

# **The Somalia Syndrome**

## **Pragmatic Humanitarianism in the World's Most Dangerous Place**



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*Dedicated to the 45 American soldiers  
who gave the ultimate sacrifice in Somalia since 1992.  
You fought in a foreign land, for a foreign people;  
not for personal gain or glory, but because it was the right thing to do.  
May this paper serve to finish what you started.*

*Acknowledgments*

“In my walks, every man I meet is my superior in some way, and in that I learn from him.” --Ralph Waldo Emerson<sup>1</sup>

Nowhere is this quote more pertinent than in a project predicated upon fixing a foreign nation. Throughout it, I suffered from a classic case of ‘if you’re not confused, you don’t understand what’s going on.’ To everyone who aided me, not just in my paper, but in any facet of my life, you contributed by forming me into the man I am; for that, I am eternally grateful.

First and foremost I would like to thank my panelists: Prof. Sarah Bauerle-Danzman, David Bender, Dr. Todd Burkhardt, Mr. Kizito Kalima, and Dr. Matthew Macgrath. The pandemic upon us has certainly disrupted daily life in unprecedented ways, so for several esteemed experts to take time out of your lives to develop and critique my report is a humbling honor. I know your professional insight will propel my report to new heights. Particular thanks to Dr. Burkhardt whose doctoral thesis, *Just War and Human Rights: Fighting with Right Intention*, formed the foundation for two of my chapters.

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<sup>1</sup> Emerson, “Every Man Is My Superior.”

Dr. Dubie, whose after school discussions over a year and a half ago first set me on the path of Somalia.

To my friends, it is through you I owe much of my character. The past four years' experiences, both the wonderful and the stressful, have shaped me into a more resilient and happy individual. Though our time was tragically cut short by COVID-19, if any lesson can be drawn from this pandemic, and this report, it is life could be much worse. I will always cherish our memories and be thankful that you all provided a welcoming and intellectually challenging community to mature in.

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To my grandfather, your devotion to me as a grandson as well as to this paper remains unparalleled. Without your steadfast enthusiasm during editing and the tedious footnoting process, this paper would have been finished much later and certainly not on the same caliber. You are wholly invaluable in the truest sense of the word.

Finally, and most importantly, to my family. How could I ever describe or repay the gift of life you have given me? You have given me everything and more. I understand the writing of this report, between the long hours locked away in my room to the ranting about the troubles prevalent throughout a distant land, has certainly not lived up to your expectations of my final

months at home. Nonetheless, you provided me with all the love and support a son could ever ask for. I know that if I continue to care and strive to promote understanding and justice throughout the world, I'll make you all proud and show everyone that Helds can change the world too.

For that, and indescribably more, I thank you all.

*Abstract*

If there was ever a place so devoid of peace in the post-Cold War era, it is Somalia. Universally notorious as the epitome of a failed nation-state, its economic and political institutions persist in a vicious cycle which has perpetuated human rights atrocities for the past half century. Since the infamous Blackhawk Down Incident, paired with mediocre nation-building results in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond, critics of humanitarian operations fiercely contend that only further quagmires will result from additional intervention. Yet, these arguments omit or misinterpret key aspects regarding efforts in Somalia.

This report, “The Somalia Syndrome,” proposes that the Western world possesses national security interests as well as a moral imperative to expand nation-building operations in the country, and offers recommendations for how to conduct such a perplexing undertaking. It asserts this over four parts. First, *The Syndromes* presents an in-depth analysis of Somali history to introduce this lawless land and identifies the vast array of issues facing national development. Next, *The Cause* examines the origins of state prosperity or poverty and illustrates the true reasons Somalia remains desolate. Third, *The Necessity* considers liberal and realist arguments on international intervention and constructs a proper procedure and criteria for action. Lastly, *The Remedies* evaluates three predominant facets of the current situation, and then offers innovative recommendations which promote Western and Somali prosperity.

By pursuing this four-fold path, humanity may one day transform “the most dangerous place in the world”<sup>2</sup> into a robust democracy brimming with economic prosperity, and halt the eternal violence once and for all.


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<sup>2</sup> Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place.”

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
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Introduction: The Somalia Syndrome

Me and Somalia against the world  
 Me and my clan against Somalia  
 Me and my family against the clan  
 Me and my brother against my family  
 Me against my brother.  
 ~Somali Proverb<sup>6</sup>

For the past half-century, Somalia persisted as the pinnacle of barbarity and anarchy in the world, possessing a magnitude of chaos only matched by its degree of savagery. “The hearts of Somalians are heavy with grief. For too long, Somalis have used violence to achieve their goals or to resolve their differences. Too many lives have been lost. Too many dreams have been destroyed” wrote the President of Somalia. “The time has come for Somalia to put an end to violence.”<sup>7</sup>

Throughout this time, organizations from the UN to the United States, from the African Union to the EU, and from Somali goat-herders to national leaders have striven to transform Somalia from rubble to a resolute prospering democracy. Yet, conventional measures to initiate national reconstruction remain thwarted by pervasive extractive political and economic institutions, reinforced by intense clan militancy. Therefore, an innovative strategy is crucial to engendering an everlasting peace sorely required amidst a land wracked by oppressive regimes, man-made famines, foreign intervention, and clan-centric terrorism.<sup>8</sup>

Such a strategy must not repeat the faults of the past which induced the terrifying images of battered American bodies paraded through the streets of Mogadishu following Blackhawk

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<sup>6</sup> Chun, *Gothic Serpent*, 4.

<sup>7</sup> Keating, *War and Peace in Somalia*, ix.

<sup>8</sup> Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs*, 1.

Down. Instead, such a strategy must transcend the issues of the present which bog down current missions and endeavor to eradicate the underlying elements generating abhorrent violence. To permanently resolve Somalia's syndromes, one must heal the severely festering institutional epidemic.

In this report, “The Somalia Syndrome,” the turbulent history of “the most dangerous place in the world” will be presented, followed by comprehensive theorising on the origins of state failure, as well as philosophical and pragmatic assessments of humanitarian intervention and nation-building.<sup>9</sup> Only then can one accurately articulate remedies to resurrect Somalia from “the modern world’s closest approximation of Hobbes’s state of nature.” Life now might indeed be “nasty, brutish, and short,” but the streets of Mogadishu need not ring with explosions as frequently as the azan (the Islamic call to prayer).<sup>10</sup>

Through extensive research and thoughtful deliberation, we can “address grievances and work to ensure respect for the human rights for all Somalis,” thereby charting a “path to a more peaceful and prosperous future.”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place.”

<sup>10</sup> Gettleman.

<sup>11</sup> Keating, xi-x.

### Part I: The Syndromes

Since 15,000 BCE, people have inhabited the Horn of Africa.<sup>12</sup> Trading precious materials across the known corners of the globe, “The Kingdom of the Gods” became a hub of luxury and prosperity; yet, this Golden Age did not last.<sup>13</sup> The rise and fall of this land is a complex tale; and, in order to understand where one must go, one must understand where one came from.

For clarity, Part I categorizes the history of Somalia into four eras. First, *Land of Gods and Clans* will review Somalian history from its prehistoric roots to the end of the colonial rule, establishing the deep cultural and political divides between the North and South before nationhood. Second, *The Colony that Rejected Freedom* demonstrates Somalia’s inevitable failure as both a republic and a socialist dictatorship following its independence in 1960. Next, *A Hollywood Movie* portrays Somalia’s descent into anarchy following the toppling of the dictatorship in 1991 and the failure of the UN/US peacekeeping mission during the 1990s. Finally, *Business End of a Machine Gun* explores the clash between the rise of governance and the rise of terrorism in Somalia and set the stage for a deep exploration of modern issues and syndromes facing Somalia that is be presented in Part IV.

This is how Somalia became “The World’s Most Dangerous Place.”<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Njoku, *The History of Somalia*, 27.

<sup>13</sup> Njoku, 31.

<sup>14</sup> Fergusson, *World’s Most Dangerous Place*, 382.

## Chapter 1

Land of Gods and Clans

Situated on the Eastern Horn of Africa, Somalia was originally labeled ‘Land of the Gods’ by the ancient Egyptians. One of the earliest descriptions of the region originates from *Periplus Maris Erythraie*, a document written in Greek during the first century A.D. It describes an arid land replete with rolling dunes and little vegetation. Although this description is not wholly accurate as mountains contain thickets and grasses in addition to a climate that occasions periodic torrential rain, overall “the vegetation is that of a dry land, but not that of a true desert.”<sup>15</sup> Therefore,, on par, Somalia’s agricultural prospects have always remained grim. The extended dryness, particularly on its coast, does not produce healthy soil and renders Somali farmers dependent on water reserves stored from irregular precipitation amounts from the rainy seasons.

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As a result, ever since the first ‘Berbers’ (inhabitants of the Northern Somali Coast) arrived, they practiced a clan-based society characterized by their pastoral lifestyle, “following their herds of sheep and goats back and forth between mountain and coast in a pattern that still continues today.”<sup>17</sup> Minor inter-clan violence was frequent, but no wide scale conflict ever emerged, and all injustices were settled between clan elders trading camels in the oral-passed *xeer* legal system.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, Somalia's strategic location on the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean perfectly situated it on the highway for “lucrative international commerce linking up the East African societies with the Middle East, India, China, Europe, and the wider

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
<sup>15</sup> Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs*, 5.

<sup>16</sup> Abdullahi, 3; Wiafe-Amoako, *The World Today Series*, 231.

<sup>17</sup> Abdullahi, 15.

<sup>18</sup> Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 239.

world.”<sup>19</sup> Port cities such as Mogadishu flourished in the exchange of gold, spices, ivory, and other “precious goods” from Rome, Baghdad, all the way to Hangzhou, China.<sup>20</sup>



Somalia's vast trading network along the Silk Road<sup>21</sup>

For millennia, several factors prohibited state consolidation and left Somalia vulnerable to foreign exploitation and regional interference. Sunni Islam swept the region and intertwined itself with Somali life. One British anthropologist believes the origin of the word Somali comes from the word, *salma*, or “become a Muslim”.<sup>22</sup> Between the late 1200s to the 1700s, a series of Sultanate city-states arose centered around prosperous ports and merged the Muslim *qadi* legal code with the traditional *xeer* system. The kingdoms of Ifat, Adal, Ajuran, and Majerteen all would briefly form armies composed of groups of united Muslim clans from across the region to combat the Christian Ethiopian kingdoms, and later Portuguese invaders. Yet, due to their mostly

<sup>19</sup> Njoku, *The History of Somalia*, 2.

<sup>20</sup> Njoku, 31.

<sup>21</sup> Buyuafrika, “Mogadishu and Ajuran Kingdom,” map.

<sup>22</sup> Abdullahi, 7-8.

nomadic lifestyle, ample coastline to establish ports, and deterrence among each other in what only can be described as “Kill me and you will suffer the wrath of my entire clan” attitude, the hereditary clans had no motive nor desire to mingle with other groups beyond their self-governing clan. Additionally, the British explorer Richard Burton noted Somalis were naturally “a fierce and turbulent race of Republicans,” meaning highly defensive of local autonomy and law.<sup>23</sup> This proved fatal as the presence of new, large, and centralized European states such as Portugal made the city-states’ economies a “pale shadow” of their former selves.<sup>24</sup> The European ‘discovery’ of direct trade routes to American and Southeast Asian raw materials redirected global trade away from the center of Eurafasia, thereby circumventing the merchants in Somalia. But while trading dwindled, the geopolitical landscape remained generally unaltered. As the various tribes chewed on their khat (amphetamine-like stimulant which causes great excitement), tended their herds, and recorded their poetic oral traditions, external powerful forces set their sights on the Somali homeland.<sup>25</sup>

The Scramble for Africa sent imperial European powers into a frenzy for African dominance. Hoping to seize the lucrative trade routes, Italy, Britain, France, and Egypt all jostled for Somalia's commercial ports, as the bleak vegetation and resource scarcity of the interior was of little interest to foreign governments or industrialists. Though Italy and Great Britain succeeded in gaining control over areas of coast, other aspects of imperialization and colonization failed. Deeply rooted Islamic traditions, including Sharia Law, rendered Somali culture “fiercely combative” to any attempts at imposing Western laws.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the

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<sup>23</sup> Abdullahi, 14-19; Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place,”; Njoku, 34-43.

<sup>24</sup> Abdullahi, 18.

<sup>25</sup> Wiafe-Amoko, 231.

<sup>26</sup> Abdullahi, 18-26; Chun, “Operation Gothic Serpent,” Wikipedia.



Europeans never even considered pursuing Christian conversion as Somalia had resisted Christian Ethiopian incursions for centuries and continued to despise the “infidels” throughout occupation.<sup>27</sup> Even establishing dominance over the native population, the most critical aspect of colonization, proved limited in its success.<sup>28</sup>



British and Italian Somalia<sup>29</sup>

The manner of colonial governance, and therefore Somalian existence under the new regimes, depended upon the goals of the colonizer. Chiefly concerned with safeguarding “ships en route to India” through the Gulf of Aden and the newly opened Suez Canal, the northern British Somaliland constructed two “‘republics’: subjects and citizens.”<sup>30</sup> ‘Subjects’ on the coastline received British investment to propel the trade economy. The goal of revitalizing the local economy did not come to pass, but those among the Northern coast were systematically

<sup>27</sup> Njoku 76

<sup>28</sup> Abdullahi, 18-26; History World, “History of Somalia”; Njoku, 54; Wiafe-Amoko, 232.

<sup>29</sup> The British Empire, “British Somaliland Protectorate,” map.

<sup>30</sup> Njoku, 65; Wiafe-Amoko, 232.

modernized with Western education, cosmopolitan lifestyle, and access to the “global capitalist economy.”<sup>31</sup> In the “hinterlands,” the British operated a laissez-faire rule with chieftains forming “well defined autonomous community[ies] with a distinct way of life.”<sup>32</sup> In these areas, nomadic, clan-centric existence continued on as it always had.

To administer a region divided by fiefdoms, the British employed the indirect rule system developed in India. British officials educated Somali chiefs, the *akili*, on methods of modern administration as well as transcribed the *qadi-xeer* legal code.<sup>33</sup> By allowing Somalis to retain their conflict-resolution processes but teaching them on how to properly frame it within a grounded bureaucracy, what “emerged in the North were more peaceful, democratic practices.”

<sup>34</sup> A small generation in Somaliland now possessed important inclusive institutions, including tools of peaceful, interclan mediation and cooperation under the same government, things their Southern brethren would be unable to develop.

Due to its delayed national consolidation, Italy was lagging in joining the Industrial Revolution until the 1860s. Now, just as Europe relied upon America to relieve it of its increasingly impoverished urban population, Italy needed a new outlet for its working class. Therefore, Italy sought to transform Southern Somalia into a raw material supplying colony operated by Italians. (This never actualized as the government could not persuade people to emigrate from their homes to a desolate foreign colony.) They altered local commerce, and “were more aggressive” towards annihilating Somali life (both the lifestyle and actual human beings).<sup>35</sup> Italy’s brutal campaign against the local clans from 1893 to 1927 culminated in the

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<sup>31</sup> Njoku, 65.

<sup>32</sup> Abdullahi, 25; Njoku, 65-66.

