 24 Risk Items
  - Historical (10)
  - Social/contextual (6)
  - Individual/clinical (8)
- 6 Protective Factor Items
- Additional Risk Factors

SAVRY Structure and Scoring

- 24 risk items that would predict to put the youth at risk for violence
- 6 protective factors that can influence whether or not the youth will be more at risk for violence.
- Rated on a scale of Low, Moderate, and High and are decided by structured judgment from the person giving the test with all the available information.
- Six Protective Factors are rated on whether they are absent or present.

SAVRY Structure

- Risk Items—3 level rating structure
  - Low
  - Moderate
  - High

SAVRY Structure

- Protective Factor Items—2 level rating structure
  - Present
  - Absent

Limitations

- Male-centric (can be used on both genders, but most research was on males)
- No specific cutoff scores=they cannot equate results to numerical scores as accurately or validly
- Dynamic factors are constantly changing- assessment needs to be repeated regularly
- Could be viewed as a subjective test from interviewer to interviewer

Historical Risk Factors

1. History of Violence
2. History of Nonviolent Offending
3. Early Initiation of Violence
4. Past Supervision/Intervention Failures
5. History of Self-Harm or Suicide Attempts
6. Exposure to Violence in the Home
7. Childhood History of Maltreatment
8. Parental/Caregiver Criminality
9. Early Caregiver Disruption
10. Poor School Achievement

Historical Risk Factors

1. History of Violence – prior violence is the best single predictor of future violence
   - Score Lo if the juvenile has committed no acts of violence.
   - Score Mod if the juvenile has committed one or two acts.
   - Score Hi if the juvenile has committed three or more acts.

Historical Risk Factors

2. History of Non-Violent Offending – juveniles who have committed non-violent criminal or delinquent offenses are at a higher risk for future violence.
   - Score Lo if the youth has not engaged in prior non-violent offending.
   - Score Mod if the youth has less than five prior acts of non-violent offending.
   - Score Hi if the youth has engaged in five or more acts of non violent offending.

Historical Risk Factors (Continued)

3. Early initiation of violence
   - Lo – no known prior acts.
   - Mod – first know violent act was between 11 and 13.
   - Hi – first known violent act was prior to 11 years.

Historical Risk Factors (Continued)

4. **Past Supervision/Intervention Failure – failure to comply with rules in the legal system.**
   - **Lo – youth has complied with court orders.**
   - **Mod – Youth has failed on less than three occasions.**
   - **Hi – Youth has failed on more than three occasions.**

Historical Risk Factors (Continued)

5. History of Self-Harm or Suicide Attempts
   - Lo – Youth has no history of suicide or self-harm
   - Mod – has history of self harm but no idea to kill themselves.
   - Hi – Has serious self harm or suicide attempts.

Historical Risk Factors (Continued)

6. Exposure to violence in the home – family discord within the family.
   - Lo – Youth has not witnessed violence.
   - Mod – Youth has witnessed occasional or one single act of violence.
   - Hi – youth has witnessed chronic physical aggression or violence in the home.

Historical Risk Factors (Continued)

7. **Childhood History of Maltreatment – child abuse**
   - **Lo – Youth has not been physically abused**
   - **Mod – Infrequent child abuse or neglect with minimal or no injury.**
   - **Hi – Youth was physically abused or neglected which is chronic or severe.**

Historical Risk Factors (Continued)

8. Parental/Caregiver Criminality
   - Lo – Youth's parents have no history of criminal behavior.
   - Mod – One or more of youth's parents has history of minor criminal behavior.
   - Hi – One or more parents have history of frequent and serious criminal behavior.

Historical Risk Factors (Continued)

9. Early Caregiver Disruption – separation from parents or caregivers
   - Lo – No disruption in continuity of care throughout childhood.
   - Mod – Some disruption but has been primarily with caregivers.
   - Hi – Significant disruption where youth has spent more than a year away from parents.

