

Stark County Teaching American History Grant

Stark County Educational Service Center
2100 38th Street NW
Canton, Ohio 44709

Policy and Protest: A Case Study



Grade Level: High School

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Osnaburg Local School District

Duration

2 class periods (45 minute class)

Courtesy of Kent State University Libraries

Overview

Students will be able to connect President Richard Nixon's "Vietnamization" and "Cambodia" speeches to eventual outbreak of violence on Kent State University's campus on May 4, 1970 after completing this lesson. Students should be familiar with the involvement of the United States in Vietnam. They will understand that the foreign policy decision of President Nixon to enter Cambodia was perceived by many Americans as a betrayal on the promises he made to bring the soldiers home from Vietnam. Computer setup with internet access and speakers will be needed for the teacher only.

Ohio's New Learning Standards

American History Statement 26: The Cold War and conflicts in Korea and Vietnam influenced domestic and international politics.

Historical Background

Following the end of World War II, the United States entered a new war of words with the Soviet Union. Despite the years of allegiance during the war, the United States and the Soviet Union were torn apart by the fear of Soviet communism spreading into other parts of the world including the United States itself. In response to the growing fear, the United States

developed the policy of containment to confront the expansion of communism. Containment allowed for the U.S. government to use any necessary means to isolate, or to keep communism from spreading. In addition to containment, the domino theory was presented by President Eisenhower after the fall of Dien Ben Phu in 1954; the French had been defeated and communism was spreading in Vietnam. Eisenhower believed that like a row of dominoes, if one country fell to communism, others would fall as well. Containment and the domino theory allowed for U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

Advisors were sent to Vietnam, but escalation into war did not occur until the late 1960s under President Lyndon Baines Johnson. There was an antiwar sentiment present in the 1960s, but it increased following the Tet Offensive in 1968. Although the Tet Offensive was a technical victory for the United States, it weakened morale and increased the distrust in the government of the United States. Prior to Tet, Americans were led to believe that the Viet Cong were not capable of a major offensive and that victory over the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese was nearing. The growing frustration with U.S. involvement in Vietnam began to appear in forms of protest, mainly on college campuses. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), created in the 1950s, organized rallies, draft card burnings, and eventually, antiwar protests on a number of college campuses.

Richard Nixon's presidential victory in 1968 gave hope to many Americans that the involvement in Vietnam would be coming to an end. Nixon's Vietnamization speech given on November 3, 1969 helped Americans envision an end of the Vietnam conflict. In this speech, President Nixon recognized the deep divisions that were taking place within the United States and that the citizens had lost confidence in the government. He issued his plan of Vietnamization, which called for training and preparing the South Vietnamese combat troops to replace the American troops. Nixon said, "As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater." These words resonated with many Americans who saw an end in sight. However, Nixon also mentioned that if needed, he would not hesitate to take action against the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong.

With the Vietnamization plan in place and troops being withdrawn from South Vietnam, the war appeared to be nearing an end. The speech that President Richard Nixon made on April 30, 1970 seemed to change the focus of the war from withdrawing troops to engaging in warfare in another country, Cambodia. Nixon's argued that Cambodia had asked for assistance from the United States because fighting had spilled over into their country. President Nixon also spoke of the communist sanctuaries across the border of Vietnam in Cambodia; his desire was to drive out the enemy, destroy their supplies and to withdraw from Cambodia. This speech enraged many Americans as protests erupted across the country especially on college campuses.

Protests erupted on Kent State University's campus in Kent, Ohio the day after Nixon's Cambodia speech on May 1, 1970. Small rallies took place throughout this day, but the large protest to Cambodia was scheduled for Monday May 4, 1970 at noon. Although the issue of Cambodia was put off for the time, students were still outraged, and not all could keep quiet. As students gathered in downtown Kent that evening, the frustration (or mob mentality) took over, which resulted in vandalism. The mayor called in local police to force the students back to campus. On Saturday May 2, 1970, a curfew was set for students and Mayor Satrom made the Ohio National Guard aware of the situation on Kent State's campus. That evening, students staged a march that led them to the ROTC building that was scheduled to be demolished. Students broke windows and eventually set fire to the building. The fire died out, but the presence of the police again enraged students. Students acted out violently by throwing stones and slashing the hoses of the firemen. In response, tear gas was used to push students back to their dormitories. One student was injured by a bayonet that evening. May 3, 1970 was a relatively quiet day, but the Ohio National Guard troops were positioned around campus. Governor James Rhodes added fuel to the fire when he held a press conference suggesting that

outside agitators were on the campus at Kent State trying to encourage demonstrations. Rhodes's "law and order" sought to eliminate those demonstrating and causing the problems. Later that evening, students gathered and were met by the Guard who used tear gas once again to prod students back to the dorms.

On Monday May 4, 1970, four students were killed and nine wounded following the altercation between the students and Ohio National Guardsmen on Kent State University's campus. The situation became hostile when students began to gather before noon. The Guard was told to scatter crowds because no gatherings were permitted on campus. Students may not have been aware of this new policy and refused to disperse. Tear gas cans were thrown back and forth between students and the Guard. With bayonets visible, some students responded by throwing stones and taunting the Guardsmen. With the frustration and hostility growing, members of the 107th Armed Calvary of the Ohio National Guard knelt down and aimed their weapons at the students, most of whom were bystanders. Sixty-seven shots were fired in thirteen seconds. Allison Krause, Jeffery Miller, Sandra Scheuer and William Schroeder were killed. Joseph Lewis, Thomas Grace, John Cleary, Robbie Stamps, Alan Canfora, Douglas Wrentmore, Dean Kahler, and Donald Scott MacKenzie were wounded.

Following the violence, Kent State sent students home for the remainder of the school year. Many other campuses around the country followed suit and shut down as well. Mixed reactions were received following the deaths of the four students. Some believed that the students deserved it, while others were appalled with the actions of the National Guardsmen and the government.

Enduring Understandings/ Essential Questions

- Enduring Understanding: The decision to go to war impacts the lives of the citizens in a nation.
- Essential Questions:
 1. In what ways do citizens demonstrate their objections to a country's decision to be involved in a war?
 2. What are the social effects on citizens at home when a nation enters and continues in a war?

Instructional Strategies

Before this lesson, students should have an understanding of the Cold War including the reasons for why the United States entered Vietnam, the draft, and the growing anti-war sentiment.

Day 1: Students should have read Nixon's Vietnamization speech prior to beginning Day 1 activities.