<sup>33</sup> Acemoglu, 239; Njoku, 57.

<sup>34</sup> Njoku, 125.

<sup>35</sup> Abdullahi, 25; Njoku, 58-59, 66.

decimation of the Somali resistance, though not resentment towards their colonizers. Although their plantations achieved financial success during the interwar period between WWI and WWII, Italy's plans ultimately never reached full potential due to Benito Mussolini's fascist regime toppling in the Second World War.

Opposed to the British style, Italy operated the colony entirely by Italians officials who constructed extractive institutions which heightened the gap between rulers and subjects, while also not exposing southern Somalians to resolution techniques beyond camel trading or violence. Furthermore, they abolished "nomad customs, especially traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution between clans" as well as humiliated clan elders.<sup>36</sup> These issues, combined with systematic colonial 'divide-and-conquer' policies of unequal rewarding created "new lines of intraethnic and interethnic quarrels among" an already volatile clan situation, forever altering Southern Somalia's historical trajectory by placing it on an extractive, vicious cycle.<sup>37</sup>

The dichotomy between inclusive and extractive institutions forms the foundation of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson's book *Why Nations Fail*.<sup>38</sup> This theory will later be expounded upon in Part II. Critical to understanding the development of these two regions is that British Somaliland leaders were conditioned to administer and solve conflict with peaceful governance. Southern Somalians were not, maintaining their rule-of-force mindset.

Directly following the Second World War, nationalistic calls intensified their cries to rally behind a single ethnicity, language, and shared oppression under the Europeans. The United Nations recommended the Northern British Somaliland unify with the Southern *Somalia Italia*

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<sup>36</sup> Njoku, 125; Wiafe-Amoako, 232.

<sup>37</sup> Njoku, 48.

<sup>38</sup> Acemoglu, 429-430.

under an independent Somalia nation-state.<sup>39</sup> Previously, “Somalis had come together as Muslims instead of Somalis” to fight the Cristian Ethiopian clans.<sup>40</sup> With the word ‘Somali’ encompassing a broader range of people, “the Somalis wanted one administration over their heads.”<sup>41</sup>

Though partially a result of overly hasty calls for independence, and partially a coverup for those in power’s desire to decolonize, the lack of forethought meant the practicality of unification was nonexistent. A British secret memorandum released in 1956 “highlighted some of the socio-political and economic problems that were considered likely to break the proposed new state; it was unequivocally noted that ‘the natural resources of Somalia are insufficient to make her [Somalia’s] economy viable without outside help.’”<sup>42</sup> Beyond a bleak economic outlook, additional quagmires plagued the new nation.

On independence day, July 1, 1960, of the new Somali Republic, the nation possessed no single administrative language as both territories employed their respective ruler’s language. Somali, though spoken by all, remained an oral language until the 1970s. Vast endeavors to combine administrative, monetary, legal, and judicial systems were needed. Furthermore, the only trained administrators in the new country were the northern coastal elite. The population as a whole remained largely uneducated (except for a select number of coastal elites) and lacked teachers.<sup>43</sup> However, perhaps the most pressing challenge befalling the new republic was the strict allegiance to the clans.

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<sup>39</sup> Wiafe-Amoako 232.

<sup>40</sup> Abdullahi, 5.

<sup>41</sup> Abdullahi, 25-26.

<sup>42</sup> Njoku, 89.

<sup>43</sup> Abdullahi, 26; Njoku, 89; Wiafe-Amoako, 231-232.

Colonial occupation did not wane the devotion to one's familial clan; rather, it exacerbated their differences and disrupted their ancient relationships. To deal with the "dizzying number of clans, subclan, and sub-sub clan" culture, the British reinforced the Somali leaders with "unusual despotic powers" while the Italians applied brutal means to eradicate them to little avail.<sup>44</sup> What resulted was an intensified militaristic sentiment on power dynamics and otherness between all clans. This did not undermine the lessons of cooperation, conflict resolution, and inclusivity the elders developed under the British bureaucracy, nonetheless interclan tensions escalated across the region. Although nationalist leaders advocated "for the elimination of the ancient inter clan and communal frictions," society, as well as most national leaders, remained steeped in "persistent orientation to the economic interests of the nuclear family."<sup>45</sup> Even Somalia's supposed first revolutionary, Mohamed Abdulle Hussan, acted parochially as many of his exploits involved "large-scale looting of camels, exacerbation of clan antagonism, and massacres of innocent Somalis in unprecedented numbers."<sup>46</sup> The formation of this new Republic was certainly a "marry in haste and repent in leisure."<sup>47</sup>

As the following chapter will demonstrate, Somalia failed to master the "democratic compromise."<sup>48</sup> Yet, the national collapse was neither a failure of Somali character or culture. Unlike major nations across the world that increasingly consolidated in the second millennia in a struggle for resources, the ample land and ports along the Somalian coast never propagated a clan consolidation. As a result, the various factions and societal fractures were easily manipulated by the Europeans who only increased animosity and differences throughout the

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<sup>44</sup> Gettleman; Njoku, 57.

<sup>45</sup> Njoku, 18, 87.

<sup>46</sup> Abdullahi, 24.

<sup>47</sup> Abdullahi, 27.

<sup>48</sup> Huchthausen, *America's Splendid Little Wars*, 163.

region. Thus, with only a vague sense of Somali identity linking the Northern inclusivity with the Southern exclusivity, upon independence, in a nation already plagued by difficulties, “Somalia, like most former colonial territories, was programmed for failure even before it reached the promised land of freedom.”<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Njoku, 90.

## Chapter 2

The Colony that Rejected Freedom

On June 29, 1960, the front cover of the Daily Herald Newspaper of London read “‘The Colony that Rejected Freedom’ and the name stuck.”<sup>50</sup> This damning title ironically would come to describe Somalia’s approach to personal liberty and national unity in the coming years.

Three days prior on June 26, Great Britain granted British Somaliland independence. Northern elites championed a unified Somalia and flew South to establish a new nation. Despite agreeing, at least in theory, that the various Northern and Southern tribes did share some cultural and political commonalities and aspirations for the future of Somalia, Southern leaders were less thrilled as they had grown quite powerful following the colonization and weren’t eager to yield any power. As a result, in the middle of the night, they presented the Northern diplomats with an outrageous ultimatum: the capital, president, prime minister, currency, and flag must all be Southern. By raising the stakes incredibly high, they conspired to force Northerners to “abandon the idea [of unification] entirely.”<sup>51</sup> Yet, due to the nationalist fervor and the precarious economic position of the colony, the Northerners took the deal. The Republic of Somalia was formed in Mogadishu on July 1, 1960.<sup>52</sup>

Any initial optimism that accompanied the Somalian independence movement during the postwar period devolved, just as happened in many African republics born out of imperialist rule. The multitude of challenges not dealt with prior to the “marriage of expediency” forced dissimilar groups into a Union which benefited none.<sup>53</sup> Though everyone, from the U.N., to

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<sup>50</sup> Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs*, 26.

<sup>51</sup> Njoku, *The History of Somalia*, 101.

<sup>52</sup> Abdullahi, 27.

<sup>53</sup> Njoku, 101.

Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), to lonely clan leaders, attempted to resolve these issues, the quarrels festered and transformed into deep wounds within Somalia which remain to the present day.

The first nine years of the newly formed republic are characterized as “The Chaotic Democratic Years.”<sup>54</sup> While fears of a North and South breakup eventually evaporated over time due to increased interaction and collaboration, Somalia failed to grasp the concept of “democratic compromise.”<sup>55</sup> This is unsurprising. In addition to the vast number of problems afflicting the new nation (outlined at the end of the last chapter), Somalia possessed no stable, unifying, democratic institutions or customs upon which nations rely. As a result, Somali politics failed to move beyond the clan strife which plagued the land since the beginning of time. Society simply viewed politics as a conduit for power-grabbing rather than an instrument of change (a crucial aspect of representative democracy). Politicians simply “sought to mobilize members of their clan” to obtain influence in national affairs rather than actually promote ideological, political, or economic change.<sup>56</sup> In the 1969 elections, nearly a thousand candidates vied for only 123 seats and the entire national government devolved into a “fraud-filled debacle.”<sup>57</sup>

Additionally, as Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson explain in *Why Nations Fail*, there were institutional reasons why the politicians entrenched themselves in their comfortable positions in Mogadishu, while the population remained impoverished:

There is no necessity for a society to develop or adopt the institutions that are best for economic growth or the welfare of its citizens, because other institutions may be even better for those who control politics and political institutions. The powerful and the rest of society will often disagree about which sets of institutions should remain in place and which ones should be changed....Because

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<sup>54</sup> Abdullahi, 29.

<sup>55</sup> Abdullahi, 27-29; Huchthausen, *America's Splendid Little Wars*, 162-163, 167.

<sup>56</sup> Abdullahi, 29.

<sup>57</sup> Huchthausen, 162-163, 167.



there is no such consensus, what rules society ends up with is determined by politics: who has the power and how this power can be exercised....Thus the politics of poverty and prosperity.<sup>58</sup>

This theory illustrates the point that the Somalian people possessed no system or process to alter Somalia for the better (the institutions), and thus were left at the whims of politicians who had no incentive to promote change or relent power for democracy's sake. This in turn led to the dissolution by the general public about the benefits of democracy, further exacerbating the desire for strongman/clan-rule which could generate true change. This yearning for action was tailor made for a military coup. Enter General Siad Barre.<sup>59</sup>

The exact motives and specifics of the coup still remain unclear to historians today, but what is known is that following the 1969 elections, the President of Somalia was assassinated. Then, acting "in line with the Machiavellian principle of self-survival" in the chaos, General Siad Barre, backed by several generals, their soldiers, and Soviet operatives, seized the power in Mogadishu without bloodshed.<sup>60</sup> "There was no choice," he later declared about the state of his nation.<sup>61</sup> Soon, this group modelled other military coups at the time and established the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) with Barre proclaimed as the new President of Somalia.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 44.

<sup>59</sup> Abdullahi, 29.

<sup>60</sup> Njoku, 111.

<sup>61</sup> Njoku, 111.

<sup>62</sup> Abdullahi, 29- 30; Njoku, 111.



On the decade anniversary of the coup, Siad Barre declared Somalia a socialist nation brimming with all the revolutionary reforms which characterized the communist/socialist countries at the time.<sup>67</sup> Important industries were nationalized, young men were sent to communal farms to increase food production; and “in the fashion of the Paris Commune,” the SCR mandated everyone regardless of age, sex, or clan was to be called *jaalle* (commrade). Additionally, the regime denounced tribalism and had effigies of tribalism publicly burned. “Soon, a joke circulated that when the effigy of tribalism was burned, Barre sneaked out in the middle of the night, dug out its skeleton, and placed it in his cupboard.”<sup>68</sup>

In reality, the nationalistic sentiments of pan-Somalianism unity were replaced with Siadism. Barre enacted the same kind of reckless and oppressive economic policies and abhorrent human rights atrocities found throughout authoritarian socialist nations at the time, earning him the title of “Black Hitler.”<sup>69</sup> He established a National Security Service (NSS) (modelled after the Gestapo) to enforce his abolishing of the right of speech, association, and habeas corpus as well as the slaughter of any intellectuals who publicly opposed him. He did little to save the millions affected by famine.<sup>70</sup> Then to consolidate power, Barre rewarded loyal clans while devastating those who dared to oppose; no was luxury too great or massacre too hideous to ensure total domination.<sup>71</sup> Siad Barre was a product of his Southern *Somalia Italia* upbringing and perpetuated the extractive institutions which monopolizes power in the hands of the few at the expense of the many. As Mohamed Abdullahi noted in his book, *Culture and Customs of Somalia*:

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<sup>67</sup> Hassig, *Somalia*, 33.

<sup>68</sup> Abdullahi, 30-31.

<sup>69</sup> Abdullahi, 45.

<sup>70</sup> Hassig, 28.

<sup>71</sup> Abdullahi, 30-32.

By 1980, the Somalis were deeply divided; the clan, a minimalist association for pasture and conflict management in the countryside had under Barre become transformed into social and political identities no different from classical ethnic identities where language, religion, or physical appearance are the differentiating factors.<sup>72</sup>

Not only were the Somali people disappointed in Barre's failure to deliver his egalitarian vision, Siad's policies actively worked to cause destruction, promote terror, and intensify clan rivalries. General Barre eventually became so egotistical he required all Somali homes to display a picture of his image.<sup>73</sup> Yet, just like similar nations at that time, the repression above ground created a powder keg underneath.

In his book, Abdullahi goes to outline five reasons why the Northerners (predominantly in the Isaaq clan) founded the Somali National Front (SNM) to liberate the North in 1981:<sup>74</sup> First, a disastrous war against Ethiopia (The Ogaden War) decimated the North and its population. Secondly, the million Ethiopian refugees who fled to Somalia were forced to stay in the North. Barre even recruited many of them into the Somali Army to repress the Northerners who sheltered them. Third, "Barre's viceroys" in charge of the Somali Army campaigned against a supposed guerilla insurgency "who were nothing more than unlucky Isaaq nomads."<sup>75</sup> Next, the North possessed a majority of the commerce in Somalia, but their wealth was stolen away in the state-run enterprises and straight up pillaging designed to fund Barre's deadly exploits.<sup>76</sup> Lastly, and most significantly, political isolation. Barre's most supported clans in the South, with the Italian fascist tradition of submitting to authority, attempted to annihilate any power the Northern clans possessed.

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<sup>72</sup> Abdullahi, 35.

<sup>73</sup> Hassig, 32.

<sup>74</sup> Abdullahi, 35.

<sup>75</sup> Abdullahi, 36.

<sup>76</sup> Abdullahi, 35; Wiafe-Amoako, *The World Today*, 233.

In 1981, the Northern clans, which increasingly looked and felt “like a colony under foreign military tyranny”<sup>77</sup> according to one British scholar, utilized their ancient traditions of coming together to fight a common enemy and went to war.<sup>78</sup> So, between 1981 and 1990 a pseudo-guerrilla war ensued, but history took a tragic turn when Barre formed an agreement with the Ethiopian Dictator Colonel Mengistu to mutually help snuff out the insurgents within their countries. What followed was “Siad Barre’s holocaust.”<sup>79</sup> Somali troops were ordered to eliminate any ““anti-Somali germs”” (Northerners) they encountered. An upwards of 100,000 Somalis were killed in two months: many of whom were trapped in the former capital of British Somalia of Hargeisa where an indiscriminate artillery and aerial bombardment destroyed 90% of the city and killed upwards of 50,000.<sup>80</sup> Unfortunately, the international community turned a blind eye as the Cold War still raged: the United States supplied Barre’s regime with military supplies to counter Soviet backed Ethiopia. And ““no one...doubted they would be used to kill people.””<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Abdullahi 36

<sup>78</sup> Abdullahi 35-36

<sup>79</sup> Mullin, Chris (1 October 2010). *A View From The Foothills: The Diaries of Chris Mullin*. Profile Books. p. 504

<sup>80</sup> Cutter, Charles H. (1 January 2005). *Africa, 2005*. Stryker-Post Publications. 232.