Historical Risk Factors (Continued)

10. Poor School Achievement
   - Lo – Youth has no significant achievement difficulties in school. No history of grade failure or poor academic performance.
   - Mod – Youth has some educational difficulties and has failed some subjects.
   - Hi – has history of grade failures and was left back or put in specialized classes for learning.

Social/Contextual Risk Factors

6 items

11. Peer Delinquency
12. Peer Rejection
13. Stress and Poor Coping
14. Poor Parental Management
15. Lack of Personal/Social Support
16. Community Disorganization

Social/Contextual Risk Factors

11. **Peer Delinquency – affiliation with delinquent peers.**
    - **Lo – youth does not associate with delinquent peers.**
    - **Mod – Youth occasionally associates with other delinquents.**
    - **Hi – youth frequently associates with other delinquents and regularly engage in antisocial acts and is involved with gang activities.**

Social/Contextual Risk Factors

12. **Peer Rejection – liked by few and actively disliked by most.**
    - **Lo – Youth is has not experience peer rejection.**
    - **Mod – Youth is experiencing moderate peer rejection but not severe or chronic.**
    - **Hi – Youth is experiencing significant peer rejection**

Social/Contextual Risk Factors

13. **Stress and Poor Coping – deaths, relationship losses, loss of status.**
    - **Lo -Has recently experience only mild stress and no significant losses.**
    - **Mod – Has experienced moderate stress or loss but have coping ability.**
    - **Hi – Youth has significant stress or loss and has poor coping abilities.**

Social/Contextual Risk Factors (Continued)

14. **Poor Parental Management – ineffective parenting skills with poor discipline.**
    - **Lo – Receiving consistent and appropriate parental discipline and supervision.**
    - **Mod – Youth is receiving discipline is sometimes inconsistent but not overly strict or overly permissive.**
    - **Hi – Youth is receiving discipline that is extremely inconsistent, either overly strict or overly permissive.**

Social/Contextual Risk Factors (Continued)

15. **Lack of Personal/Social Support – Absence of supportive relationships**
    - **Lo – Family offers emotional support and helpful guidance.**
    - **Mod – Family is sometimes available and willing to offer emotional support.**
    - **Hi – Youth has few or no family who are able to offer emotional support.**

Social/Contextual Risk Factors (Continued)

16. Community Disorganization
    - Lo – Youth lives in community with low rates of crime, poverty, and violence.
    - Mod – Youth lives in a community with some problems related to the above.
    - Hi – Youth lives in a community with significant problems related to high rates of crime, poverty, and or violence.

Individual/Clinical Risk Factors

8 items

17. Negative Attitudes
18. Risk Taking/Impulsivity
19. Substance Use Difficulties
20. Anger Management Problems
21. Low Empathy/Remorse
22. Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Difficulties
23. Poor Compliance
24. Low Interest/Commitment to School

Individual Risk Factors

17. **Negative Attitudes – antisocial attitudes or social cognitive deficiencies.**
    - **Lo – Attitudes do not support the legitimacy of crime or violence and can generate non aggressive solutions to problems.**
    - **Mod – Some attitudes support the legitimacy of crime or violence and has some problems generating non aggressive solutions to problems.**
    - **Hi – clearly endorses attitudes and values that condone violence and has severe difficulty in generating non aggressive solutions to problems.**

Individual Risk Factors

18. **Risk Taking/Impulsivity**
    - **Lo – Youth has no problems with risk taking or impulsivity.**
    - **Mod – Youth has some minor or less serious risk taking.**
    - **Hi – Youth has significant risk taking or impulsivity.**

Individual Risk Factors

19. **Substance Use Difficulties**
    - **Lo – has no current or past difficulties related to alcohol or drug use.**
    - **Mod – Youth has not recently abused alcohol or drugs but has history of significant substance abuse problems.**
    - **Hi – Youth currently uses alcohol or drugs.**

Individual Risk Factors (Continued)

20. Anger Management Problems – can be a potent activator of aggression.
    - Lo – Youth shows age appropriate ability to express and manage feelings of anger.
    - Mod – Youth has moderate difficulty with controlling expression of anger.
    - Hi – Youth has significant difficulty with controlling expressions of anger.