1. Begin class with a review of Vietnam and make a comparison to the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan today. Give your students a hypothetical situation. Tell them that President Obama has made a speech recently about instituting the draft for a final push in Afghanistan. After this succeeds, he will be able to bring all troops home. Lead a

student discussion of the draft and the possibility that seniors or recent graduates would likely be drafted. Ask your students to share their emotions and what they would do if the draft is instituted. Remind students that President Obama has said that he would like to withdraw the troops from Afghanistan by 2014. Disapproval of our actions in Afghanistan has been increasing because many Americans believe that Afghanistan is not our war to fight.

2. Students should have read Nixon's Vietnamization speech prior to class today (Appendix A). Students should focus on the highlighted portions of the speech where Nixon addresses the antiwar movement and other portions that suggest hope that the U.S. action in Vietnam was coming to an end. Guide the discussion of Nixon's speech. Ask students to picture themselves as teenagers in the late 1960s with the draft still in place. Ask how they would feel after reading his speech. Inform your students that Americans were hopeful that the war would be ending soon when Nixon announced his plan for Vietnamization. Connect this to the emotions that many Americans have about US actions in Afghanistan.
3. Remind students that Nixon does not give a deadline for troop removal and that he will do anything to protect the American soldiers fighting in Southeast Asia.
4. Ask your students to remember how they felt about the possibility of a draft to make a final push in Afghanistan. Help students to connect their feelings to the possible feelings of the students in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
5. Students will listen to Nixon's Cambodia Speech (Appendix B) from the beginning to 8:00 minutes. Each student should have their own copy and should highlight or underline parts of the speech that describe the actions in Cambodia and why the actions were necessary. This speech can be found at <http://millercenter.org/speeches/detail/3890>
6. Summarize the last part of the speech for the students. Highlighted portions for your assistance can be found in Appendix C.
7. Again, ask students how they would feel after listening to and discussing Nixon's speech. Connect their emotions from both speeches to explain that students began to distrust the government and will protest to show their frustration. Connect these emotions to how they felt about the hypothetical situation and how they would respond (step #4).
8. Using the historical background, describe the scene in Kent, Ohio in the days that led to May 4, 1970. You may want to read portions of the historical background to the students if you are short on time. Students should have an understanding that protests and interactions with campus, local, and Ohio National Guardsmen took place prior to the day of the shooting. Describe to students that the events of May 4, 1970 were a culmination of tensions for three days. If you would like more specifics, use <http://speccoll.library.kent.edu/4may70/exhibit/chronology/> to describe the events leading up to the shooting. If time permits, use the <http://www.kentstate1970.org//index2> website and go through the timeline with your students.
9. Listen to portions of Ohio Governor Rhodes's speech concerning the situation at Kent State including the "Brownshirts." This speech can be found at <http://www.kentstate1970.org/timeline/may3rd1970> . Go back to the hypothetical situation and ask students to imagine their emotions had this speech been given by President Obama. Tie the emotions to the actions of students on Kent State's campus in the days prior to May 4, 1970.

Day 2:

1. Finish the activities from the Day 1 if necessary.
2. Use an opening question to assess student understanding from the previous day.
Examples:
 - a. How are citizens, specifically students, socially affected by the perceived betrayal of Richard Nixon and the federal government?
 - b. How do young people feel about Vietnam and the decision to enter Cambodia?
3. Provide the pictures from Appendix D to your students without giving them any information. Have students create their own story about what happened at Kent State. Allow students to discuss with their peers at your discretion. If you do not have time to complete this step, move on to step 4.
4. Give each student a copy of the list of events that led to the National Guardsmen opening fire on the crowd of students (Appendix E). Discuss the events with students. Tie the chronology of events to the pictures that students viewed in the previous step.
5. Using youtube.com or any other sources, listen to Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young's *Ohio*. Provide lyrics to your students using the following sites: <http://www.azlyrics.com>, <http://www.metrolyrics.com>, or <http://www.lyricsmode.com>. Students may need to listen to this song more than once. This song was recorded on May 21, 1970.
6. Discuss with students how the song connects not only to Kent State, but with the overall attitude of many college students and their distrust of the government especially after Nixon's decision to enter Cambodia. Link the song and the events of May 4, 1970 both of Nixon's speeches as a lead in to the assessment.
7. Handout the assessment for the lesson (Appendix F). Answer questions as needed and assign a due date.

Ideas to extend this lesson plan:

Day 2-Step 3 Extension: Have students view the photographs (Appendix D) and incorporate audio from <http://www.kentstate1970.org/timeline/may4th1970>. Students should use the information and make connections to the pictures to create their own understanding of the events on May 4, 1970. A gallery walk with other primary sources could be a way of extending this step as well.

Day 2-Step 4 Extension: Complete step 4. To extend the lesson, have students read the articles from the Cleveland Plain Dealer that appeared on May 5, 1970 using <http://www.newsintohistory.com/blog/kent-state-student-protesters-shot-national-guard>

Classroom Materials

- Computer with internet access and speakers.
- Appendices:
 - Appendix A: President Nixon's "Vietnamization" speech
 - Appendix B: President Nixon's "Cambodia" speech
 - Appendix C: President Nixon's "Cambodia" speech key
 - Appendix D: Photographs for Activity on Day 2
 - Appendix E: May 4, 1970 Chronology of Events
 - Appendix F: Assessment
 - Appendix G: Sample Student Responses

Resources

Nixon, Richard. "Vietnamization" speech. November 3, 1969. Accessed January 5, 2013.

<http://vietnam.vassar.edu/overview/doc14.html>

Nixon, Richard. "Incursion into Cambodia" speech. April 30, 1970. Accessed January 5, 2013.

<http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3890>

Poulton, Chuck. Site Administrator. *KentState1970.org*. "May 4, 1970 Chronology."

Accessed April 3, 2013. <http://www.kentstate1970.org/timeline/may4th1970>

Kent State University News Service. *The May 4 Collection*. Box 28-28A.

Permission for photographs granted by the Kent State University Archives:

Photo #1: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives.
704/30-3. "Burned out ROTC building."

Photo #2: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives.
705/3-1-14. "Burned out ROTC building, ambulance driving up hill in background near Power Plant."

Photo #3: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives.
705/4-1-13. "Close up of National Guard personnel in Jeep."

Photo #4: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives.
705/4-1-13. "National Guard personnel on campus."

Photo #5: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives.
705/4-1-22. "National Guard personnel wearing gas masks, holding rifles."

Photo #6: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives.
705/4-1-29. "National Guard personnel with rifles, bayonets fixed."

Photo #7: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives.
705/4-1-33. "National Guard personnel walking toward crowd near Taylor Hall, tear gas has been fired."