<sup>81</sup> Abdullahi 36-38



Ruins of Hargeisa, the 2nd Largest City in Somalia at the time<sup>82</sup>

Despite the regime's best efforts however, the war became unsustainable as thousands of Southern boys died or returned wounded without proper medical supplies. Paired with the other hardships, Somalis had had enough of General Siad Barre. Loyal clans and generals soon defected to establish their own movements such as the United Somali Congress (USC) or the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). By the end of 1990, Barre's jurisdiction shrank so much "he was dubbed the 'mayor of Mogadishu.'"<sup>83</sup> But Barre was not done yet; despite a war-torn countryside that left a third of the population as internal refugees, he declared, "I came to power

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<sup>82</sup> Fataho, *Soomaaliga*. photograph.

<sup>83</sup> Abdullahi, 39.

with a gun; only the gun can make me go.”<sup>84</sup> A month-long brutal fight ravaged through the streets of Mogadishu with the USC and some SPM forces closing in. After implementing a scorched-earth policy in the city, the former despot fled to the small city of Baidoa where his already decimated army faced mass starvation in the “City of Death.”<sup>85</sup>

With the regime shattered, the USC captured Mogadishu on January 28, 1991 for what became a short-lived peace. The following day, a leader of the Congress, an obscure man to most of the nation, self-declared himself President of Somalia without consulting anyone. One of his top generals, a man by the name of Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aidid, felt cheated out of power as he led the attacks against Barre while someone who had been politicking from the sidelines essentially crowned himself. General Aidid assembled his own private militia from loyal USC members and his clan to wage war upon the USC.<sup>86</sup> Soon the armies “fractured into factions focused on rival clan leaders who became warlords intent on control of territory and whatever resources remained that would sustain their power.”<sup>87</sup> The ensuing civil war would plunge Southern Somalia into anarchy for years to come.

These actions led to alienation and animosity among Northerners who had had enough of Southern encroachment. Not only had they fought Barre for the past decade and were now left out of the new government, but the USC gave no indication of acting any more benevolently towards them, as the USC was composed of former Barre oppressors. Therefore, a convention was convened that included all the Northern clans: both former anti and pro Barre ones. On May 18, 1991, the Convention withdrew from the Somali union they had made with the South 31

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<sup>84</sup> Abdullahi, 39.


<sup>85</sup> Abdullahi, 38-41.

<sup>86</sup> Abdullahi, 39.

<sup>87</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 233.

years prior and established the Republic of Somaliland, reimplementing the old British colonial borders.<sup>88</sup> The new republic possessed a presidency with an upper and lower house parliament. In the beginning it was essentially a "power-sharing coalition of Somaliland's main clans;" but, it was certainly a start.<sup>89</sup>

In the end, General Barre would fade away. His army would go on to pillage the countryside but eventually fizzle out. After a brief stay in Kenya, he went into permanent exile in Nigeria where he died in 1995. The former “hero of Somali nationalism” turned ruthless dictator, whose actions rivals those of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, ended his life the way most Somalis began it: a penniless nomad.<sup>90</sup>



The splintering of power following Barre's overthrow, 1992<sup>91</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Abdullahi, 40.

<sup>89</sup> “Strategy for International Democratization Support to Somaliland.” 108.

<sup>90</sup> Abdullahi, 42.

<sup>91</sup> Kalpana, “Somali Civil War,” map.



## Chapter 3

A Hollywood Movie

Starving Somali Children during the famine of 1991-1992<sup>92</sup>

Though Barre certainly did not distribute power among the people, the regime's monopoly on power curbed internal clan civil war. During his reign, however, clans became increasingly attractive as political and military organizations to amass clout behind the scenes; so upon his toppling in January 1991, chaos ensued. "Looting, indiscriminate shootings, and continuing civil war among different political factions and militia groups built around clans and subclans" ravaged the nation.<sup>93</sup> Worse, the ensuing environmental degradation brought about by the conflict created a severe drought and famine. The acute food shortages incited clans to battle

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<sup>92</sup> "10 Most Deadly Famines in Africa." Answers Africa. (April 18, 2018), map..

<sup>93</sup> Njoku, *The History of Somalia*, 137.

for food supplies, hoarding them for their own people and soldiers, and starving rivals and driving out non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in a quest to obtain “political supremacy.” With no central government to restrain the escalating violence and trauma, Somalia in 1991 looked “like a plot in a Hollywood movie.”<sup>94</sup>

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and crumbling of the Soviet Union in the early 1991, the United States now stood apart “as both the supreme power and irreplaceable global leader, its status guaranteed by its unstoppable military might,” “perfectly positioned to determine the future of all of mankind.”<sup>95</sup> “America’s unrivaled big stick could right the world’s wrongs, feed the hungry, democratize the planet”<sup>96</sup> just as it had done in Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait. So, as images of death and destruction (as well as starving Somali children) shocked the West, “public concern grew vocal.”<sup>97</sup> Opinion shapers such as the *New York Times* demanded a “UN peacekeeping force, strong enough to quell the warlords.”<sup>98</sup> The United Nations agreed.

On April 27, 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed *Resolution 751*, to establish United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to deliver \$20 million (the largest sum ever put forth by the UN in humanitarian aid) to Southern Somalia (as Northern Somaliland avoided severe starvation and political instability). UNOSOM however, failed dismally. Only 550 Pakistani peacekeepers and 50 unarmed observers protected the supplies. As a result, clan members stole food from rivals at gunpoint, then stored it or then resold it to the UN to strengthen their grip on their population. In July 1992, two UN relief flights were even stopped

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<sup>94</sup> Njoku, 137.

<sup>95</sup> Bacevich, *Twilight of the American Century*, 202, 268.

<sup>96</sup> Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, 112.

<sup>97</sup> Huchthausen, *America’s Splendid Little War*, 167.

<sup>98</sup> Hyland, *Clinton’s World*, 53.

and looted by armed gunmen right on the runway of the Mogadishu airport.<sup>99</sup> “The constant bombardment of gruesome pictures on American and Western television, showing starving children with distended stomachs and the marauding clansmen dashing around the capital stealing UN relief goods, proved too much for the West.”<sup>100</sup> As 3,000 Somalis died daily, politicians felt “fervent public and political pressure in the United States and Europe for stronger action.”<sup>101</sup> Again, the UN agreed. Someone needed to disarm the clans; and who better than the all-powerful United States Military?

Despite reservations from other nations that increased military activity would only antagonize the clans and further the violence, in December of 1992, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali approved Operation *Restore Hope*. This was to be lame-duck President George H.W. Bush’s last “grand gesture” of his presidency.<sup>102</sup> However, the Bush Administration considered any nation-building operations a “dubious enterprise.” Officials believed a new government would play favorites with tribes and violate human rights. Therefore, the United States expected the military could quickly stabilize the region (just as in the Gulf War) and provide humanitarian relief, and then leave the long term nation building operation to the UN.<sup>103</sup> “We will stay not one day longer,” Bush declared. Yet flushed with compassion he also said, “General Hoar and his troops have authority to take whatever military action is

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<sup>99</sup> Chun, *Gothic Serpent*, 6-7; Huchthausen, 167; Njoku, 145, 148.


<sup>100</sup> Huchthausen, 170.

<sup>101</sup> Njoku, 148. In my other Somalia Paper, also named *The Somalia Syndrome*, I demonstrate how the CNN Effect, the idea that the media shapes foreign policy more than governments in the age of 24-hour news, played out in the United States at this time. The media was the chief reason for the United States’s entrance, and subsequent withdrawal from Somalia. Additionally, the horrified reporting by U.S. media after the Black Hawk Down Incident caused Bill Clinton and subsequent Presidents to not intervene in later humanitarian crises.


<sup>102</sup> Chun 8-9; Huchthausen, 167; Hyland, 53. For clarity, this is not to suggest President Bush was a political ‘lame duck,’ rather the term ‘lame duck President’ denotes a president in between losing an election and the inauguration of the next President.

<sup>103</sup> Huchthausen, 176-177; Hyland, 55.

necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives of the Somali people.”<sup>104</sup> Critics, such as National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, asserted that jumping in and out of a civil war wouldn’t be so easy. Eventually, the UN or US would be dragged into a long, costly war on the clans to ‘safeguard’ the population, just as in Vietnam.<sup>105</sup> They were right.



*Time* cover: December 14, 1992<sup>106</sup>



*Time* cover: December 21, 1992<sup>107</sup>

At first, things went well. The UN operation was touted as a model for “moral advance” by the *New Yorker* and the public who loved to view American marines saving the day. The United Task Force (UNITAF) of 39,000 personnel (28,900 of whom were American) destroyed

<sup>104</sup> Huchthausen, 171.

<sup>105</sup> Chun, 8-9.

<sup>106</sup> ”The TIME Magazine Vault.” *Time*, photo.

<sup>107</sup> *Time*, photo.

277 weapons and 45,000 pounds of ordinance in the first five months. This, paired with an American newspaper and radio station which distributed in Somali to promote cooperation as well as clever inter-clan peace mitigation by US ambassador Robert Oakley, who would “enter the den of the warring factions,” maintained peace in Mogadishu through May 1993.<sup>108</sup> But, when UNITAF alleviated the starvation of 100,000 Somali civilians, US marines withdrew and the UN forces (renamed UNOSOM II) regained command; old problems recurred.<sup>109</sup>

The UN peacekeepers, composed primarily of developing countries’ poorly trained units (many African and Asian), fought for financial or prestige purposes and had no interest in ‘peacekeeping.’ Additionally, UNITAF never truly disarmed the clans; so when UNOSOM II was charged with disarmament, establishing a police and judicial system, as well as repatriating refugees and urging “the country towards a national reconciliation” (in other words, nation building), the failures from the previous USOSOM reappeared.<sup>110</sup> The only difference was UNSOM II leader US Admiral Jonathan Howe, “who had practically no experience in Somali politics or any civilian diplomacy at all,” was now going to chase down General Aidid, the most notorious warlord in Mogadishu, as his “great white whale.”<sup>111</sup>

Just like Moby Dick however, General Aidid wasn't too keen on being captured by “Animal Howe” (as his propagandists referred to him).<sup>112</sup> When UNITAF “with tacit approval” allowed his main rival to acquire the city of Kismayu shortly after they demanded his forces depart from there, tensions rose.<sup>113</sup> To Aidid, UNITAF and UNOSOM were just another clan

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<sup>108</sup> Bowden, 216; Huchthausen, 173-174, 176-177; Hyland, 55.

<sup>109</sup> Chun, 10-13; Tierney, “Black Hawk Up: The Forgotten American Success Story in Somalia.”

<sup>110</sup> Huchthausen, 175.

<sup>111</sup> Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs*, 44, 46.

<sup>112</sup> Abdullahi, 45-46.

<sup>113</sup> Abdullahi, 44.

encroaching upon his territory. In a land where chaos equaled power and profit on the black market, solidarity was not going to come about without a fight.<sup>114</sup> As a result, ‘Animal Howe’s’ “shoot first, and talk later” (literally a quote from a Marine booklet) “‘Rambo’ policies” clashed with the brutal Aidid’s operations of raids and resistance against the perceived foreign invaders.<sup>115</sup>

Ironically, taking “on the characteristics of a struggle by Somali clan chiefs,” Admiral Howe authorized many attacks on Somali militants which tarnished the reputation of the UN’s ‘humanitarian objectives.’<sup>116</sup> Somalis, who first welcomed the UN presence, now felt “brutalized and harassed.”<sup>117</sup> After Aidid’s soldiers killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers on a mission to shut down his Radio Mogadishu (Aidid’s propaganda and broadcasting center),<sup>118</sup> Pakistanis retaliated and slaughtered a group of unarmed demonstrators, according to Paul Watson of the *Toronto Sun*. When the Radio Mogadishu was blown up (killing many civilians along with it), an entire “audio-visual tape library” of Somali culture was destroyed. Furthermore, believing Aidid’s War Council was meeting to discuss battle plans, US-UN forces decimated a conference center with 70 clan “elders, religious men, and intellectuals” who were in fact gathering to discuss Howe’s latest peace proposal.<sup>119</sup> Lastly, Aidid’s propagandized assertion that the Americans wanted to convert the Sunni Islam population to Christianity heralded back to the Medieval Ethiopian Wars and inspired a patriotic unity among the people. Infuriated, Islamic fighters poured in from across the Middle East to drive out the Christian ‘infidels.’ In a further complicated twist, American intelligence agencies may have armed and trained many of these

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<sup>114</sup> Njoku, 148.

<sup>115</sup> Abdullhi 43, 46. Additionally, those same booklets conveniently omitted the U.S.’s supply of arms to create this debogle.

<sup>116</sup> Njoku, 154.

<sup>117</sup> Njoku, 154.

<sup>118</sup> Aidid’s men Skinned and mutilated the soldiers’ bodies as well to the horror of Western audiences.

<sup>119</sup> Abdullhi, 45-46.

fighters to combat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The jihadists not only passed on their experience of fighting a ‘modern military,’ but also demonstrated what failure to reintegrate soldiers into society can lead to.<sup>120</sup>

“The mess in Mogadishu is the result of a team effort at mismanagement that would be comical if lives weren’t at stake,” *Newsweek* reported. Howe failed to understand that Somalia was more akin to Vietnam or Afghanistan, with their experienced guerilla warriors, than conventional warfare in Panama or Kuwait. Nevertheless, with full backing from UN Secretary Boutros-Ghali for his “hardline approach,” Howe was going to get his whale.<sup>121</sup> Confident in their abilities, U.S. troops launched six raids capturing members of Aidid’s inner circle. But when Americans launched a simple “snatch and grab” operation in broad-daylight on an unusually urgent, but unreliable, report of a meeting of Aidid’s top officials, “American policy changed virtually overnight.” The date was October 3, 1993. Military reports label it *The Battle of Mogadishu*. Somalis refer to it as “*Maalinti Ranger*,” Day of the Ranger. Most people know it as “*Black Hawk Down*.”<sup>122</sup>

The plan was simple. Task Force Ranger (TRF), composed of US Army Rangers, Delta Force, and Navy SEALs, would helicopter into Mogadishu’s infamous Black Sea region in the heart of Aidid’s territory, seize the lieutenants, and make a speedy exit by vehicle back to base. The estimated mission time, 30 minutes. The real mission time, 17 hours of nonstop combat. During the firefight, several thousand Somalis engulfed the city bent on killing the Americans. Two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, forcing the ground units to protect the helicopters until support arrived. However, due to miscommunication and the slow nature of the organizing

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<sup>120</sup> Chun, 5; Njoku, 154.

<sup>121</sup> Abdullahi, 46.

<sup>122</sup> Chun, 38; Dotson, *Successes and Failures*, 181; Njoku, 154.

multinational UN forces, Somalis overran the crash site of Black Hawk Helicopter *Super Six-Four* before the Americans could reach it, capturing pilot Michael Durant. Not until the next morning would UN support arrive, leading to potentially avoidable US deaths. By October 4, 18 US soldiers lay dead, 73 were wounded, and one was captured and missing.<sup>123</sup> Estimates range from 500-3,000 Somali casualties, mostly civilians. The fight for Aidid was over.<sup>124</sup>

As the sun set over the United States on October 3, the main story featured coup d'état in the streets of Moscow; but as Americans woke up and turned on their morning news, they saw a much different picture than a year earlier, the true price of 'peacekeeping.'<sup>125</sup>



A slain US soldier's body being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu<sup>126</sup>



Time cover: October 18, 1993 featuring captive pilot Micheal Durant<sup>127</sup>

<sup>123</sup> Clinton, *My Life*, 551. The captive pilot Michael Durant was quickly released when the US declared they would not leave without him.