Individual Risk Factors (Continued)

21. Low Empathy/Remorse
   - Lo – Youth has developed an age appropriate capacity for remorse and empathy.
   - Mod – Youth shows moderate impairment in age appropriate capacity for remorse and minimizes the feelings or others and his behaviors on others.
   - Hi – Youth show significant impairment and is unaffected by other's distress or misfortune or what their actions do to others.

Individual Risk Factors (Continued)

22. Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Difficulties
   - No difficulties noted with hyperactivity.
   - Mod – Moderate difficulties with hyperactivity.
   - Hi – Severe difficulties with hyperactivity.

Individual Risk Factors (Continued)

23. Poor Compliance – likelihood that the youth will comply with provisions of a risk reduction plan
   - Lo – Youth understands the need for intervention and demonstrates positive attitude.
   - Mod – Youth does not fully appreciate need for intervention and sometimes expresses negative attitudes towards the intervention.
   - Hi – Youth does not believe he/she is at risk or does not appreciate need for intervention and expresses negative attitudes.

Individual Risk Factors (Continued)

24. Low Interest/Commitment to School
   - Lo – Youth shows at least average interest in commitment to school.
   - Mod – Youth has a low interest or commitment to school but attends regularly
   - Hi – Youth has a low interest or commitment to school and is often truant, late, or does not complete assignments.

Protective Factors

- 6 items
  1. Prosocial Involvement
  2. Strong Social Support
  3. Strong Attachment and Bonds
  4. Positive Attitude Toward Intervention and Authority
  5. Strong Commitment to School
  6. Resilient Personality Traits

Protective Factors

- Should assess protective and mitigating factors.
- Positive Factors
  - Factors that are notable for their presence
- Negative Factors
  - Factors that are notable for their absence

Protective Factors

1. **Prosocial Involvement – refers to socially valuable behaviors such as helping, cooperating, negotiating, appropriately expressing emotions, and recognizing others feelings.**

Protective Factors

2. **Strong Social Support – Refers to a network of individuals who provide emotional support and concrete assistance in times of distress and need.**

Protective Factors

3. **Strong Attachments and Bonds – Warm and affectionate relationships with adults who encourage and recognize a youth's competence and convey an attitude of affection and acceptance.**

Protective Factors

4. **Positive Attitude Towards Intervention and Authority – positive attitude towards remediation attempts describe active involvement by youth in lessening risk for violence.**

Protective Factors

5. **Strong Commitment to School – school involvement, educational achievement, and a strong bond towards schools may lessen the likelihood of future violence.**

Protective Factors

6. **Resilient Personality Traits – Ability to succeed or have positive outcomes, despite adverse conditions.**

Additional Risk Factors

- Additional factors or situational variables may emerge that are important in understanding a person's potential for future violence

- Appears related to the individual's risk for interpersonal violence. If factor considered to be significant in the evaluation it would be written as such in the Rating Form.

Summary Risk Rating

- Based on the results of the entire assessment
- Number of scores is not a determinant
- Risk rating is based upon professional judgment based on the case facts and research

SPJ Risk Assessment Younger Age Children

- Early Assessment Risk List for Boys
  - (EARL – 20B, Augimeri, et al., 2001)
    - School settings and community
- Early Assessment Risk List for Girls
  - (EARL – 21G, Levene, et al., 2001)
    - School setting and community

EARL-20B Version 2, Augimeri, Koegl, Webster and Levene, 2001
EARL-21G Version 1, Levene, Augimeri, Pepler, Walsh, Webster and Koegl, 2001

- Theoretically and empirically grounded items
- Utilized to identify intervention strategies
- Especially helpful in identifying children who are high risk
- Structured professional judgment
- Up to age 12
- No overall score