Photo #8: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives.
705/4-2-11. "Line of National Guard personnel, walking forward, wearing gas masks, with weapons."

Photo #9: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives.
705/4-2-14. "Small crowd of people in foreground, National Guard personnel in background."

Photo #10: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives. 705/4-2-19. "People running, one person is in the act of throwing something."

Photo #11: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives. 705/4-2-23. "People ducking and running for cover in and around a parking lot."

Photo #12: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives. 705/4-2-24. "People lying prostrate on ground."

Photo #13: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives. 705/4-2-30. "An injured person being given first aid."

Photo #14: May 4 Collection. Kent State University Libraries. Special Collection and Archives. 705/4. "Crowd around Don Drumm sculpture, injured or slain person being taken to ambulance."

Nixon's "Vietnamization" speech

November 3, 1969

Good evening, my fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battle-front in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.

-The war had been going on for 4 years.

-31,000 Americans had been killed in action.

-The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule.

-540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.

-No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

-The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.

From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war. But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.

The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. Any many others I among them have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it? In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.

- They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

- We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

- With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but through-out the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: "... we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence.

"We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

- A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.

- Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

- This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives.

It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefield....

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people.

Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them." ...

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

- First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
- Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
- Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

-After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.

-The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office.

-Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.

-Most important United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy

activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at the time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution.

If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program.

We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.

If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which, as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war. -I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

-Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary a plan in which we will withdraw all our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course.

It is not the easy way.

It is the right way.

It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen.

Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home."

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

I respect your idealism.

I share your concern for peace.

I want peace as much as you do.

There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

-I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. -But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world.

-And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

If it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership. Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.

And so tonight to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: "This is the war to end war." His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have

initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated the goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it.

I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

Thank you and goodnight.

SOURCE: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, pp. 901-909.

<http://vietnam.vassar.edu/overview/doc14.html>

Directions: As you listen to President Nixon’s speech, highlight or underline portions that describe the actions of the U.S. in Cambodia and why action is necessary.

Nixon’s “Cambodia” speech

April 30, 1970

Good evening my fellow Americans:

Ten days ago, in my report to the Nation on Vietnam, I announced a decision to withdraw an additional 150,000 Americans from Vietnam over the next year. I said then that I was making that decision despite our concern over increased enemy activity in Laos, in Cambodia, and in South Vietnam.

At that time, I warned that if I concluded that increased enemy activity in any of these areas endangered the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam, I would not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

Despite that warning, North Vietnam has increased its military aggression in all these areas, and particularly in Cambodia.

After full consultation with the National Security Council, Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, and my other advisers, I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after withdrawal of another 150,000.

To protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization programs, I have concluded that the time has come for action.

Tonight, I shall describe the actions of the enemy, the actions I have ordered to deal with that situation, and the reasons for my decision.

Cambodia, a small country of 7 million people, has been a neutral nation since the Geneva agreement of 1954—an agreement, incidentally, which was signed by the Government of North Vietnam.

American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people. We have maintained a skeleton diplomatic mission of fewer than 15 in Cambodia's capital, and that only since last August. For the previous 4 years, from 1965 to 1969, we did not have any diplomatic mission whatever in Cambodia. And for the past 5 years, we have provided no military assistance whatever and no economic assistance to Cambodia.

North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality.

For the past 5 years—as indicated on this map that you see here—North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam. Some of these extend up to 20 miles into Cambodia. The sanctuaries are in red and, as you note, they are on both sides of the border. They are used for hit and run attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.

These Communist occupied territories contain major base camps, training sites, logistics facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, airstrips, and prisoner-of-war compounds.

For 5 years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation. Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries four weeks ago, we counseled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own commanders.

In contrast to our policy, the enemy in the past two weeks has stepped up his guerrilla actions and he is concentrating his main forces in these sanctuaries that you see on this map where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces and those of South Vietnam.

North Vietnam in the last two weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries; they are encircling the capital of Phnom Penh. Coming from these sanctuaries, as you see here, they have moved into Cambodia and are encircling the capital.

Cambodia, as a result of this, has sent out a call to the United States, to a number of other nations, for assistance. Because if this enemy effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier—a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation.

North Vietnamese men and supplies could then be poured into that country, jeopardizing not only the lives of our own men but the people of South Vietnam as well.

Now confronted with this situation, we have three options.

First, we can do nothing. Well, the ultimate result of that course of action is clear. Unless we indulge in wishful thinking, the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam after our next withdrawal of 150,000 would be gravely threatened.

Let us go to the map again. Here is South Vietnam. Here is North Vietnam. North Vietnam already occupies this part of Laos. If North Vietnam also occupied this whole band in Cambodia, or the entire country, it would mean that South Vietnam was completely outflanked and the forces of Americans in this area, as well as the South Vietnamese, would be in an untenable military position.

Our second choice is to provide massive military assistance to Cambodia itself. Now unfortunately, while we deeply sympathize with the plight of seven million Cambodians whose country is being invaded, massive amounts of military assistance could not be rapidly and effectively utilized by the small Cambodian Army against the immediate threat. With other nations, we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army of 40,000 needs and can use for its defense. But the aid we will provide will

be limited to the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other.

Our third choice is to go to the heart of the trouble. That means cleaning out major North Vietnamese and Vietcong occupied territories—these sanctuaries which serve as bases for attacks on both Cambodia and American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. Some of these, incidentally, are as close to Saigon as Baltimore is to Washington. This one, for example [indicating], is called the Parrot's Beak. It is only 33 miles from Saigon.

Now faced with these three options, this is the decision I have made.

In cooperation with the armed forces of South Vietnam, attacks are being launched this week to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border.

A major responsibility for the ground operations is being assumed by South Vietnamese forces. For example, the attacks in several areas, including the Parrot's Beak that I referred to a moment ago, are exclusively South Vietnamese ground operations under South Vietnamese command with the United States providing air and logistical support.

There is one area, however, immediately above Parrot's Beak, where I have concluded that a combined American and South Vietnamese operation is necessary.

Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality.

This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.

These actions are in no way directed to the security interests of any nation. Any government that chooses to use these actions as a pretext for harming relations with the United States will be doing so on its own responsibility, and on its own initiative, and we will draw the appropriate conclusions.

Now let me give you the reasons for my decision.

A majority of the American people, a majority of you listening to me, are for the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. The action I have taken tonight is indispensable for the continuing success of that withdrawal program.

A majority of the American people want to end this war rather than to have it drag on interminably. The action I have taken tonight will serve that purpose.

A majority of the American people want to keep the casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute minimum. The action I take tonight is essential if we are to accomplish that goal.