<sup>124</sup> Bowden, 3-405; Huchthausen, 179-181.

<sup>125</sup> Clinton, 549-550.

<sup>126</sup> Popplewell, "Somalia the Star-crossed," photo. The image of the ambiguous American is notably similar to Jesus of Nazareth after the crucifixion which some suggest contributed subtle symbolism in the image; Dauber, *Shot Seen Round the World*, 667.



“The people who were dragging around the bodies of Americans don't look very hungry to the people in Texas,” proclaimed Senator Phil Gramm.<sup>128</sup> A “tidal wave” of outrage swept the country from the poorest farms to the halls of Congress; people who previously called for action, now demanded withdrawal with equal fervor. With no national interests at stake, now incumbent President Bill Clinton curbed his foreign policy to please the media. On October 7 Clinton said, the United States “has no obligations elsewhere,” and it was not America’s duty to “rebuild Somali society.” These new principles would not only disavow his previous support for UN peacekeeping operations, but also reject his humanitarian goals which were the foundation for his campaign. “Within 48 hours the President committed to withdrawing within six months.”<sup>129</sup> The abrupt withdrawal of US forces from Somalia “doomed the entire UN intervention to certain failure.”<sup>130</sup> UNOSOM II quickly deteriorated and left Somalia by 1995, having “never conducted another raid.”<sup>131</sup>

The West’s effort to “uproot it [i.e. clan divisions] violently, clearing the way for an outbreak of Jeffersonian democracy” failed miserably, in the words of Colin Powell. “Nothing could be closer to the truth than this.”<sup>132</sup> In fact, the vacuum left by the U.N. blue helmets ensured chaos’s revitalization. Soon thereafter, Aidid declared himself as President and was killed himself by clan violence in 1996. His son, ironically a U.S. citizen and marine who served in UNITAF, attempted to form a coalition government to no avail.<sup>133</sup> Furthermore, various international negotiations between southern warlords failed. “By early 2000, four warlords still

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<sup>127</sup> *Time*, photo.

<sup>128</sup> Dauber, 667-669, 684.

<sup>129</sup> Hyland, 58.

<sup>130</sup> Huchthausen, 182.

<sup>131</sup> Chun, 71.

<sup>132</sup> Njoku 156.

<sup>133</sup> Chun, 77.

contended over divided Mogadishu,” with dozens more warlords tyrannizing the countryside.<sup>134</sup>

Displeased with the nonexistent governance, Somalia’s northwest provinces convinced a constitutional convention to establish the Puntland State of Somalia in 1998. Though Puntland does not seek to separate from Somalia as Somaliland, the region operates autonomously from the rest of the nation. After a century of incredible change, arachy, and disarray, Somalia had returned to its ancient tribal nature.

In 2001, Hollywood portrayed the events in a movie entitled *Black Hawk Down*, which showcased the abhorrent state of Somali during that time: glorifying the U.S. while vilifying the Somalis. Before the battle one soldier says, “You know, it's kind of funny. Beautiful beach, beautiful sun. Could almost be a nice place to visit.”

“Almost” replies his comrade.



Mogadishu, 1993<sup>135</sup>



The wreckage of a Blackhawk helicopter in a Mogadishu neighborhood, 1993<sup>136</sup>

<sup>134</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, *The World Today*, 234.

<sup>135</sup> “Somalia: Development by Other Means,” photo.

<sup>136</sup> Klaidman, photo.

## Chapter 4

Business End of a Machine Gun

The secession of Somaliland, paired with the decentralization of authority in the federal states of Puntland due to the absence of a central government, essentially rendered Somalia to a patchwork of independent fiefdoms unified only by custom and international boundary sovereignty. For some today, the new arrangement proves advantageous, for others, it proves fatal. Nevertheless, many Somalis and members of the community of nations remained resolute in their efforts to consolidate the various factions under one democratic government “by the people, for the people.”<sup>137</sup> Thus, the populace persists, trapped between desiring the idealistic Pan-Somalia and resigning themselves to an unsatisfactory reality when staring down the barrel of a gun.

In the decades following the collapse of UNOSOM II, Somalia underwent continuous brutal infighting which ravaged the nation. In 2000, the 13th Somali National Reconciliation Conference met in Djibouti to establish a new government. Bringing together a broad cross section of community leaders including “clan elders, religious leaders, academics, businessmen (and for the first time a group of women),” the conference elected a new Transition National Government (TNG) in exile.<sup>138</sup> Somaliland and Puntland both rejected the results, however, citing the prominent individuals elected from the former Barre Regime which ravished much of the North. All the international recognition of the new government did nothing to improve its ability to govern, and so became just another Mogadishu clan.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Lincoln, “The Gettysburg Address.”

<sup>138</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, *The World Today*, 234.

<sup>139</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 234.

To undermine the TNG, Ethiopia founded its own new government with Somali leaders in the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). Post 9/11, the U.S. feared an ensuing large scale regional civil war would become a refugee and breeding ground for radical Islam and terrorism. Therefore, the United States persuaded Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti to assist them in convincing the two governments to merge. After two years of sputtering talks, a breakthrough occurred in Nairobi, Kenya in 2004. What emerged was a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with a parliament and an executive branch. (The president's cabinet consisted of 79 members, demonstrating the fragile factional egos and obsequious political maneuvering required to gain support). "Consisting of a loose coalition of Somali leaders who intended to lay the foundation for a national government over a five-year period, the TFG has never gained widespread local support and initially received only tepid backing from the international community, including the United States."<sup>140</sup> In fact, the TFG's formation produced a counterreaction from a new "racial youth militia group" called al-Shabaab, or "the youth."<sup>141</sup> This radical group pursued a campaign of terror against the TFG's members, assassinating many.<sup>142</sup>

While the bright optimism surrounding the TFG died like many of its members, US intelligence operatives increasingly grew alarmed at the presence of several al-Qaeda members within al-Shabaab and sought to capture them. In February 2006, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) hastily constructed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT) among numerous clans to combat the threat. Unfortunately, the

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<sup>140</sup> Bruton, "Somalia: A New Approach," 7.

<sup>141</sup> Jones, *Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency*, 1.

<sup>142</sup> Bruton, 7.

CIA's "involvement was hard to hide, and ARPCT's creation caused a popular revolt" against Western-backed organizations.<sup>143</sup> This not only escalated the anti-Western sentiments, but also strengthened adherence to Muslim traditions. What resulted was the Somali populous (particularly Mogadishu residents) banding together to support the Islamic Courts Union. This organization quickly rose to prominence and drove the ARPCT from Mogadishu. Crowning itself the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) following its victory, the coalition swept the countryside and controlled all of Southern Somalia up to Puntland (except for the city of Baidoa where the fledgling TFG held out with military security from Ethiopian forces).<sup>144</sup> As Bronwyn Bruton writes in her report "Somalia: A New Approach":

The SCIC's rise to power owed more to happenstance than to strategy. It depended on a rare confluence of factors: the growing influence of the Sharia courts as a rudimentary source of law and order, the business community's willingness to invest in public security, and the clan-based backlash against international counterterrorism and state-building efforts. But the SCIC ably capitalized on its military advantage and on the population's eagerness for peace to expel the warlords that had balkanized Mogadishu for more than a decade. The subsequent restoration of order generated nationwide enthusiasm, and the UIC governance model was rapidly duplicated across southern Somalia.<sup>145</sup>

In the midst of newfound Southern hegemony, the SCIC replicated their Sharia courts system, providing law and order across the country. "People could walk in the streets of Mogadishu without fear for the first time since the eruption of civil conflict."<sup>146</sup> Unfortunately, al-Shabaab, the SCIC's military arm, quickly dominated and radicalized the politics of the organization. They instituted strict Islamic Sharia Law: banning music, foreign media, political gatherings, and drugs; enforcing ruthless punishment on those who disobeyed. The extent to which other SCIC

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<sup>143</sup> Bruton, 7.


<sup>144</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 235.

<sup>145</sup> Bruton, 7.

<sup>146</sup> Harper, *Getting Somalia Wrong?*, 5.

leaders endorsed such actions remains unclear. Regardless, al-Shabaab's restraint on culture, restriction of foreign aid, and implementation of high taxes on businesses isolated support to only the most extreme individuals, overriding the contribution of security the SCIC contributed.

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The rapid conquest SCIC. The city of Baidoa is on the left while Puntland and Somaliland remained independent.<sup>148</sup>

The SCIC was vulnerable to collapse. Ethiopia recognized this. Following al-Shabaab declaring a “holy war” against them, Ethiopian troops were on the brink of being routed in Baidoa. Therefore, Ethiopia launched a full scale invasion of Southern Somalia. The combined arms of the Ethiopian army, aided by US satellite imaging, overwhelmed the inexperienced

<sup>147</sup> Bruton, 7-8; Wiafe-Amoako, 234; “Somali Militants Order U.N. to Leave.”

<sup>148</sup> “Somalia land, 2006,” Map.

militias and asserted control of Southern Somalia within a month. By New Years Day of 2007, thousands of militants and civilians had perished.<sup>149</sup>

The TFG triumphantly reasserted itself in Mogadishu; but the loathing for the SCIC didn't translate into love for the TFG or their perception as foreign goons either. The remnants of Al-Shabaab promptly reorganized themselves into a traditional guerilla terrorist organization like that of al-Qaeda (to which they had many connections). Proclaiming not to relent until all foreign soldiers were driven from Somalia, al-Shabaab presented itself as the leader of resistance to Somalis occupiers (a perpetual desire of the wider population). Additionally, "foreign jihadists, including al-Qaeda, sensed an unprecedented opportunity to globalize Somalia's conflict and quickly funneled support to the Shabaab."<sup>150</sup> Importing tactics, weapons, and veterans to the jihadist cause (fighters from 17 different countries were captured by Ethiopian forces), al-Shabaab terrorized the countryside and cities.<sup>151</sup>

Further intensifying animosity, Ethiopian, US, and several African Union units committed mass atrocities upon the civilians. US missiles missed their SCIC targets on several occasions and killed scores of noncombatants. Ethiopians, with a few thousand Kenyan and Burundi soldiers, disregarded human rights by raping, kidnapping, firing mortars upon civilian hospitals and media buildings, as well as carrying out indiscriminate shelling of unarmed crowds in response to insurgent attacks. "During the two years of Ethiopia's occupation, Mogadishu was reduced to a level of human suffering, violence, and disorder unknown since the civil war, and anti-American sentiment rose to an all-time high."<sup>152</sup> Perfectly playing into al-Shabaab

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<sup>149</sup> Bruton, 8; Wiafe-Amoako, 235.

<sup>150</sup> Bruton, 9; Wiafe-Amoako, 235.

<sup>151</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 235.

<sup>152</sup> Bruton, 9.

propaganda, Somalis, both home and abroad, grew more resolute in their determination to drive out foreign oppressors. In October 2008, 26-year old Shirwa Ahmed drove a car into a government compound in Puntland. It was later discovered he was raised in Minneapolis, Minnesota; one of twenty known American youths who fled to Somalia radicalized by al-Shabaab.<sup>153</sup>

Similar to the United States near the end of the Vietnam War, Ethiopia recognized the futility of defending an ineffective government unable to combat the native guerilla forces at such an exuberant cost of men and material. With no troops to protect from the SCIC and no indication that al-Shabaab sought to invade Ethiopia, Ethiopia withdrew its forces in January, 2009. Meanwhile, the TFG elected former SCIC leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as President. Despite his former connections, Sheikh was a moderate who attempted to gain support from the people by imposing Sharia Law; yet, he also refused to sever support from foreign militaries and aid organizations. Initial optimists believed he could unite the radical Muslims and the general populace. However, the TFG “failed to generate a visible constituency of clan or business supporters in Mogadishu” as well as relied on foreign troops as TFG soldiers.<sup>154</sup> The result was a President viewed as both too secular by radicals and a foreign puppet by the average Somali.

With Ethiopian forces removed, Al-Shabaab rapidly seized control of the country (South of Puntland), with another dangerous outbreak of fighting ensuing. Paired with a severe drought and famine, certainly amplified by the conflict that killed thousands and forced thousands more to flee to neighboring countries, the situation appeared grim.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Elliott, “A Call to Jihad.”

<sup>154</sup> Bruton, 9-11; Wiafe-Amoako, 236.

<sup>155</sup> Bruton, 11-13; Wiafe-Amoako, 236.



Somalia took a turn for the better in 2011 with an “increasingly coordinated effort (from Ethiopia, Kenya, [Djibouti] and the African Union, among others, with the US military flying drones in support).”<sup>156</sup> Since 2007, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), composed of several neighboring nations’ troops, had been subsidiary units to the main Ethiopian and Somali National Army (SNA) force. But by 2012, AMISOM expanded to over 18,000 soldiers and launched a highly successful counter-offensive clearing out al-Shabaab from all major towns and villages.<sup>157</sup>

This mass influx of troops was assembled from the previously aforementioned states: Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.<sup>158</sup> Since its inception, Kenya always maintained strong economic and political ties with its Northern neighbor. Following al-Shabaab's subjugation of southern Somalia in 2012, a slew of refugees flooded into Kenya. From June 12 to August 13, the number of Somali refugees exploded from 42, 578 to over 935, 621 according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Agency.<sup>159</sup> Kenya’s UN Ambassador further explained concerns over al-Shabaab’s international threat, “Kenya has suffered dozens of incursions that were repulsed by its military and police forces. Scores of Kenyans lost their lives over the past 36 months in border towns and communities owing to terrorist actions and incursions from al-Shabaab militants. The violent and incessant infringement and violation of Kenya’s territory...can no longer go unchecked.”<sup>160</sup>

Reinvigorated by Kenya’s actions, Ethiopia rejoined the fray in 2011 with an estimated 4,000 soldiers. Somalis remained unthrilled about reoccupation by Ethiopian troops; nevertheless,

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<sup>156</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 235.

<sup>157</sup> Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia*, 126, 346.

<sup>158</sup> Williams, 126

<sup>159</sup> UNHCR Operational Portal, “Somali Situation,” chart.

<sup>160</sup> Williams, 128.

their removal of al-Shabaab was tolerated if not intensely welcomed by most locals. Al-Shabaab had become unpopular for banning external humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, “locals were unconcerned about any prospects of Ethiopian neo-imperialism since ENDF troops had, as one local put it, ‘been in Baidoa many times before.’”<sup>161</sup> While not officially under the command of AMISOM until late 2016, Ethiopian’s divisions battling al-Shabaab in the Western country greatly alleviated the other forces.<sup>162</sup>

In early 2010, Djibouti’s President Ismail Guelleh proposed contributing to AMISOM as well. In contrast, several of his generals bulked at the notion. They were overruled. President Guelleh sought to “enhance his key regional and donor relationships.”<sup>163</sup> Relying heavily on the US for training and weapons, Djibouti attempted to garner “as much security assistance as possible in return for joining AMISOM.”<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Williams, 137-138.