EARL-20B Version 2, Augimeri, Koegl, Webster and Levene, 2001
EARL-21G Version 1, Levene, Augimeri, Pepler, Walsh, Webster and Koegl, 2001

- Three Sections

1. Family (6 items)
   - Family (7 items) Earl 21G
2. Child (12 items)
3. Responsivity (2 items)

Family Items

1. Household Circumstances
2. Caregiver Continuity
3. Supports
4. Stressors
5. Parenting Style
6. Antisocial Values and Conduct
   - ✓ 7. Caregiver – Daughter Interaction

Family Items

1. Household Circumstances
   - 2 = families experiencing major financial problems with place them below the poverty level
   - 1= families experiencing financial problems but able to provide for family needs with adequate space
   - 0=few or no financial difficulties, well-maintained homes

Family Items

2. Caregiver Continuity

- 2=multiple caregivers, "kicked from pillar to post" or separation from caregiver, foster care home, residential setting
- 1=has had one reasonably stable caregiver with few parental disruptions
- 0=no parenting disruptions for a period of time

Family Items

3. Supports

- Assessment of emotional and instrumental support to family
- 2=family has few if any effective positive social supports in place; family may be socially isolated or guarded in their willingness to accept help
- 1=some positive supports in place and can access community resources
- 0=healthy, well-developed connections to family members, friends and community resources

Family Items

4. **Stressors**

- 2=debilitating stress from major or minor situations, families can report that their lives are "out of control"
- 1=experiencing one or more stress or a string of minor stresses
- 0=ordinary stressful events and circumstances

Family Items

5. Parenting Style

- ✓ 2=parents use violent, punitive or extremely lax or permissive discipline style; do not adequately monitor children; do not enforce rules and do not engage in problem-solving approach
- ✓ 1=generally attentive to children but difficulty setting boundaries, monitoring children, maintaining routines
- ✓ 0=reinforce children's behavior, monitor behavior, nurturing parenting style; able to enforce rules in collaborative manner, communicate effectively

Family Items

6. Antisocial Values and Conduct

- Focus on immediate family as well as others involved in male's life
- 2=reserved for families that embrace a criminal lifestyle; convictions not needed – endorsement of antisocial lifestyle
- 1=some evidence of unacceptable thinking and involvement in antisocial activities
- 0=embrace conventional values – minimal to no evidence of antisocial thinking and behavior

Family Items

7. Caregiver-Daughter Interaction (21G only)

- ✓ Immediate family members, adults important in girl's life, incarcerated parents (if applicable) should also be taken into account
- ✓ 2=reserved in cases when one family member was openly involved in illegal activities, evidence within the family of strongly distorted, antisocial thinking with apparent effect on everyday behavior
- ✓ 1=families with some antisocial thinking and activities; not have an extensive history or current involvement in legal system
- ✓ 0=family embraces conventional values, prosocial attitudes, minimal to no evidence of antisocial thinking or behavior

Child Items

7. Developmental Problems

- ✓ Physical and cognitive development-obstetrical, neonatal, preschool; sources are primary caregivers and collateral reports
- ✓ 2=difficulty meeting age-appropriate developmental milestones, delays remains
- ✓ 1=experienced difficulties but was able to overcome
- ✓ 0=met developmental milestones on time; no adverse effects on developmental milestones

Child Items

8. **Onset of Behavioural Difficulties**

- **Strictly coded by onset, not frequency**
- **2=prior to age six, serious or persistent oppositional behavior and conduct problems**
- **1=after age 7 but before age 12**
- **0=have not had serious problems before age 12**

Child Items

9. Abuse/Neglect/Trauma

- Emotional, sexual and physical maltreatment of children by adults, siblings or peers
- 2=documented or well-substantiated evidence of maltreatment; includes children diagnosed with PTSD
- 1=suspicion of evidence but not conclusive
- 0=not subjected to maltreatment

Child Items

10. Hyperactivity/Impulsivity/Attention Deficit (HIA)

- 2=diagnosed with ADHD
- 1=hyperactive boy, impulsivity, attentional problems in "milder forms"
- 0=no evidence of hyperactivity, impulsivity and attentional problems