We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire. We have made—we will continue to make every possible effort to end this war through negotiation at the conference table

rather than through more fighting on the battlefield.

Let us look again at the record. We have stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have cut air operations by over 20 percent. We have announced withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. We have offered to withdraw all of our men if they will withdraw theirs. We have offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition—and that is that the future of South Vietnam be determined not by North Vietnam, and not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves.

The answer of the enemy has been intransigence at the conference table, belligerence in Hanoi, massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia, and stepped-up attacks in South Vietnam, designed to increase American casualties.

This attitude has become intolerable. We will not react to this threat to American lives merely by plaintive diplomatic protests. If we did, the credibility of the United States would be destroyed in every area of the world where only the power of the United States deters aggression.

Tonight, I again warn the North Vietnamese that if they continue to escalate the fighting when the United States is withdrawing its forces, I shall meet my responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces to take the action I consider necessary to defend the security of our American men.

The action that I have announced tonight puts the leaders of North Vietnam on notice that we will be patient in working for peace; we will be conciliatory at the conference table, but we will not be humiliated. We will not be defeated. We will not allow American men by the thousands to be killed by an enemy from privileged sanctuaries.

The time came long ago to end this war through peaceful negotiations. We stand ready for those negotiations. We have made major efforts, many of which must remain secret. I say tonight: All the offers and approaches made previously remain on the conference table whenever Hanoi is ready to negotiate seriously.

But if the enemy response to our most conciliatory offers for peaceful negotiation continues to be to increase its attacks and humiliate and defeat us, we shall react accordingly.

My fellow Americans, we live in an age of anarchy, both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last 500 years. Even here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed. Small nations all over the world find themselves under attack from within and from without.

If, when the chips are down, the world's most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.

It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight. The question all Americans must ask and answer tonight is this: Does the richest and strongest nation in the history of the world have the character to meet a direct challenge by a group which rejects every effort to win a just peace, ignores our warning, tramples on solemn agreements, violates the neutrality of an unarmed people, and uses our prisoners as hostages?

If we fail to meet this challenge, all other nations will be on notice that despite its overwhelming power the United States, when a real crisis comes, will be found wanting.

During my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to bring Americans home from Vietnam. They are coming home.

I promised to end this war. I shall keep that promise.

I promised to win a just peace. I shall keep that promise.

We shall avoid a wider war. But we are also determined to put an end to this war.

In this room, Woodrow Wilson made the great decisions which led to victory in World War I. Franklin Roosevelt made the decisions which led to our victory in World War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions which ended the war in Korea and avoided war in the Middle East. John F. Kennedy, in his finest hour, made the great decision which removed Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba and the Western Hemisphere.

I have noted that there has been a great deal of discussion with regard to this decision that I have made and I should point out that I do not contend that it is in the same magnitude as these decisions that I have just mentioned. But between those decisions and this decision there is a difference that is very fundamental. In those decisions, the American people were not assailed by counsels of doubt and defeat from some of the most widely known opinion leaders of the Nation.

I have noted, for example, that a Republican Senator has said that this action I have taken means that my party has lost all chance of winning the November elections. And others are saying today that this move against enemy sanctuaries will make me a one-term President.

No one is more aware than I am of the political consequences of the action I have taken. It is tempting to take the easy political path: to blame this war on previous administrations and to bring all of our men home immediately, regardless of the consequences, even though that would mean defeat for the United States; to desert 18 million South Vietnamese people, who have put their trust in us and to expose them to the same slaughter and savagery which the leaders of North Vietnam inflicted on hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese who chose freedom when the Communists took over North Vietnam in 1954; to get peace at any price now, even though I know that a peace of humiliation for the United States would lead to a bigger war or surrender later.

I have rejected all political considerations in making this decision.

Whether my party gains in November is nothing compared to the lives of 400,000 brave Americans fighting for our country and for the cause of peace and freedom in Vietnam. Whether I may be a one-term President is insignificant compared to whether by our failure to act in this crisis the United States proves itself to be unworthy to lead the forces of freedom in this critical period in world history. I would rather be a one-term President and do what I believe is right than to be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and to see this Nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history.

I realize that in this war there are honest and deep differences in this country about whether we

should have become involved, that there are differences as to how the war should have been conducted. But the decision I announce tonight transcends those differences.

For the lives of American men are involved. The opportunity for Americans to come home in the next 12 months is involved. The future of 18 million people in South Vietnam and 7 million people in Cambodia is involved. The possibility of winning a just peace in Vietnam and in the Pacific is at stake.

It is customary to conclude a speech from the White House by asking support for the President of the United States. Tonight, I depart from that precedent. What I ask is far more important. I ask for your support for our brave men fighting tonight halfway around the world—not for territory—not for glory—but so that their younger brothers and their sons and your sons can have a chance to grow up in a world of peace and freedom and justice.

Thank you and good night.

Text and video found at <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3890>

KEY

Nixon's "Cambodia" speech

April 30, 1970

Good evening my fellow Americans:

Ten days ago, in my report to the Nation on Vietnam, I announced a decision to withdraw an additional 150,000 Americans from Vietnam over the next year. I said then that I was making that decision despite our concern over increased enemy activity in Laos, in Cambodia, and in South Vietnam.

At that time, I warned that if I concluded that increased enemy activity in any of these areas endangered the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam, I would not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

(He also mentioned that he would take necessary action in his "Vietnamization" speech)

Despite that warning, North Vietnam has increased its military aggression in all these areas, and particularly in Cambodia.

After full consultation with the National Security Council, Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, and my other advisers, I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after withdrawal of another 150,000.

To protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization programs, I have concluded that the time has come for action.

Tonight, I shall describe the actions of the enemy, the actions I have ordered to deal with that situation, and the reasons for my decision.

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North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality.

For the past 5 years—as indicated on this map that you see here—North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam. Some of these extend up to 20 miles into Cambodia. The sanctuaries are in red and, as you note, they are on both sides of the border. They are used for hit and run attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.

These Communist occupied territories contain major base camps, training sites, logistics facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, airstrips, and prisoner-of-war compounds.

For 5 years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation. Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries four weeks ago, we counseled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own commanders.

In contrast to our policy, the enemy in the past two weeks has stepped up his guerrilla actions and he is concentrating his main forces in these sanctuaries that you see on this map where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces and those of South Vietnam.

North Vietnam in the last two weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries; they are encircling the capital of Phnom Penh. Coming from these sanctuaries, as you see here, they have moved into Cambodia and are encircling the capital.