<sup>162</sup> Williams, 139.

<sup>163</sup> Williams, 132, 139.

<sup>164</sup> Williams, 139-142.

Country (maximum troop contribution)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Uganda (6,200)		AMISOM (March 2017)										
Burundi (5,400)		AMISOM (March 2017)										
Djibouti (1,800)						AMISOM (December 2011)						
Kenya (4,300)						Unilateral (October)	AMISOM (June 2012)					
Sierra Leone (850)				Pledge (reported)		Public pledge		AMISOM (April 2013– January 2015)				
Ethiopia (4,400)	Unilateral (pulled out January 2009)					Unilateral (at request of IGAD)			AMISOM (January 2014)		Unilateral	

NOTE: Ethiopia continued its unilateral intervention in support of its AMISOM contingent until late 2016/early 2017.

#### AMISOM counties' troop contributions and timeframe<sup>165</sup>

Akin to how the large contingent of American soldiers in UNITAF stabilized the troubled nation, so too did AMISOM effectively annihilate al-Shaabab's territorial holdings. Still, as Professor Paul D. Williams at George Washington University notes in his book *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017*, AMISOM proved unsuccessful in constructing a long term infrastructure necessary for the Somali National Army to continue operations.<sup>166</sup> In essence, AMISOM committed several errors which America committed in the Vietnam War. First, AMISOM engaged in "Search and Destroy" missions, where troops would drive terrorists from a village, liberate it, then promptly leave. "The abrupt withdrawal of AMISOM forces from some newly liberated towns and

<sup>165</sup> Dobbins, James, *Africa's Role in Nation-Building*, 154.

<sup>166</sup> Williams, 338.

forward positions also generated anger for exposing Somali security forces, civilian administrators, and ordinary civilians to great risk, especially those who publicly welcomed the arrival of AU contingents.”<sup>167</sup> During the liberation of France during WWII, this strategy proved effective as France already possessed a strong sense of national identity with unwavering allegiance to a single government in exile waiting to reassert governance. This tactic proved highly effective in ridding al-Shabaab’s holdings; however, “after recovering numerous towns, the mission was unable to constantly carry out the ‘clear’, ‘hold’ and ‘build’ phases of its operations because of the lack of governance capabilities possessed by the Somali authorities.”<sup>168</sup> The absence of government institutions (police, judicicals, construction workers, state-sponsored investment) effectively annihilated the opportunity to reconcile and reconstruct after liberation from an occupying power. The droves of service members, paired with the Marshall Plan, rebuilt France and Germany and thwarted any attempts for conflict to resurge. Though the capital of Mogadishu is ‘clear’ (just as Saigon), al-Shabaab retains “towns such as Bariire within 60km of the capital city.”<sup>169</sup>



Ugandan soldiers’ weapon seizures after a mission<sup>170</sup>

<sup>167</sup> Williams, 340-341.

<sup>168</sup> Williams, 347.

<sup>169</sup> Williams, 347.

<sup>170</sup> Pflanz, “Somalia's Islamist War,” Photo.

With the loss of direct ground, al-Shabaab consistently performs deadly terrorist attacks (mostly car bombs and convoy raids) on the population.<sup>171</sup> With the average Somali having “limited interactions” or seeing “little direct benefit” from AMISOM, in June 2016, 48 percent surveyed demanded its immediate withdrawal with another 30 percent wanting withdrawal in six months to two years. “In contrast, in 2014, only 15 percent of respondents had wanted AMISOM to leave immediately.”<sup>172</sup>

Amid this chaos, but sustained by the recent security, particularly in Mogadishu, Southern Somalia has achieved greater stability and economic growth in recent years. Leaders of the TFG established a permanent federal government with the adoption of a Constitution in 2012.<sup>173</sup> “There are tall new buildings...police, sanitation crews and new construction everywhere,” Mark Bowden, author of *Blackhawk Down*, writes about Mogadishu after a recent visit. “I was pretty surprised...there was actually a skyline” reported Brig. Gen. Miguel Castellanos to Bowen. Expatriates are returning and reinvesting.<sup>174</sup> However, while on the surface all appears progressive, underneath corruption is rampant reports the Business Anti-Corruption Portal:

Somalia ranks among the world’s most corrupt countries. Insecurity is also a major issue; the ongoing instability greatly restricts business. Corrupt government officials tolerate illegal activities in return for bribes. Dysfunctional institutions facilitate an environment of lawlessness, and the absence of any form of regulatory framework hinders prospects of economic competitiveness. Business is based on patronage networks, and tight monopolies dominate the market. Somalia’s Provisional Constitution criminalizes several forms of corruption (including abuse of office, embezzlement and bribery); however, implementation is non-existent. The governing elite is continuously involved in allegations of embezzlement of public funds from the already meager Somali coffers. Finally,

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<sup>171</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 237.

<sup>172</sup> Williams, 341.

<sup>173</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 237.

<sup>174</sup> Bowden, “Legacy of Black Hawk Down,” 74.

bribery is commonplace in all sectors, and procurement contracts frequently involve corruption.<sup>175</sup>

Not only does this pervasive corruption impact civilian and political affairs, but it stretches deep into the military and compounds its obstacles.

The readiness of SNA remains in a dire state. Despite hundreds of millions devoted by international actors to bolster its capability, the SNA is “army in name only.” The military persists “confined to defensive and localized operations, unable to undertake a coherent national campaign,” and often reliant on foreign actors “for protection, securing supply routes, logistics support, and casualty evacuation.”<sup>176</sup> With the sunset of the AMISOM mandate in December 2021, few believe in the adequacy of SNA to sustain security and operations against al-Shabaab cells. Even now, most defense stems from the thousands of fractured, antagonistic local militias. Somalia would descend into tribalism without foreign propping.<sup>177</sup>

For the past half century, Somalia has been the world’s epitome of a failed state; albeit, the current situation is more promising than ever before: al-Shabaab’s grip is slipping, the economy is slowly recovering, and for the first time since the end of the Civil War, citizens of Mogadishu walk confidently in their own neighborhood. Still, the state of Somalia (both the sentiments of the people as well as the federal government itself) remains fragile and bleak: corruption, inefficiency, political infighting, and secessionist movements rattle the nation. Rectifying these injustices, as well as a more precise analysis of them, will be the focus of Part III.

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<sup>175</sup> “Somalia Corruption Report: Snapshot.”

<sup>176</sup> Williams, “What Went Wrong?”

<sup>177</sup> “Security Council Extends Mandate of Mission in Somalia.”; Williams, “What Went Wrong with the Somali National Army?”

“Peace can never be achieved if we do not fully understand the causes, complexity, and dynamics of many conflicts which blight our nation,” writes sitting Somalian President Farmaajo.<sup>178</sup> Consistent with these principles, Part I explored the underlying origins for vexing predicaments and then elaborated upon their infectious syndromes which scourge this ancient land. Solutions have evaded the international community for over 30 years. Despite whatever facts they possessed, throughout decades of an ever shifting Somali society clashes over ideals, political power, and its Muslim identity, one fact holds true: a person’s “sphere of influence is limited to the end of their Kalashnikov [AK-47].”<sup>179</sup>



Posted by Somalia’s Special Envoy to the UN<sup>180</sup>

<sup>178</sup> Keating, *War and Peace in Somalia*, x.

<sup>179</sup> Njoku, 149.

<sup>180</sup> Arman, “The Corruption Tango,” cartoon.

Part II: The Cause

In 2018, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (which ranks countries on metrics of public services, corruption, political freedoms, rule of law, policy implementation, and government's commitment to such policies, etc.) ranked Somalia second to last in the world.<sup>181</sup>

“The whole country has become a breeding ground for warlords, pirates, kidnappers, bomb makers, fanatical Islamist insurgents, freelance gunmen, and idle, angry youth with no education and way too many bullets” wrote Foreign Policy in 2009.<sup>182</sup> But why is this? Billions of dollars, decades of intervention, and the perishing of millions has radically altered the political landscape across time; yet the typical Somali citizen’s prospects for economic advancement remains grim.

To properly discern why Somalia failed, it must first be determined why nation failure, or flourishing, occurs. An exploration of this question is the subject of Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s 2012 book *Why Nations Fail*. Replete with historical anecdotes, their work identifies five concepts that the destiny of the world is predicated upon. Using Acemoglu and Robinson arguments to undergird Part II, this part, composed of three chapters, theorize the answer to the timeless, and important, question of what truly influences a state’s prosperity (or lack thereof in Somalia’s case) and explain its tenants. *The Origins of Prosperity and Poverty* elaborates on the underlying elements causing Somalia’s devastating syndromes by examining the critical nature of inclusive and exclusive political and economic institutions to a state’s status. The second chapter, *History Rhymes* expounds upon how inclusive and extractive

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<sup>181</sup> Kaufmann, “World Governance Indicators.” The worst ranked country is Yemen. With an active, open civil war which has been transformed from a small uprising to a global proxy war by foreign nations like the US, Saudi Arabia, and Iran vying for control; Cook, “War in Yemen.”

<sup>182</sup> Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place.”




institutions perpetuate in the virtuous and vicious cycles, respectively. Lastly, *Breaking the Mold* reveals the manner by which nations redirect their national trajectory.

This is why “even among failed states...Somalia stands apart”<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>183</sup>Bruton, vii.

## Chapter 5

The Origins of Prosperity and Poverty

Amount of light observed at night from the Korean Peninsula, 2018<sup>184</sup>

Consider North and South Korea. Standing amidst the labyrinth of barbed wire, mines, and guard posts situated at the 38th Parallel, look South and one will gaze upon a robust democracy rapidly becoming one of the world's premier economies and leaders in technological innovation only 65 years after being decimated by a civil war. The life expectancy is 82.6 years. The average income is \$40,000. Children attend exceptional schools; and, citizens possess a fair judicial system not subject to political coercion. Glimpse North, however, and one will see a

<sup>184</sup> Friedman. "3 Maps That Explain North Korea."

desolate nation notorious for its human rights atrocities, economic isolation, and infatuation for an absolute despot. Any theory which claims to possess the answer to state development must be able to explain *how* and *why* a homogeneous people sharing the same geography, culture, and political heritage only 65 years ago could now experience such a paradoxical juxtaposition when separated by just an arbitrary line. That is what this chapter seeks to answer.

Since the formation of the first states within the bronze age, humanity has endlessly debated the factors which contribute to affluence and prosperity; despite widespread popularity, routinely, these theories falter when confronted with the dilemma of North and South Korea. In *Why Nations Fail*, Acemoglu and Robinson refute notions that a country's prosperity is primarily the result of, (1) geography (particularly in our global economy), (2) prohibitive culture, or (3) ignorant, incompetent and directionless leadership. Rather, a country's success is "the link between inclusive economic and political institutions and prosperity."<sup>185</sup>

Once again, consider North and South Korea. Although the North is slightly more mountainous and less suitable for farming than the South's lowlands, the geography theory does not explain the stark difference directly on the parallel. Furthermore, South Korea's economy is almost entirely predicated upon the technological sector, not natural resources. Therefore, there is nothing in the land that inherently prohibits Pyongyang from developing a booming modern economy identical to its Southern neighbor.

Perhaps the most prevalent theory lies among the general population, "the cultural hypothesis" suggests that social norms of religion, "beliefs values, and ethics" induce either constitution or degradation of a modern nation-state.<sup>186</sup> "Though it is not politically correct to

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<sup>185</sup> Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 429. *Why Nations Fail* presents its arguments to discredit the three theories listed above. This report draws on its basic ideas but offers additional commentary and reasoning.

<sup>186</sup> Acemoglu, 56-57.

articulate in public, many uneducated people still maintain that Africans are poor because they lack a good work ethic, still believe in witchcraft and magic, or resist new Western technologies.” Likewise, “many once believed that Chinese culture and Confucian values were inimical to economic growth, though now the importance of Chinese work ethic as the engine of growth in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore is trumpeted.”<sup>187</sup> German sociologist Max Weber once even argued in 1905 that the facilitation of the Western Industrial Revolution in the world was primarily a result of Protestant work ethic.<sup>188</sup> To clarify, the cultural hypothesis possesses some credence, as certain cultural norms or perspectives (such as the militant clanism in Somalia) are conducive to the prosperity or poverty of a nation; however, as will be demonstrated later, important notions which impact development often result from, or are perpetuated by their institutions, not that of a fundamentally deficient society. Only a mere 500 years ago did Europe rip itself apart in constant warfare among a myriad of tribalistic states. As evidenced by the exponential growth of China and many African economies among the past few decades (not to mention numerous non-protestant nations), this theory remains inadequate in revealing the root cause for a state’s success, but rather, it merely identifies the syndromes which perpetuate it.

The most persuasive hypothesis among the upper echelons of academic and policy-making sectors though is one of ignorant leadership. The ignorance theory suggests leaders are either neglectful or confused how to promote strong economic and political institutions; yet, this fails to fully decipher why leaders adopt atrocious policies. Though famous examples of well-intentioned economic blunders dot history books, the millennia of recorded

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<sup>187</sup> Acemoglu, 57.

<sup>188</sup> “Max Weber,” Biography.

human existence offer modern leaders an excellent reference when deliberating policy on a macro level. On a micro level, the governments of North Korea, Venezuela, or even Somalia need only to scour the thousands of academic and think tank reports published across the internet to discover targeted policy recommendations to solve both political and economic challenges. Assumptions that the Kim or Maduro regimes, within North Korea and Venezuela respectively, are either ignorant or reckless prove unfounded. As explained later, ruling bodies understand the consequences of their actions; but alternative factors ultimately decide why leaders act.

“The ignorance hypothesis differs from the geography and culture hypothesis in that it comes readily with a suggestion about how to ‘solve’ the problem of poverty: if ignorance got us here, enlightened and informed rulers and policymakers can get us out, and we should be able to ‘engineer’ prosperity around the world by providing the right advice and convincing politicians of what good economics is.”<sup>189</sup> This discernment underscores the fact that the chief obstacles facing the adoption of sound economic and political growth is not the “ignorance of politicians,” rather the constraints and incentives from economic and political institutions within their societies.<sup>190</sup> Nations which evolve from poverty to prosperity (i.e. China) didn’t simply start receiving better advice overnight, nor did once prosperous but now failing nations (Venezuela) suddenly become incompetent. Instead, a fundamental change occurred to alter the incentives of the ruling party to switch their strategy to either exclusive or inclusive institutions.

As a result, any attempt to “engineer prosperity” proves fatally flawed. “Though on their own many of these reforms might be sensible, the approach of international organizations in Washington, London, Paris, and elsewhere is still steeped in an incorrect perspective that fails to

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<sup>189</sup> Acemoglu, 67.

<sup>190</sup> Acemoglu, 67.

recognize the role of political institutions and the constraints they place on policymaking.”<sup>191</sup> In essence, they focus on the syndromes, and not the root cause of the problems. Therefore, this report does not seek to “engineer prosperity” by offering security and economic reforms similar to those of other agencies and think tanks. Humanitarian missions have attempted those many times.<sup>192</sup> Acemoglu and Robinson instead propose a grand theory as to why certain nations prosper and others (like Somalia) writhe in poverty and chaos.<sup>193</sup>

Replete with historical anecdotes across time and continents, *Why Nations Fail* suggests that the success of nations is predicated upon their ability to create inclusive institutions versus extractive institutions.

Inclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level playing field, and encourage investments in new age technologies and skills are more conducive to economic growth than extractive economic institutions that are structured to extract resources from the many by the few and fail to protect property rights or provide incentives for economic activity. Inclusive economic institutions are in turn supported by, and support, inclusive political institutions, that is, those that distribute political power widely in a pluralistic manner and are able to achieve some amount of political centralization so as to establish law and order, the foundations of secure property rights, and an inclusive market economy. Similarly, extractive economic institutions are synergistically linked to extractive political institutions which concentrate power in the hands of a few, who will then have incentives to maintain and develop extractive economic institutions for their benefit and use the resources they obtain to cement their hold on political power.<sup>194</sup>

Inclusive political and economic institutions and exclusive political and economic institutions go hand in hand. Political and economic institutions are entirely co-dependent upon each other to function or else risk collapse. Therefore, Inclusive political institutions lead to inclusive

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<sup>191</sup> Acemoglu, 447.

<sup>192</sup> Acemoglu, 446-447.

<sup>193</sup> Acemoglu, 428.

<sup>194</sup> Acemoglu, 429-430.

economic institutions. When a country possesses a system in which the national government holds a monopoly on power, but distributes that power equally among the people, it allows individuals to create and pursue incentives in the free market without fear of extortion or seizure of their property. These nations prosper. The opposite is also true. When a central government is unable to maintain hegemony in its own country to enforce laws (in the prime example of Somalia), concentrates power in the hands of the few, and/or manipulates the economic system to reinforce their own power, society fails.<sup>195</sup> Likewise, inclusive economics leads to inclusive politics. When society experiences a flourishing economic sector, it will combat any attempts by the government to enforce extractive political institutions to ruin the prosperity (Hong Kong's recent protests against China's aggressive state-politics encapsulates this). Adversely, when a nation possesses extractive political institutions where monetary power is consolidated in the hands of a few, these few will wield their clout to ensure no government undermines them (Mexico's drug cartels).



Without centralized government to maintain order, clans form militias for protection. Local 'guardsman' on watch in 2003.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Acemoglu, 368-403.

<sup>196</sup> Makhubela, "Understanding Civil Militia," photo.

“These tendencies do not imply that extractive economic and political institutions are inconsistent with economic growth;” only that growth under extractive institutions is limited for two primary reasons: First, “sustained economic growth requires innovation, and innovation cannot be decoupled from creative destruction, which replaces the old with the new in the economic realm and also destabilizes established power relations in politics.”<sup>197</sup> The elites dominating the extractive institutions will oppose any opposition, economic or political, which could ultimately undermine their power. The US antebellum South presents a prime example for this: while the Northern inclusive institutions rapidly innovated, thereby destroying the old economic and political orders, Southern plantation owners maintained an antiquated, not to mention immoral, slave-based economy that paled in comparison to Northern industry.<sup>198</sup> Secondly, as will be further elaborated upon in the following chapter, consolidating power consequently forces elites to battle for the limited positions of power, ensuing political instability.<sup>199</sup>

Applied to Somalia, the theory holds true. As noted in the *Land of Gods and Clans*, the British established a robust system of governance in which Somaliland bureaucrats learned the process of pluralistic governance coupled with conflict resolution by rule of law. It is therefore not surprising that Somaliland, albeit poor due to factors identified in Part IV, retained the inclusive political institutions to create a stable democracy with relatively peaceful inter-clan power dynamics. It also proves, therefore, unsurprising that the Southern Italian Somali

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<sup>197</sup> Acemoglu, 430.

<sup>198</sup> Acemoglu, 351-355; W.,C., “Did Slavery Make Economic Sense?”

<sup>199</sup> Acemoglu, 430.



warlords, who derived from leaders of militant independence groups without any practice in rule of law of peaceful resolution, fared far worse than their Northern brethren.

Once enshrined, institutions do not easily transition; in fact, as the next chapter will demonstrate, they burrow themselves within society as time goes on. Nonetheless, an institutional system is not timeless, and the nations of the world frequently undergo processes of alteration revealed in Chapter 7.

By dissociating from flawed theories while achieving a deep understanding of the paramount function institutions play in determining the origins of prosperity and poverty in nation-states, the curtain is drawn back on the fundamental issue causing Somalia's Syndromes: extractive political and economic institutions.

## Chapter 6

History Rhymes

“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes,” wrote Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain).<sup>200</sup> It is true that historical events are like snowflakes, never appearing completely identical; but they definitely echo the themes of past conflicts and challenges. This proves especially true in specific regions with strong ethnic roots. As presented in the previous chapter, there exists a stark difference between inclusive and exclusive institutions. A region or nation’s existence upon this spectrum of inclusivity or exclusivity determines its level of prosperity. However, these institutions also define the future, to a certain extent. Acemoglu and Robinson assert that the state of modern nations is a result of cycles of productivity or destruction towards prosperity that these institutions have created throughout time: “The synergies between extractive economic and political institutions create a vicious circle, where extractive institutions, once in place, tend to persist. Similarly, there is a virtuous circle associated with inclusive economic and political institutions.”<sup>201</sup> Essentially, inclusive institutions lead to additional (and the reinforcement of) inclusive institutions, with the unfortunate reciprocal also being true for exclusive institutions.

The causes of a virtuous cycle stem from the inclusivity of the institutions which perpetuate it. Inclusive institutions constrain the exercise of political power for personal gain, and instead promote a pluralistic distribution of wealth and political rights equally among its citizens as “enshrined in the rule of law.”<sup>202</sup> The broad coalition retaining ultimate power will not allow their rulers to upend the norms of economic prospects, political activism, and social status

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<sup>200</sup> Patterson, Richard North. “History Doesn’t Repeat Itself”

<sup>201</sup> Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 430-431.

<sup>202</sup> Acemoglu, 308.

to which they are accustomed. In fact, any actor or individual, once imbued with power, desires more. “Once populous and the rule of law were established, there would be demand for even greater pluralism and greater participation in the political process.”<sup>203</sup> Unfortunately, the devastating reverse similarly holds true: “absolute power corrupts absolutely” in the words of Lord Acton.<sup>204</sup>

As stated, actors “have every interest in defending the system” which grants them power.<sup>205</sup> Therefore, when certain political and economic systems are extractive, it ignites a feedback loop of further extrativeness “which enriches the few at the expense of many. Those who benefit from extractive institutions thus have the resources to build their (private) armies and mercenaries, to buy their judges, and to rig elections in order to remain in power.”<sup>206</sup> Power within society is thereby increasingly consolidated within the hands of a select few who may dictate the rules of society, as they please, to reinforce their influence.

Another syndrome of power concentration is the emergence of political/tribal/clan conflict. Because influence resides at the top, it induces infighting and civil war among rulers to battle against other rulers with their private armies for supremacy.<sup>207</sup> Unlike famous civil wars in inclusive nations, wars of creative destruction which pit the new order versus the old (English Civil War; US Civil War; and American Revolution within the South to some respect between loyalists and rebels), extractive conflicts are power struggles between warlords who are only concerned with their own clout.<sup>208</sup> China during the warring factions periods, Middle Ages

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<sup>203</sup> Acemoglu, 309.

<sup>204</sup> Acemoglu, 343.


<sup>205</sup> Acemoglu, 343.

<sup>206</sup> Acemoglu, 343.

<sup>207</sup> Acemoglu, 344.

<sup>208</sup> Acemoglu, 350.

Europe, and many African nations today illustrate the persuasive cruelty suffered by the populations amidst overlord infighting. These elites stacked institutions in a way to favor their extractive position was the primary reason human rights atrocities occurred abundantly while innovation petered on sluggishly.



President Farmajo stands center left in a suit while the Prime Minister Khaire stands far right<sup>209</sup>

Unquestionably, Somalia serves as a prime example of how these cycles work. As noted in the previous chapter, the British rule instigated inclusive institutions with their grassroots administration while the Italians' brutal centralization of power instituted extractive institutions. As the cycles predicted, Somaliland remains a vibrant democracy while Somalia remains in tatters. For example, Somalia's current Prime Minister Hassan Khaire, a former 4,000 man

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<sup>209</sup> Goldman, David.

strong militia leader, recently experienced a failed assassination attempt which implicated sitting President Mohamed Farmajo according to several Somali government organizations including their National Intelligence and Security Agency.<sup>210</sup> Somalia's systematic chaos and violence are mere syndromes of the vicious cycle which consolidates power in the hands of a few while hindering innovation.

Aiding and encouraging the virtuous cycle in the North while redirecting the vicious cycle pervasive throughout the South will be the key focus of Part IV. But before the precise remedy can be prescribed, an understanding of the process of how nations shift from one institutional system in a safe and successful transition to another proves necessary.

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<sup>210</sup> Goldman, "Somalia's President Faarmajo's."

## Chapter 7

Breaking the Mold

The US South, China, Russia, Germany, England, France, Venezuela, Japan, Korea, Somalia, and nearly every nation on earth proves that “neither the vicious nor the virtuous circle is absolute...Major institutional change, the requisite for major economic change, takes place as a result of interactions between existing institutions and critical junctures.”<sup>211</sup>

To break the mold of extractive institutions, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that countries have (and should) undergo ‘critical junctures,’ i.e. any event which overthrows or undoes the reigning institutions and processes. These typically manifest themselves in revolutions or wars--The Meiji Revolution for Japan, The French Revolution, WWII for Germany--to smash the ruling powers; though they are not always extremely violent--The Glorious Revolution for England and the Civil Rights movement for the U.S.<sup>212</sup> To clarify, Acemoglu and Robinson note that inclusivity from ‘creative destruction’ (the process of replacing the old institutions with the new) does not always place nations on the path of inclusivity (as seen in the Chinese and Russian Revolutions, and in the case of Somalia, Barre’s coup in 1969 or his overthrow).

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<sup>211</sup> Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 431.

<sup>212</sup> This is not to suggest that the Glorious Revolution and the U.S. Civil Rights Movement were not violent, as both resulted in the deaths of thousands. However, to further emphasize virtuous cycle, neither of these ‘critical junctures’ were as violent as the ones which preceded it--the English Civil War for the former, and U.S. Civil War for the latter.



The US's virtuous cycle ensured the Civil Rights Movement proved far more peaceful than the Civil War a century earlier<sup>213</sup>

Frequently, the critical junctures that do succeed contain a broad coalition of society (the poor and rich, young and old, and most importantly, the weak and the powerful). When this occurs, with a little luck, inclusive institutions should follow. (This is why Barre and post-Barre warlords turned oppressive and extractive despite commanding support to overthrow the reigning powers. Barre and the warlords never were supported by the full cross-section of society, and certainly never shared power with them).<sup>214</sup>

Before the 20th Century, Korea existed for a 600 years under the Joseon Dynasty. "The kings sat atop the system," followed by government and military officials, then merchants and craftsmen, finally by farming peasants and slaves living in a serf existence.<sup>215</sup> This social

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<sup>213</sup> "Civil War to Civil Rights."

<sup>214</sup> Acemoglu, 405-426.

<sup>215</sup> "History of Korea."

hierarchy nearly mirrors that of medieval Europe. As mentioned, the Glorious and French Revolutions in England and France respectively overthrew the authority of the ruling elites. In Korea, however, the Japanese occupation from 1910-1945 demolished the reigning extractive institutions. The post-WWII, Soviet-backed, Juche system of the North abolished private property and independent markets while consolidating power among a few party leaders who would stifle the adoption of new technologies or reforms--generating an even more vile vicious cycle. Meanwhile, in Western-backed South Korea, “economic institutions encouraged investment and trade” throughout all levels of society, initiating a virtuous cycle which revamped South Korea into a world’s “‘Miracle Economy,’ one of the most rapidly growing nations in the world.”<sup>216</sup>

What is required, therefore, as happened in Korea and countless other countries, is to “facilitate the process of empowerment and, thus, the development of inclusive political institutions.”<sup>217</sup> It is a fatal misconception for actors to provide support to another country or organization in the form of resources and training, and/or judging success based on metrics of lives saved and terrorists killed. Such approaches were tried in Vietnam:

“[US Defence Secretary Robert] McNamara was trying to develop a list of metrics to allow him to scientifically follow the progress of the war. He asked [US Air Force Brigadier General Edward] Lansdale if the list was complete. Lansdale replied that it was missing “factor x”, the feelings of the common rural Vietnamese people. McNamara wrote it down on his list in pencil, then erased it and told Lansdale that he could not measure it, so it must not be important.”<sup>218</sup>

Fixating upon the elimination of bad actors without the termination of the fundamental reason *why* those actors were able to amass their clout, will inevitably fail, just as Admiral Howe did

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<sup>216</sup> Acemoglu, 72-73.

<sup>217</sup> Acemoglu, 460.

<sup>218</sup> Quiggin, John. “The Worst Case Is Happening.”



with his fixation on Aidid. “Killing leaders is fine” adds U.S. Brig. Gen. Don Bolduc, former Commander of Special Operations in Africa, “but it has absolutely no long-term effect and really doesn’t have any short-term effect either. Someone is always going to be there to be the next leader.”<sup>219</sup> Such efforts will not solve the underlying issue of *why* Somalia is “the most dangerous place in the world.”<sup>220</sup> Rather, what is necessary is to induce:

. . . the presence of some degree of centralized order so that social movements challenging existing regimes [in our case, warlords] do not immediately descend into lawlessness; some preexisting political institutions that introduce a modicum of pluralism...so that broad society institutions can form and endure; and the presence of civil society institutions can coordinate the demands of the population so that opposition movements can neither be easily crushed by the current elites nor inevitably turn into a vehicle for another group to take control of existing extractive institution.<sup>221</sup>

Carving the way for Jeffersonian democracy in one master plan will not succeed. “The process is slow,” Acemoglu and Robinson write.<sup>222</sup> The recommendations in the coming chapters do not seek simply to help Somalis; they seek to support Somalis in helping themselves by inducing critical junctures to break the vicious cycle pervasive throughout Somali society.

“This battle must be led by Somalis,” writes the current President of Somalia Mohamed Farmaajo, “My government is committed to this agenda and to restoring hope to Somalis...but we need the sustained commitment and support from the African Union, United Nations and key international partners.”<sup>223</sup> What is needed, in the immortal words of Abraham

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<sup>219</sup> Bowden, “The Legacy of Black Hawk Down,” 76-77.

<sup>220</sup> Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place.”

<sup>221</sup> Acemoglu, 460

<sup>222</sup> Acemoglu, 461.

<sup>223</sup> Keating, *War and Peace in Somalia*, ix-x.

Lincoln is a “new birth of freedom--and [a] government of the people, by the people, for the people.”<sup>224</sup>

### Part III: The Necessity

Strategies comprise tactics; but a variety of tactics do not constitute strategy. Before any consideration is given as to specific recommendations towards Somalia’s syndromes, it is critical to establish why and how another international actor (multi-government alliance, nation, NGO, etc.) should pursue action in a seemingly unimportant country in terms of global significance. In the process of identifying motives for intervention, the overall strategic objectives as well as the proper mindset for striving towards them will become apparent.