Child Items

11. Likability

- Use data from other adults, parents and caretakers – critical in establishing therapeutic alliance
- 2=viewed as unlikeable, lack of social skills, unpleasant demeanor, difficult temperament
- 1=some difficulty in getting along with others, accepted by others
- 0=gets along with others, sociable, agreeable

Child Items

12. **Peer Socialization**

- **Surrounds self with prosocial and/or antisocial children, friends are age appropriate**
- **2=associates with peers who engage in antisocial acts, beliefs or rejected/ostracized by others**
- **1=some positive influences, but spends most time with children who get into trouble**
- **0=ability to establish positive ties with others, unambiguously prosocial**

Child Items

13. Academic Performance

- Is child meeting educational goals appropriate to his age and grade? Review of academic records important
- 2=marked academic deficits, learning disability or placed in special education classes
- 1=some academic deficits (e.g., one year below grade level), tutoring for school problems
- 0=functioning at age/grade appropriate levels

Child Items

14. Neighbourhood

- Assess appropriate social outlets, “seedy” or “dangerous”; may want to visit neighborhood
- 2=neighborhood considered high risk
- 1=reputation of “tough” but some supportive outlets
- 0=relatively safe and crime-free neighborhood, after school programs

Child Items

15. Authority Contact

- ✓ Actual contact with authority figures based on his misbehavior; family, police, fire, security or school personnel
- ✓ 2=repeated contacts with authority figures and repeated problems with school officials
- ✓ 1=some negative involvement for minor incidents, where contact is with persons other than police
- ✓ 0=no contact with authority figures due to antisocial behavior

Child Items

16. Antisocial Attitudes

- ✓ Perception of the world, identify thought processes, attitudes – including toward authority, attributions
- ✓ 2=clearly embraces antisocial attitudes, value of aggression, seen as manipulative, deceptive
- ✓ 1=some evidence of prosocial thinking, however, tendency to revert to antisocial, counterproductive or self-defeating thinking
- ✓ 0=accurate understanding of right and wrong, prosocial identified

Child Items

17. Antisocial Behaviour

- ✓ Severity of behavior, number of behaviors and context/settings
- ✓ 2=one or more serious antisocial act (e.g., assault, bodily harm) or several antisocial acts across settings or diagnoses of CD and ODD
- ✓ 1=engaging in milder forms of antisocial behavior (e.g., theft, vandalism); occur in one or two settings
- ✓ 0=exhibits no conduct problems that are of concern

Child Items

18. Coping Abilities

- are coping abilities adequate for current surroundings, self-confidence, self-discipline, positive outlook and sense of control over events
- 2=unable to cope with most dimensions in various dimensions
- 1=able to perform tasks without too much difficulties, some signs of depressive symptoms
- 0=regardless of life circumstances, able to adapt well

Responsivity Items

19. Family Responsivity

- ✓ Motivation to participate in treatment
- ✓ 2=reserved for families where there is a clear indication that parents are reluctant to engage in treatment; not likely to follow through, minimize problems faced by child
- ✓ 1=some resistance to treatment, can be difficult to engage, guarded, inconsistent
- ✓ 0=able to work collaboratively, make necessary effort to modify behavior

Responsivity Items

20. Child Responsivity

- ✓ Child's motivation levels
- ✓ 2=clearly opposed to reasonable interventions, difficult to engage, uninterested, uncooperative
- ✓ 1=guarded or resistant, but able, at least minimally, to participate in treatment
- ✓ 0=clearly responsive to treatment and interested in changing behavior

Overall Clinical Judgment

1. Low, moderate or high
2. Total score not as important – may be instance when a low scoring child is deemed "high risk"
3. Generally, speaking a child coded with a higher score is more likely to present a higher risk
4. Critical items
    1. Distinctively important to child's risk – idiographic in nature

THANK YOU!

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