Cambodia, as a result of this, has sent out a call to the United States, to a number of other nations, for assistance. Because if this enemy effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier—a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation.

North Vietnamese men and supplies could then be poured into that country, jeopardizing not only the lives of our own men but the people of South Vietnam as well.

Now confronted with this situation, we have three options.

First, we can do nothing. Well, the ultimate result of that course of action is clear. Unless we indulge in wishful thinking, the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam after our next withdrawal of 150,000 would be gravely threatened.

Let us go to the map again. Here is South Vietnam. Here is North Vietnam. North Vietnam already occupies this part of Laos. If North Vietnam also occupied this whole band in Cambodia, or the entire country, it would mean that South Vietnam was completely outflanked and the forces of Americans in this area, as well as the South Vietnamese, would be in an untenable military position.

Our second choice is to provide massive military assistance to Cambodia itself. Now unfortunately, while we deeply sympathize with the plight of seven million Cambodians whose country is being invaded, massive amounts of military assistance could not be rapidly and effectively utilized by the small Cambodian Army against the immediate threat. With other nations, we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army of 40,000 needs and can use for its defense. But the aid we will provide will

be limited to the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other.

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Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality.

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These actions are in no way directed to the security interests of any nation. Any government that chooses to use these actions as a pretext for harming relations with the United States will be doing so on its own responsibility, and on its own initiative, and we will draw the appropriate conclusions.

*****STOP AUDIO*****

Summarize the remainder of this speech for your students

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Let us look again at the record. We have stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have cut air operations by over 20 percent. We have announced withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. We have offered to withdraw all of our men if they will withdraw theirs. We have offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition—and that is that the future of South Vietnam be determined not by North Vietnam, and not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves.

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crisis the United States proves itself to be unworthy to lead the forces of freedom in this critical period in world history. I would rather be a one-term President and do what I believe is right than to be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and to see this Nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history.

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Thank you and good night.

Text and video found at <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3890>



Image Courtesy of the Kent State University Libraries

(Photo #1)



Image Courtesy of the Kent State University Libraries
(Photo #2)



Image Courtesy of the Kent State University Libraries
(Photo #3)



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(Photo #4)



Image Courtesy of the Kent State University Libraries
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Image Courtesy of the Kent State University Libraries
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Image Courtesy of the Kent State University Libraries
(Photo #11)



Image Courtesy of the Kent State University Libraries
(Photo # 12)



Image Courtesy of the Kent State University Libraries
(Photo #13)



Image Courtesy of the Kent State University Libraries
(Photo #14)

May 4, 1970 Chronology

A Crowd Begins to Gather - 11:00am

About 11:00 a.m., students began gathering on the Commons, apparently for a variety of reasons. Some had heard vaguely that a rally would be held. Some came to protest the presence of the Guard. Some were simply curious, or had free time because their classes had been canceled. Some students stopped by on their way to or from lunch or class. The Commons is a crossroads between several major university buildings.

Many students who described themselves as "straight," or conservative, later attributed their presence at the rally to a desire to protest against the National Guard.

General Canterbury reached the Commons between 11:30 and 11:40 a.m. with Lt. Col. Charles R. Fassinger, commander of the Second Squadron of the 107th Armored Cavalry*. Canterbury told a Commission investigator he did not feel that the crowd represented a significant threat at that time.

The Guard Makes Its First Move

Fassinger estimated that by 11:45 the crowd had grown to more than 500. The principal group gathered around the Victory Bell about 170 yards across the Commons from the burned-out ROTC building. ... Canterbury ordered the crowd dispersed. Fassinger then ordered troops to form up by the ruins of the ROTC building. Some 40 to 50 men from Company A, about 35 to 45 men from Company C, and 18 men from Troop G were hurriedly assembled. Those who had not already done so were ordered to "lock and load" their weapons. By this process, an M-1 rifle is loaded with an eight-round clip of .30 caliber ball ammunition, and one bullet is moved up into the chamber ready to fire. The weapon will then fire immediately after the safety mechanism is disengaged and the trigger is pulled. Throughout the weekend, whenever guardsmen were on duty, their weapons were locked and loaded.

A Kent State policeman, Harold E. Rice, stood near the ROTC ruins and, using a bullhorn, ordered the students to disperse. It is doubtful that Rice was heard over the noise of the crowd. ... The students responded with curses and stones. Rocks bounced off the jeep, and Rice said the occupants were hit several times.

... At 11:58 a.m., as the jeep returned, Canterbury ordered the 96 men and seven officers to form a skirmish line, shoulder to shoulder, and to move out across the Commons toward the students. Each man's weapon was locked and loaded. Canterbury estimated the size of the crowd on the Commons at about 800; another 1,000 or more persons were sitting or milling about on the hills surrounding the Commons. His goal as he moved out was to disperse the crowd.

The Rally Begins at the Victory Bell - 12:00pm

Shortly before noon, students began to ring the Victory Bell. Two generalized emotions seem to have prevailed among the 2,000 or so young persons who were now on or near the Commons. One was a vague feeling that something worth watching or participating in would occur that something was going to happen and that the Guard would respond. The other was antipathy to the Guard, bitter in some cases, accompanied by the feeling that the Guard, although fully backed

by official pronouncements, was somehow "trespassing" on the students' own territory.

A majority of the crowd was watching the tableau from the patio of Taylor Hall and from the slopes around the adjacent buildings of Prentice, Johnson, and Stopher Halls. The hills made a natural amphitheater from which students could watch events on the Commons floor. Most of the onlooking students could not be described-as neutral: in almost any quarrel between students and guardsmen, they would take the side of their fellow students. The troops lined up with fixed bayonets across the northwestern corner of the Commons. ... Eight to ten grenadiers with M-79 grenade launchers fired two volleys of tear gas canisters at the crowd, which began to scatter. Canterbury, in civilian clothes and unarmed, was in command.

The Guard Starts Firing Tear Gas

The day was bright and sunny, and a 14-mile-an-hour breeze was blowing. The tear gas did not at first scatter all the students: the wind blew some of the gas away; the aim of some of the grenadiers was poor, causing many who were only spectators to be gassed; and some of the students picked up the tear gas canisters and threw them back. Canterbury ordered the troops to move out. The guardsmen were wearing gas masks. Company A was on the right flank, Company C was on the left flank, and Troop G was in the middle. Moving out with the men were Canterbury, Fassinger, and the third in command, Major Harry D. Jones. ...

The Guard Marches Up Blanket Hill

The guardsmen marched across the flat Commons, the students scattering before them up a steep hill beyond the Victory Bell. ...