Part III comprises three chapters. The first, *The Greatest Regret*, presents legal and philosophical arguments through a liberal<sup>225</sup> lens as to the moral imperative of humanitarian intervention. Furthering that logic, the second, *Philosophy to Policy*, defines a six-fold criteria for determining intervention and then subjecting modern Somalia to it. Thirdly, *The Definition of Victory* identifies the key target for a successful nation-building operation as well as explain the correct perception on how to judge success, finalizing the preparation required to suggest concrete objectives for actors to seek in Part IV.

This is why the world should “defend innocent men, women and children, who suffer the brunt of this war.”<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Lincoln, Gettysburg Address

<sup>225</sup> Baylis, *Globalization of World Politics*, 116-117, 119. Liberal as in international relations theory, not a progressive or Democratic Party-affiliated individual in United States politics. Rooted in the writings of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson, Liberalism insists states and peoples seek to avoid war and chaos. As a result, nations cooperate to promote order, liberty, justice, and toleration amongst themselves whenever feasible. This is often viewed as the optimistic view of international relations.

<sup>226</sup> Keating, *War and Peace in Somalia*, ix.

## Chapter 8

The Greatest Regret

The aftermath of the United States's Battle of Mogadishu "paralyzed [the Clinton Administration's] ability to act" in any future humanitarian crisis.<sup>227</sup> American forces withdrew from critical reconstruction efforts in Haiti. In Bosnia, American troops constituted a mere "token force to feign support" and were positioned away from the "hotter spots" while aircraft simply dropped bombs that caused the foreseeable "the death of thousands of civilians."<sup>228</sup> But most tragically, just six months after the Battle, Rwanda faced "the largest U.N. defined genocide since the massacre of the Jews in WWII."<sup>229</sup> Between April and July 1994, Hutus executed an estimated one million Tutsis. In defiance of pleas from the UN demanding action from the United States, "U.S. officials reasoned that continuing with the UN operation would invite disaster similar to the kind witnessed in Somalia," and were fearful "of what more images would represent."<sup>230</sup> Thus, despite using the term privately, the Clinton Administration refused to publicly classify the slaughter a *genocide*, as they believed any genocide would warrant United States action. Instead, they labeled it a 'civil war' which by "definition precluded the use of peacekeeping troops."<sup>231</sup> Clinton later lamented that even a marginal force early on could have prevented over 300,000 lives; it was the "greatest regret of my presidency" he bemoaned.<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> Zinni, *First Shots Are Fired*, 38.

<sup>228</sup> Dauber, *The Shot Seen Round*, 189-192; Burkhardt, *Just War and Human Rights*, 85.

<sup>229</sup> Dotson, *Successes and Failures*, 187.

<sup>230</sup> Oloughlin, *Images as Weapons*, 81.

<sup>231</sup> Dotson, 189.

<sup>232</sup> Hughes, "Bill Clinton Regrets."



“Human remains in Somaliland's Valley of Death,” 2018<sup>233</sup>

The question of which circumstances necessitate or preclude, humanitarian intervention perplexes international relations scholars and foreign policy makers to this day. Clearly, no one wishes for another genocide to occur, and humanity has lived to deeply regret its failure to prevent the slaughter of Armenians, Jews, Cambodians, Rwandans, and even the Northern Somalis during “Barre’s Genocide.”<sup>234</sup> However, not all injustices require foreign intervention, and many issues reach satisfactory conclusions when dealt with internally. To properly assess if a foreign actor should become involved in Somalia, it first requires determining the responsibilities of fellow nations corresponding to humanitarian action.<sup>235</sup>

<sup>233</sup> Einashe, “In the Valley of Death,” photo.

<sup>234</sup> Mullin, *A View From The Foothills: The Diaries of Chris Mullin*, 504.

<sup>235</sup> Burkhardt, *Just War*, 85-125. It must be noted that the foundations of this chapter is based upon the fourth chapter of Burkhardt’s book *Just War and Human Rights Fighting with Right Intention*. His assertions have been elaborated, expounded upon, and modified for a more general reader as well as tailored to Somalia, but the underlying structure was initially found in his book.

In the midst of European chaos throughout the late Renaissance period, Enlightenment writers attempted to resolve the quandaries by constructing moral proofs as to the rights of the people and the responsibilities of rulers, or ‘social contracts.’ The two English thinkers who emerged most predominate in this field, John Locke and Thomas Hobbs, offered differing conclusions on human rights and state sovereignty. Hobbs, royalist during the English Civil War that resulted in the beheading of King James I, famously argued that life in its natural state is “nasty, brutish, and short”--that the chaos of anarchy (similar to Somalia in the 1990s) posed the greatest danger to human existence.<sup>236</sup> Therefore, to avoid conflict and lawlessness, all subjects should cede all power to an unchecked despot by submitting “their wills, every one to his will” he wrote, “and their judgements, to his judgements.” “Nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretense [sic] so ever, can properly be called injustice, or injury” to obtain “common peace and safety.” Building upon his logic, the absence of an international sovereign therein allows states to freely interfere with one another without any moral violation.<sup>237</sup>

Employing Hobbs’s reasoning results in a juxtaposed set of deductions on state interference. One might contend internal affairs are best resolved by the national ruling institutions, as intervening might only cause more disorderly suffering than before (as seen in UNISOM’s intervention). Additionally, one might derive that actors may intervene as they please, securing any interests they desire in or from a foreign state.

Thomas Hobbs’s theories perhaps provide an understanding as to the chaos that developed without a ruling order in Somalia; yet, when extrapolated macroly on an international scale, Hobbs commits several hypocrisies in our modern world in relation to Somali intervention:

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<sup>236</sup> Williams, “Thomas Hobbes.”

<sup>237</sup> Burkhardt, 92; Lloyd, “Hobbes's Moral and Political Philosophy.”

First, if subjects submit themselves to a ruling power regardless of that power's brutal use of authority (Siad Barre, Al-Shabaab) in a quest for "common peace and security," then why should any Somali continue to display deference to leaders that fail to provide "peace and security."<sup>238</sup> Barre's reign consisted of famine, torture, war, and genocide for millions, a vast majority of the population. Though it might be argued the ensuing civil war after Barre's downfall caused greater chaos, either way, the overthrow of his government has allowed the regions of Somaliland, Puntland, and other federal states to form new, more stable and economically friendly governments.

Second, at the time of Thomas Hobbs, no order existed to maintain world peace, therefore he argued international politics existed as the state of nature. However, following the Second World War, the international community decided to create an organization "in order to save us from the hell" of unchecked warfare that Hobbs describes: The United Nations.<sup>239</sup> If the lesser individuals (whether states or people as he defines in his reasoning) should yield to the higher authority for order, should not the nations of the world yield "their will, and their judgment" to the United Nations and universal stipulations?<sup>240</sup>


Hence, when projected onto the 21st Century global order, Hobb's vindication of state deference and transnational anarchy fails to predict the correct course of action and only further reinforces the necessity of a concrete intervention criteria the world requires so as to prevent turmoil. Contrarily, Locke's perspective offers a foundational stance from which to formulate a guideline.

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<sup>238</sup> Burkhardt, 92.

<sup>239</sup> Boel, "Dag Hammarskjöld."

<sup>240</sup> Burkhardt, 92.



John Locke, “The Father of Liberalism”<sup>241</sup>

For John Locke, “the fundamental law of nature is that ‘as much as possible mankind is to be preserved.’”<sup>242</sup> Agreeing with Hobbs’s deductions, John Locke posits human nature to be a violent condition, where without laws or restrictions, people could freely violate the fundamental law without punishment. As a result, the “the governments of the world...*were made by the consent of the people;*” who united into communities “for their comfortable, safe, and peaceful living against one another, in secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it.”<sup>243</sup> Opposing Hobbs, Locke suggests people should not cede all their rights to a despot in order to obtain security, as the dictatorial actions would violate the fundamental law as well as the natural rights of “life, liberty, and property” that all humans possess.<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> Kneller, Portrait of John Locke.

<sup>242</sup> Tuckness, “Locke's Political Philosophy.”

<sup>243</sup> Burkhardt, 93.

<sup>244</sup> Tuckness.

Therefore, a government's duty is not to maintain peace at all costs, but rather safeguard mankind and natural rights. If a government breached fundamental or natural law by killing, enslaving, or impoverishing its people, whether under the banner of state/public security or not, it would undo the very purpose humans voluntarily entered into a government in the first place, to protect their rights from others. A nation's people "are not considered subjects, but citizens" he claims, free to criticize and critique their rulers in order to have them "uphold the standards of conduct that they were charged with" as sovereigns.<sup>245</sup> If treachery persists, the duty of the people therein becomes the overthrow of the oppressive institutions.<sup>246</sup> "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure," Thomas Jefferson later added.<sup>247</sup>

When extrapolated to the realm of international politics, John Locke further agreed with Hobbs that the state of nature exists in a realm with no higher power. Hence, states possess no restrictions on their actions. However, unlike Hobbs who maintained the absence of authority allowed for limitless interference, Locke contended that individuals, states or people, bear the moral imperative to defend humanity (similar to the position of Immanuel Kant). Locke asserted the "actions of men and of rulers must be in conformity to the laws of nature, and the fundamental law of nature is the preservation of mankind."<sup>248</sup> A sovereign who fails to uphold these obligations "renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of mankind, that will join him in the execution of justice, [against] any other...noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor security."<sup>249</sup> The only legitimate political entities are

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<sup>245</sup> Tuckness.

<sup>246</sup> Burkhardt, 93; Tuckness.

<sup>247</sup> Jefferson, "The Tree of Liberty."

<sup>248</sup> Tuckness.

<sup>249</sup> Burkhardt, 93.



ones which maintain a standard justice and human rights; failing to meet this standard results in a forfeiture of sovereignty, noninterference, and territorial integrity. Humans own both the negative duty *not* to commit violations, but also the positive duty *to* thwart any injustices.<sup>250</sup>

Over time, the international community has concurred with Locke's beliefs and reasoning, using it as the basis for global order. In 1815, The Congress of Vienna justified demanding an end to the Transatlantic Slave Trade based upon the "principles of humanity and universal morality."<sup>251</sup> Nearly a century and a half later, steeped in the world's destruction following the Second World War, the international community realized the necessity of a body to safeguard human existence and prosecute those in violation of them: The United Nations.<sup>252</sup>

The founding 'Charter of the United Nations' both employed and enshrined Locke's reasoning in international law. Chapter I of the Charter stated nations are entitled to "sovereign equality of all its Members." Yet, "all Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership," nonintervention among them, "shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter." These obligations are not only "to maintain international peace and security," but to defend "human rights and for fundamental freedoms."<sup>253</sup> Though some opponents of the legality of humanitarian intervention argue the definition of 'human rights' is legally vague; they purposely omit the UN Charter's sister document that defines them: 'The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (UDHR). Article III, drawing directly from Locke's language, affirms "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."<sup>254</sup> The creation of stipulated 'crimes against humanity' as

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<sup>250</sup> Burkhardt, 93, 124.

<sup>251</sup> Shelton, *Advanced Introduction Human Rights Law*.

<sup>252</sup> Baylis, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 515.

<sup>253</sup> "Charter of the United Nations."

<sup>254</sup> "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," 2.

prosecutable and punishable by the UN later on fortified the concept of humanitarian intervention.<sup>255</sup>

Another retort to the interventionist argument stems from Article 2.7 of the Charter, which restricts the UN from intervening “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Though this clause holds great merit when discussing aspects such as governance and/or the extent of legal freedoms, as previously mentioned, both Locke and the UN Charter articulate the preservation of fundamental rights and life as the foremost duty of members of the international community. Once again, sovereignty is forfeited without basic protections of a state’s citizens. By this standard, the transnational attacks of Al-Shabaab and pirates only further emphasize Somalia’s syndromes are not a simple domestic affair.

The initial wave of optimism that accompanied a post-WWII world, quickly disintegrated as East versus West tensions arose. The intrusive US and USSR foreign policies which employed espionage, coercion, proxy wars, and government overthrow were little concerned (nor wanted to preach and sound hypocritical) with human rights. Nonetheless, humanitarian intervention spiked after the collapse of the Soviet Union due to the now Western-based U.N. hegemony’s ability to pursue humanitarian action unimpeded by power politics.<sup>256</sup> The result was a series of poorly planned and overly ambitious humanitarian missions from the early 1990s into the new millennium from Haiti, to Kosovo and Bosnia, to Somalia; none of which could be deemed a complete success.<sup>257</sup> Their efforts should be applauded; but, the failure to institute long term solutions to solve the underlying society issues defeats the purpose of intervention. The UNSC tended to the syndromes, not the underlying causes. Furthermore, the UNSC’s inability to act in

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<sup>255</sup> Gjelten, “Boundlessly Idealistic.”

<sup>256</sup> Baylis, 115.

<sup>257</sup> McCall, “Determining a Successful Intervention.”

the aforementioned crises, in addition to the modern affronts on human rights in Yemen, Myanmar, Darfur, Sudan, and even the Chinese Uighurs in Xinjiang.<sup>258</sup>

If Hobbs's reasoning proved sound, the UNSC, with the duty of authorizing intervention and peace enforcement, would retain the right of the ultimate decider of intervention. Yet, Locke demonstrates superior logic, with his deductions constituting the basis for the UN and International Law. In line with his reasoning therefore, humanity must apply it to our reality: the UNSC does not, and practically cannot protect clear atrocities across the globe. With this reality recognized, when the international sovereign charged with ensuring the fundamental rights and natural law no longer fulfills those ends, then individuals (states in this case) have a moral obligation to install a new system which fulfils this responsibility.



The UNSC with 5 permanent members and 9 rotating members. Often times a permanent members' vetoes will halt a humanitarian action as mentioned on the right-hand side of the infographic<sup>259</sup>

<sup>258</sup> Bummel, Andreas. "Security Council Failed Syria,"

<sup>259</sup> "UN Security Council Structure," infographic.

The institution of a new global order or system which operates independently from the UNSC though is impractical; the benefits of the UN are many when compared to unilateral action. The UN allows for coordination and collaboration among various states that might not otherwise possess robust channels communication. Further benefit derives from the punishment an overarching body can inflict to ensure adherence to standards and fulfillment of goals that individually acting states cannot. UN mandates also safeguard against dominance of operation or imperialistic conduct by the nations participating. Lastly, the UN's global composition mitigates the bystander effect, where the more bystanders there are to a crisis, the less likely one will step forward and assist, and reassures nations that many states will assist in pooling in the vast amount of capital, military capacities, experts, and strategic planning necessary for successful operations. Some believe "regional and subregional alliances, coalitions, and organizations [such as NATO] can mitigate the bystander effect."<sup>260</sup> Although this is true, and the use of local forces contains many advantages, the global federation of states must not commit the error of believing alliances will therefore pursue what is just and necessary. Alliances always form with an intended purpose, often security, and so, they cannot be trusted or required to act in accordance with an objective outside its purpose. As demonstrated, the UN's purpose is the safeguarding of all peoples regardless of ethnicity or nationality; "the task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work better than it has."<sup>261</sup> For clarity states may act unilaterally (following the criteria outlined in the next chapter) if they so desire, but coordination with the UN is crucial for effective and ethical aid.<sup>262</sup>

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<sup>260</sup> Burkhardt, 102.