When Canterbury reached the crest of Blanket Hill, however, he concluded that it would be necessary to push the students beyond a football practice field which lay about 80 yards below the crest of Blanket Hill.

By this time the crowd seemed more united in mood. The feeling had spread among students that they were being harassed as "a group, that state and civic officials had united against them, and that the university had either cooperated or acquiesced in their suppression. They reacted to the guardsmen's march with substantial solidarity. The guardsmen generally felt that the students, who had disobeyed numerous orders to disperse, were clearly in the wrong. The razing of the ROTC building had shown them that these noisy youths were capable of considerable destruction.

The guardsmen marched down the east slope of Blanket Hill, across an access road, and onto the football practice field, which is fenced in on three sides. The crowd parted to let them down the hill to the field and then reformed in two loose groups-one on Blanket Hill, above the football field, and the other in the Prentice Hall parking lot at the north end of the field. The crowd on the parking lot was unruly and threw many missiles at guardsmen on the football field. ... Nearby construction projects provided an ample supply of rocks. ... After the Guard would shoot a canister, students sometimes would pick it up and lob it back ... In some cases, guardsmen would pick up the same canister and throw it at the students. Some among the crowd came to regard the situation as a game -- "a tennis match" one called it -- and cheered each exchange of tear gas canisters. Only a few students participated in this game, however. One of them was Jeffrey Glenn Miller. A few minutes later, Miller was fatally shot. ...

While on the football field, about a dozen guardsmen knelt and pointed their weapons at the

students in the Prentice Hall parking lot, apparently as a warning... Whether any shot was fired on the field is in dispute.

The Guard Retraces Their Steps

After the guardsmen had been on the football field for about 10 minutes, Canterbury concluded that his dispersal mission had been sufficiently accomplished. He ordered his troops to retrace their steps back up Blanket Hill. He also thought -- wrongly-- that his men had exhausted their supply of tear gas. ... Canterbury made no check to determine if tear gas was still available before the order to move out was given.

...The Guard's march from Blanket Hill to the football field and back did not disperse the crowd and seems to have done little else than increase tension, subject guardsmen to needless abuse, and encourage the most violent and irresponsible elements in the crowd to harass the Guard further. ...

The Crowd Scatters Around the Area

As the guardsmen left the practice field on their way back up Blanket Hill, they encountered a crowd of several hundred students ... The crowd divided to let the Guard through. A small gathering of 25 to 50 persons stood on the crest of Blanket Hill. As the Guard approached them, they retreated down the west slope of the hill and away from the scene of action. About 100 persons stood on the east terrace of Taylor Hall, watching the guardsmen approach the adjacent hill. They are not known to have thrown any rocks and seem to have been spectators throughout. Perhaps another 100 persons withdrew from the edge of the practice field to slope just below the east side of the hall. They threw some rocks.

A crowd of about 200 persons near Johnson Hall had generally watched the guardsmen pass by and had not followed them to the football field and back. As the Guard crossed the road that lies between the football field and the foot of Blanket Hill, perhaps 200 persons moved off to the left of the troops through the trees toward Lake Hall. Among them was student James D. Russell, subsequently wounded as he stood more than 100 yards from the firing line on Blanket Hill.

In the Prentice Hall parking lot, to one side of the withdrawing Guard, were some 100 to 200 students, some throwing rocks, others carrying books.

About 20 to 50 persons formed the most conspicuous part of the crowd. In this group were those most active in throwing rocks. ... Included in this group of 20 to 50 were two young men, one carrying a red flag and the other a black flag ...particularly aggressive, cursing and jeering the guardsmen, following and pursuing them at a range varying from about 20 to 80 yards.

Near the crest of Blanket Hill stands the Pagoda, a square bench made of 4-by-4 wooden beams and shaded by a concrete umbrella. The events which occurred as the Guard reached the Pagoda, turned, and fired on the students, are in bitter dispute.

Shots Fired - 12:25pm

...Fassinger had removed his gas mask to see more clearly. He said the guardsmen had reached a point between the Pagoda and Taylor Hall, and he was attempting to maintain them in a reasonably orderly formation, when he heard a sound like a shot, which was immediately followed by a volley of shots. He saw the troops on the Taylor Hall end of the line shooting. He

yelled, "Cease fire!" and ran along the line repeating the command.

Major Jones said he first heard an explosion which he thought was a firecracker. As he turned to his left, he heard another explosion which he knew to be an M-1 rifle shot. As he turned to his right, toward Taylor Hall, he said he saw guardsmen kneeling (photographs show some crouching) and bringing their rifles to their shoulders. He heard another M-1 shot, and then a volley of them. He yelled, "Cease fire!" several times, and rushed down the line shoving rifle barrels up and away from the crowd. He hit several guardsmen on their helmets with his swagger stick to stop them from firing. General Canterbury stated that he first heard a single shot, which he thought was fired from some distance away on his left and which in his opinion did not come from a military weapon. Immediately afterward, he heard a volley of M-1 fire from his right. His first reaction, like that of Fassinger and Jones, was to stop the firing. Canterbury, Fassinger, and Jones -- the three ranking officers on the hill -- all said no order to fire was given.

Twenty-eight guardsmen have acknowledged firing from Blanket Hill. Of these, 25 fired 55 shots from rifles, two fired five shots from .45 caliber pistols, and one fired a single blast from a shotgun. Sound tracks indicate that the firing of these 61 shots lasted approximately 13 seconds. The time of the shooting was approximately 12:25 p.m.

Four persons were killed and nine were wounded. As determined by the FBI, their distances from the firing line and the types of wounds they received were as follows:

1. Joseph Lewis, Jr., 20 yards, wounded in the right abdomen and the left lower leg.
2. Thomas V. Grace, 20 yards, wounded in the left ankle.
3. John R. Cleary, 37 yards, wounded in the left upper chest.
4. Allen Michael Canfora, 75 yards, wounded in the right wrist.
5. Jeffrey Glenn Miller, 85 to 90 yards, killed by a shot in the mouth.
6. Dean R. Kahler, 95 to 100 yards, wounded in the left side of the small of his back. A bullet fragment lodged in his spine, and he is paralyzed from the waist down.
7. Douglas Alan Wrentmore, 110 yards, wounded in the right knee.
8. Allison B. Krause, 110 yards, killed by a bullet that passed through her left upper arm and into her left side
9. James Dennis Russell, 125 to 130 yards, wounded in the right thigh and right forehead
10. William K. Schroeder, 130 yards, killed by a shot in the left back at the seventh rib.
11. Sandra Lee Scheuer, 130 yards, killed by a shot through the left front side of the neck.
12. Robert Stamps, 165 yards, wounded in the right buttock.
13. Donald Scott Mackenzie, 245 to 250 yards, wounded in the left rear of the neck.

Schroeder and Kahler were hit while lying prone. MacKenzie and Canfora were wounded while running away from the line of fire. Russell and Stamps were apparently hit by ricochets. Two of the casualties, Lewis and Russell, were wounded twice. Of the 25 riflemen who admitted firing, 21 said they fired their 41 shots either into the air or into the ground. Four riflemen acknowledged firing nine of their total of 14 shots into the crowd. Two men fired pistols: one said he fired two shots into the crowd and the other said he fired three shots into the air. The guardsman who fired a shotgun said he fired a single blast into the air. Russell was wounded by shotgun pellets believed to have ricocheted off nearby trees. The guardsmen admit firing a total of only 11 rounds into the crowd. Besides the 15 wounds sustained by the casualties, however, a number of parked cars in the Prentice Hall parking lot afterward showed bullet holes.

Guardsmen have claimed that they were under an increasingly heavy barrage of rocks and other objects as they advanced back up Blanket Hill and that students rushed toward them threateningly. Many indicated that they began firing when they heard one or some of their fellow guardsmen open fire.

Although General Canterbury said his men were "not panic stricken," it is clear that many of them were frightened. Many suffered bruises and abrasions from stones, although only one guardsman, Sgt Dennis L. Breckenridge, required overnight hospitalization. He passed out from hyperventilation...

...A few students and a few guardsmen claim to have heard something like an order to fire. One student testified to the Commission that he saw an officer raise and lower his pistol just before the firing, possibly as a signal to shoot. The weight of the evidence indicates, however, that no command to fire was given, either by word or by gesture.

As the shooting began, students scattered and ran. In the parking lot behind Prentice Hall, where two were killed and two were wounded, students dove behind parked cars and attempted to flatten themselves on the pavement. On the slope east of Taylor Hall, where four were wounded, students scrambled behind a metal sculpture, rolled down the incline, or sought cover behind trees. The scene was one of pell-mell disorder and fight.

Many thought the guardsmen were firing blanks. When the shooting stopped and they rose and saw students bleeding, the first reaction of most was shock. Jeffrey Miller lay on the pavement of an access road, blood streaming from his mouth.

Then the crowd grew angry. They screamed and some called the guardsmen "murderers." Some tried to give first aid. One vainly attempted mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on Sandra Lee Scheuer, one of the fatalities. Knots of students gathered around those who had fallen.

Sandra Lee Scheuer, 20, a junior, is believed to have been on her way to a 1:10 p.m. class in the Music and Speech Building when she was struck. She has not been identified in any available photographs as having attended the prohibited noon rally on the Commons.

Allison B. Krause, 19, a freshman, was among the group of students gathered on the Commons by the Victory Bell shortly before noon. After her death, small fragments of concrete and cinder block were found in the pockets of her jacket.

Jeffrey Glenn Miller, 20, a junior, was present in the crowd on the Commons when the dispersal order was given and made obscene gestures with his middle finger at guardsmen. He also threw back a tear gas canister at the Guard while it was on the football practice field.

William K. Schroeder, 19, a sophomore, was an ROTC cadet. A photograph shows him retreating up Blanket Hill from the rally on the Commons, but he is not shown taking part in any of the harassment of the Guard.

At the moment of the firing, most of the nine wounded students were far beyond a range at which they could have presented any immediate physical threat to the Guard.

The closest casualties -- Lewis, Grace, and Cleary-- were all within 20 to 40 yards. At the moment shooting began, Lewis was standing between Taylor Hall and the metal sculpture, making obscene gestures at guardsmen with the middle finger of his right hand. Cleary was standing on the other side of the sculpture, which was perforated by a bullet. Grace was near them, but a little farther away from Taylor Hall. His actions are not known.

Canfora, who said he had been chanting antiwar slogans earlier, had started to run for cover behind cars in Prentice Hall parking lot when he was hit. Kahler was standing at the northwest corner of the football field, beyond stone-throwing range, when the firing began. He dropped to the ground and was hit while prone. Wrentmore was in the Prentice Hall parking lot and said he walking away to a class when he heard the firing begin, turned, and was wounded. Russell, apparently hit by a ricochet, was standing far away from all the other casualties, near Lake Hall and Memorial Gymnasium. Stamps, tear gassed on the Commons, had just left Prentice Hall after washing tear gas off his face. He was wounded in Prentice Hall parking lot as he tried to run away from the firings.

Mackenzie, the casualty most distant from the Guard, said he heard the firing begin and had turned to run when he was hit. The entire length of Prentice Hall parking lot and the east slope of Blanket Hill lay between him and the Guard.

After the shooting, students ran to Taylor, Prentice, and Dunbar Halls to telephone for ambulances. Others ran down to the Commons screaming for ambulances. Several minutes passed before the ambulances came. Students linked their arms and formed rings around the bodies to keep them from further injury. Some students wept. Others wandered around dazed.

The shooting on Blanket Hill was done principally by members of Troop G and Company A. Company C, except for two members who went down to the football field and returned to Blanket Hill with the main body of troops, remained at the northern end of Taylor Hall where they had been dispatched by General Canterbury. The C Company members at that position, which is at the opposite end of Taylor Hall from Blanket Hill, did not fire their weapons.

After the firing, the C Company commander, Capt. Snyder, took seven men down to the Prentice Hall parking lot to render first aid. He looked at two young men who had fallen, probably Miller and Schroeder, but concluded both were dead. While the detachment was in the vicinity of the body of Jeffrey Miller, enraged students began to scream at them. The guardsmen responded by throwing a tear gas pellet at the student group. Capt. Snyder withdrew his unit to its original position and then back across the Commons, leaving the casualties where they had fallen. Many students subsequently believed that no guardsmen made any effort to render first aid after the shootings and added this to their catalogue of charges against the troops.

After the Shots

The scene after the shooting was tense, and there was a possibility of further trouble. After an ambulance removed Miller's body, a demonstrator who had carried a black flag during the confrontation dipped the flag into the pool of Miller's blood and waved it at nearby students in an apparent effort to inflame them further. Canterbury withdrew his troops to the Commons almost immediately. He ordered a weapons check to determine how many guardsmen fired how many rounds. He also ordered that no more rounds be fired except at a specified target and upon an officer's order.

After the casualties were removed, students began to gather again on the hills overlooking the

Commons. The largest concentration, varying from 200 to 300, congregated on the slope below Johnson Hall at one corner of the Commons. Many of them would later have trouble describing their emotions.

Professor Glenn W. Frank obtained permission from General Canterbury to allow faculty marshals to attempt to persuade this crowd to leave without further military action. Frank and Dr. Seymour H. Baron, who had a bullhorn, persuaded the students to sit down instead of milling around. Baron warned the students they might be shot if they approached the guardsmen again.

Adapted from the May 4, 1970 chronology found at: <http://www.kentstate1970.org/index.php?url=may4th1970>

Assessment: Kent State and Vietnam

Directions: Choose one of the following two prompts and write a letter to the editor of newspaper. This letter needs to be an opinion based on the events that happened on Kent State's campus following Nixon's speech announcing that U.S. forces will enter Cambodia. You must describe how you have been affected by the decisions of the government.

Prompt A: You are the leader of the antiwar group on your college campus, and this group has agreed that and you must address the entire student body regarding the events that took place at Kent State on May 4, 1970. You will write a letter to the editor of your school newspaper to issue your concerns about the recent violence, the perceived betrayal of Richard Nixon, and how your life has been affected by the decision to stay in Vietnam and enter Cambodia. Use Nixon's speeches and the rubric below to assist you while writing your letter.

Prompt B: You are a citizen that disagrees with the anti-war movement that has been staging protests around the country. After the Kent State shootings, you feel the need to address the other citizens of your community pointing out the need for continuous involvement in Vietnam and now, in Cambodia. You believe that the students and other members of the anti-war movement do not understand the importance of maintaining a presence in Southeast Asia. Write a letter to the editor of the local newspaper to discuss your support of Richard Nixon and the U.S. government's decisions concerning Vietnam and Cambodia. Use Nixon's speeches and the rubric below to assist you while writing your letter.

Pre-writing space:

CATEGORY	4 - Above Standards	3 - Meets Standards	2 - Approaching Standards	1 - Below Standards	Score
Goal/Thesis 30%	Strongly and clearly states a personal opinion. Clearly identifies the issue. 0.30x4=1.2 point	Clearly states a personal opinion. Some references to the issue. 0.30x3=0.9 point	Personal opinion is not clearly stated. Little or no references to the issue. 0.30x2=0.6 point	Personal opinion is not easily understood. Has no reference to the issue. 0.30x1=0.3 point	
Reasons and Support 50%	Two or more excellent points are made with good support. Writer includes support from both of Nixon's speeches. It is evident that the writer put much thought and research into this assignment. 0.50x4=2.0 point	Two or more points are made with support, but the arguments are somewhat weak in places. Writer includes support from both of Nixon's speeches. The writer doesn't persuade completely. 0.50x3=1.5 point	Two points are made; shows some preparation, but weak arguments. Writer includes support from only one speech. 0.50x2=1.0 point	Preparation is weak; arguments are weak or missing; and less than two points are made. Writer includes support from only 1 speech. 0.50x1=0.5 point	
Conclusion 10%	Summarizes personal opinion in a strong concluding statement. 0.10x4=0.4 point	Summarizes personal opinion in a concluding statement. 0.10x3=0.3 point	Concluding statement is a weak summary of personal opinion. 0.10x2=0.2 point	Concluding statement makes no reference to personal opinion. 0.10x1=0.1 point	
Organization/Mechanics and Grammar 10%	Sentences and paragraphs are well written and varied. Contains few, if any punctuation, spelling, or grammatical errors. 0.10x4=0.4 point	Sentence and paragraph structure is generally correct. Contains several errors in punctuation, spelling, or grammar that do not interfere with the meaning. 0.10x3=0.3 point	Sentence and paragraph structure is inconsistent. Contains many punctuation, spelling, and/or grammatical errors that interfere with meaning. 0.10x2=0.2 point	Little or no evidence of sentence or paragraph structure. Contains many punctuation, spelling, and/or grammatical errors that make the piece illegible. 0.10x1=0.1 point	

Sample Student Response

Dear Editor,

As the president of Ohio State University's antiwar group, I feel like it is my duty to express my views about the recent events on Kent State's campus. I feel that the situation should have never happened because these students were only expressing their opinions and exercising their First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly. The administration of Kent State University, the National Guard, the city of Kent and of Governor Rhodes are responsible for the deaths of four young college students. Students did throw rocks, but they were intimidated by the National Guardsmen. If the National Guardsmen would not have been called in, there would have been no violence on campus. Simply, the authority figures are to blame because they overreacted, created the violence, and now, four sets of parents will have to bury their child.

I must defend the students' desires to protest for I also wanted to protest against our lying government, especially President Nixon. Nixon lied to us when he said that he wanted to bring troops home from Vietnam. When he announced his plan for Vietnamization, President Nixon said that he would be truthful about the situation in Vietnam and that he wanted to bring troops home. He said, "We have adopted a plan for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable." This was good news, and my antiwar group was extremely hopeful. As a group, we believed that Nixon was a big improvement and would not lie to us like President Johnson did. In the same speech, President Nixon said, "The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy." Finally, we thought that we have a president that would be truthful with the American people. Clearly, we were wrong.

Hopeful that we would withdraw from Vietnam sooner than later, we were shocked when we heard the news about our expansion into Cambodia. A few days ago, Richard Nixon claimed that Cambodia asked for our help because they are now threatened with a communist Vietnamese invasion. He said that Cambodia could become an "enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South Vietnam...a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation." We are now expanding our presence in Asia when Nixon promised that our troops would come home. Why we are even concerned with what happens in Cambodia? Let them fight their own war, just like the South Vietnamese should have done from the beginning. We have lost thousands of lives and now we are expanding. Nixon gave us three options, but none of them are acceptable. We should pull out of Vietnam right away and not even be concerned with Vietnam. This is the only option that we would like to see put into place.

Our lives are affected by the recent violence and the expansion of the U.S. military into Cambodia. First, the men in our group are fearful that this conflict will never end and that they

too, will be drafted. This frightening reality has only been made worse by entering Cambodia, which will extend the amount of time that our military will spend in Asia. We are all fearful; the men about the possibility of being drafted, but all of us do not want to see any more soldiers die for a pointless war. Second, because of Kent State, we are afraid to exercise our First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. If we choose to protest, will Governor Rhodes call out the National Guard again? Will more young people die if we speak out? We are citizens of this country, yet we are denied our rights. We live in the United States not in the Soviet Union, so our government needs to stop acting like it!

In conclusion, I feel betrayed by this country and our leadership. I believe that our government should stop making promises that they will not keep. We know that they lie, and I guess this is just the way it will be in this country. If our rights are being taken away now, what will it be like in future generations? I feel badly for the future of this country because in twenty years, we will still be in Vietnam and our children will not have any freedom.