<sup>261</sup> Burkhardt, 102-103.

<sup>262</sup> Burkhardt, 120-121.

Recognizing this imperative, the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) created *The Responsibility to Protect* (RTP) doctrine, stressing humanity's obligation to prevent, react, and rebuild before and after massive human rights violations.<sup>263</sup> These sentiments were echoed by the UN General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit which voted unanimously for the following:

The UN will be prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.<sup>264</sup>

Though the World Summit debated whether or not the UN possesses a 'duty' beyond the 'right' to intervene, as the reasoning has demonstrated, the UN and humanity have a responsibility to act in a given situation.<sup>265</sup>

The respect of basic human rights of security, both in the matter of an individual and access to food, as well as the safeguarding of fundamental liberties is the bedrock of modern civilization. Rejecting the moral imperative forwarded by Locke will only result in the brutal Hobbsian state of nature he prophesied: where the mighty prey on the weak while humanity looks on apathetically. By uniting together under one uniform, nondiscriminatory international code which limits the extent to which dictatorial societies may abuse their citizens, humanity may be one step closer to achieving its perpetual goal of peace on Earth.

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<sup>263</sup> Burkhardt, 88.

<sup>264</sup> Burkhardt, 88-89.

<sup>265</sup> Burkhardt, 89.

## Chapter 9

Philosophy to Policy

Throughout history, scholars have struggled with the question of formulating criteria under which actors, states, and/or alliances should intervene when a sovereign state violates the civil and human rights of its citizens, pursues global criminal conduct, or acts as an aggressor towards its neighbors. Despite evidence that the UNSC often fails to limit these atrocities, the principles of John Locke, the UN's founding documents, the recent Right to Protect (RTP) doctrine, as well as a pragmatic understanding of intervention capabilities leads to the conclusion that formulating a clear model for collective obtrusion in the affairs of another country remains humanity's best and logical justification option. As will be demonstrated in Part II, providing mere aid to a region is incredibly ineffective, and political pressuring often results in only further suffering to the oppressed population.<sup>266</sup> Yet, due to resource constraints as well as realistic power dynamics, intervention is viable only under certain conditions. Referring to full humanitarian intervention missions, Dr. Todd Burkhardt in his book *Just War and Human Rights: Fighting with Right Intention* suggests six circumstances an actor must consider before it coordinates with the UN and acts either in tandem with others or independently. After describing and elaborating upon each criteria, Somalia's current situation will be evaluated as to whether it meets said threshold, thereby proving the viability, and necessity, of a humanitarian mission.

The first and foremost essential rule is "physical security rights take precedence."<sup>267</sup> Without basic security of the individual, a population may not seek to improve their liberties or economic status. The damage inflicted upon a population when the government fails to ensure

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<sup>266</sup> Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 450-555.

<sup>267</sup> Burkhardt, *Just War*, 96.

basic safety is profound: “the physical act of murder cannot be undone nor can the psychological effects of being tortured, raped, or witnessing” such violent acts.<sup>268</sup> Furthermore, deliberate and manufactured human starvation should also be counted among the crimes, as food insecurity makes people slaves to their overlords (as seen in 1990s Somalia).<sup>269</sup> That stated, legal freedoms such as the freedoms of speech, movement, marriage equality, and association “are neither immediate...nor necessarily irreparable.”<sup>270</sup> Though the restriction of these rights, as stipulated by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Lockean Philosophy, constitute inhuman crimes, their prevalence across the globe makes enforcement simply unobtainable. Pragmatically, foreign nations should only intervene when wide scale ‘crimes against humanity’ as defined by the 1998 Rome Statute are committed.<sup>271</sup> Customs and laws adjust with international pressure and time, physical harm cannot. Conservative and aggressive opinions might differ as to when immediate intervention could be debated, but for Somalia, there is no debate. “Since 1997, Amnesty International has consistently reported that ‘hundreds of deliberate and arbitrary killings, politically motivated detentions, hostage-taking, torture, including rape, and ill-treatment, have continued to obstruct peace and national reconciliation.’”<sup>272</sup> Paired with Al-Shaabab’s grip on the countryside, Somalia clearly passes this threshold.

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<sup>268</sup> Burkhardt, 97.

<sup>269</sup> Njoku, *The History of Somalia*, 137.

<sup>270</sup> Burkhardt, 97.

<sup>271</sup> 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court defined the 11 ‘crimes against humanity’: Murder; Extermination; Enslavement; Deportation or forcible transfer of population; Imprisonment; Torture; Grave forms of sexual violence; Persecution; Enforced disappearance of persons; The crime of apartheid; Other inhumane acts.

<sup>272</sup> Huchthausen, *America’s Splendid Little Wars*, 182.



Al-Shabaab propaganda footage<sup>273</sup>

Next, “the initiation of a military intervention should not be premature.”<sup>274</sup> By this, it remains imperative in order to uphold the sanctity of sovereignty that the UN and other nations should attempt every alternative measure to achieve the end before resorting to military action. As is found throughout any war, the toll of civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure stagger amidst war, For examples, one need only revisit the previously mentioned UN actions in former Yugoslavia as well as the over 2 million civilian dead during the Vietnam War.<sup>275</sup> It also proves far more costly to rebuild a ravished nation than an untouched one. However, once deployed, the military should pursue all objectives necessary to solve the underlying problems, not just the syndromes. It is important to remember that insignificant military force was a primary downfall in UNISOM II.<sup>276</sup> Also, withdrawal of military measures during the Gulf and

<sup>273</sup> Bodetti, “The Real Reason,” photo.

<sup>274</sup> Burkhardt, 105.

<sup>275</sup> Burkhardt, 85.

<sup>276</sup> Njoku, 156.



Korean Wars resulted in festering issues that later on needed to be resolved by a second war in the former case (Iraq War), with the latter still unresolved (North Korea). The approach must be carefully weighed as “military intervention should not be a never-ending commitment or blank check, rather, only what is required to adequately remedy the situation.”<sup>277</sup> With regards to Somalia, military policies concerning al-Shabaab will come in Part III, but certainly, “denying al-Shabaab the ability to decisively defeat the Somali government is critical to bringing the group to the table” wrote Scott Hartwig, a former US military assistance coordinator in Somalia.<sup>278</sup> When pursuing humanitarian goals, actors must remember “the primary aim is to rescue not to punish.”<sup>279</sup>

Expanding upon that goal, another component of RTP is predicated on whether an mission enjoys a “reasonable chance of success.” “No plan of operations reaches with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main force” said famed Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke,<sup>280</sup> yet, certain metrics can be analyzed to determine a possible military success. If the ruler possesses a large, modernized military force and/or the country’s terrain is favorable for guerilla warfare (Vietnam, Afghanistan), success proves dubious. Another component to the success equation is whether a military victory will ensure the security of the rights and a lasting peace. War is not an end within itself, wrote Carl von Clausewitz in his book *On War*, “but the continuation of policy by other means.”<sup>281</sup> If the invading actors cannot catalyze a shift away from extractive institutions to permanent inclusive institutions (in what Part III will classify as a ‘critical juncture’), the enterprise will only cause more “grievous harms” to

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<sup>277</sup> Burkhardt, 105.

<sup>278</sup> Hartwig, “How to End. ”

<sup>279</sup> Burkhardt, 105.

<sup>280</sup> Ratcliffe, *Oxford Essential Quotations*, 7547.

<sup>281</sup> von Clausewitz, *On War*.

an already suffering population. The presence of a powerful military and dangerous terrain epitomizes why a humanitarian action towards China in defense of the Uighurs would be a terrible foreign policy decision. However, Somalia is the antithesis to China. Simple investment and development of Somali forces, sweeping liberation operations by AMISOM, and US airstrikes all continue to be incredibly effective against a poorly trained and equipped terrorist organization on Somalia's predominantly flat savanna.<sup>282</sup>



Galmudug State (an autonomous region) in tandem with Somali National Army  
on a successful liberation sweep against al-Shabaab<sup>283</sup>

Overly hasty deployment when the problem could be rectified internally also causes unnecessary carnage. Therefore, pressuring states to adhere to a “stipulated timeline” to remedy their behavior before an intervention occurs “seems consistent with the R2P[RTP] and the Lockean concept of sovereignty.”<sup>284</sup> The international association of nations must acquire

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<sup>282</sup> Bowden, “The Legacy of Black Hawk Down.”

<sup>283</sup> Agnon, “Galmudug Troops,” photo.

<sup>284</sup> Burkhardt, 106.

concrete evidence of ‘crimes against humanity’ persisting within the target country after the designated period to righteously conclude a loss of sovereignty and intervene ethically.

The fifth component of the practical determination for intervention relies on the sentiments of the people, whether they actually welcome intervention. “That is, would civilians reasonably subject themselves to further danger knowing that the force intervening is there to stop genocide and ultimately protect them?” as Burkardt articulates perfectly.<sup>285</sup> Amidst the barbarity without alternative measures to improve one’s status, an exploited populous should desire deliverance; nonetheless, countries like Pakistan that fiercely oppose Western values could not sustain an operation. This benchmark also serves as a check against imperialism or proxy war politics, as citizens of stable nations rarely wish to see an institutional shift and so will not support foreign aid and manpower. Though the general population of Somalia retains mixed notions concerning the presence of foreign troops, universally they are happy to be rid of al-Shabaab; and as noted before, the current national government desires Western assistance. “We want to engage with the USA.” said Somalia’s US ambassador, “It’s so much better now.”

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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, any actions should foremost consider the ramifications of the loss of life and cost compared to the perceived benefits, an analysis of proportionality. As previously mentioned, Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN proclaimed, “the United Nations was not created to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.”<sup>287</sup> The toll on governments’ economic institutions paired with astronomical death tolls of both soldiers and civilians would potentially outweigh the gains of the mission.

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<sup>285</sup> Burkhardt, 106.

<sup>286</sup> Keating, “Not *Black Hawk Down*, ”

<sup>287</sup> Boel, “Dag Hammarskjöld.”

Additionally, one must account “for destructive second- and third-order effects not only to the parties to the conflict but to the other states in the region as well.” Inciting “greater regional instability, escalating a subregional conflict into a regional war, etc” would be contrary to the purpose of both the operation and a mission. If a “World War III-type scenario” arises out of the action, humanity would descend into the “hell” it was founded to thwart.<sup>288</sup> This case confirms why any attempt to overthrow the Kim Regime in North Korea by conventional means remains a precarious situation. War would result in billions of civilians annihilated by rockets, nuclear explosives, combat, and not to mention the likely eruption of World War III as a result of China and the US clashing. Thankfully, intervention in Somalia will not ignite further conflict; contrarily AMISOM organized six of Somalia’s neighbours into a humanitarian mission to suppress transnational piracy and terrorism.<sup>289</sup> Action by Western forces would alleviate those nations’ resources, not aggravate them. Furthermore, when one considers the proportionality of casualties, even the ‘Rambo’ policy of UN/US forces saved over 200,000 lives at a cost of roughly 100 peacekeepers and 6,000 Somalis (mostly combatants, with some civilians).<sup>290</sup>

Unfortunately, “war is a necessary part of God's arrangement of the world” in the words of General von Moltke.<sup>291</sup> “But in order to save us from hell,”<sup>292</sup> the global order must adhere to Locke’s fundamental law of nature and be prepared to sacrifice in accordance with the positive duty every human possesses to safeguard life. By following the sixfold criteria (immediate physical rights concerns, last resort, reasonable chance of success, waiting until after a

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<sup>288</sup> Burkhardt, 107.

<sup>289</sup> Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia*.

<sup>290</sup> Njoku, 150,157.

<sup>291</sup> Ratcliffe, 7547.

<sup>292</sup> Boel.

reasonably negotiated timeframe, populous support, and proportionality),<sup>293</sup> humans on all levels may transform their philosophical obligations into pragmatic policy beneficial for the human race and their own nation. “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” wrote Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and nowhere does injustice endure more prevalent than in the former ‘Land of the Gods.’

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<sup>293</sup> Burkhardt, 124. Throughout his book, and more particularly chapter four of his book, Burkhardt expands on when and how to fight a ‘just war.’ Chapter 4 elaborates further on the duties of the UN, rights of soldiers and nations in regards to intervention. Though certainly worth consideration, for the purposes of this chapter, it would be superfluous to the point of justifying practical intervention in Somalia.

## Chapter 10

### The Definition of Victory

Touted as the “graveyard of foreign-policy failures,” opponents of nation building commonly utilize Somalia as the prime example as to why the United States should not engage in nation-building operations.<sup>294</sup> Yet, as Part II demonstrated, UNISOM/UNITAF “was not a typical UN intervention; it was a singularly, uniquely inept one marred by an inadequate mandate, poor resources, unclear command and control, and no political will.”<sup>295</sup> This chapter contends failures do not forecast the destiny of future missions, only that previous approaches were ill advised or improperly conducted. “If I find 10,000 ways something won't work, I haven't failed...every wrong attempt discarded is often a step forward” said Thomas Edison referring to the lightbulb.<sup>296</sup> Success in these endeavors is not as simple as creating a lightbulb. Achieving relative success in nation-building proves one of the most challenging undertakings a country can perform, as post-WWII history demonstrates well. Generally, nation-building efforts neither entirely establish a full-fledged stable democracy nor end dramatically; often, as with Somalia, the result remains ambiguous. Beyond a vindication of nation-building, this chapter will attempt to better define what a victory would entail from an intervention.

In the 21st century, “the need to engage in nation-building is inescapable. State failure incubates serious threats to regional and international order.”<sup>297</sup> Moral justification for this

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<sup>294</sup> Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place.”

<sup>295</sup> Miller, “The Case for Nation-Building.”

<sup>296</sup> Beals, “Thomas Edison Quotations.”

<sup>297</sup> Miller.

statement was discussed in the previous two chapters, and realism justification appears in Part IV. Unconvinced by this reasoning, the prevailing sentiment among the public is that nation-building, particularly in chaotic countries, typically proves to be an extremely wasteful enterprise, as the minimal results never appear adequate compared to the resources and manpower (not to mention lives) devoted to it. The opponents of nation-building recall famous examples of dramatic failures (ones that typically receive the most media attention) to reinforce their argument: Angola, Liberia (first time), Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.<sup>298</sup> However, these assertions omit several aspects in regards to those missions, as well as simplify the progress of national development.

The primary fallacy forwarded asserts these missions were complete and utter failures. This, however, is usually far from the case. In Somalia between 1992-1994, the combined UN and US effort saved over 100,000 people from starvation with only 40,000 soldiers at its peak.<sup>299</sup> Albeit Blackhawk Down was undeniably a tragedy for both sides, in all, only 43 Americans died in Somalia during the two years, or one for every 2,500 Somali lives saved. Undeniably impressive feat for such a minute force.<sup>300</sup>

Other erroneous conclusions emerge from Afghanistan. Former military officer Jason Hawk, who served as aide-de-camp to predominately Western generals as well collaborated extensively with Afgan officials, reported in 2019 (contrary to popular narrative) that, in fact, “...the Afghan government has the Taliban on the run. Taliban and ISIS forces are surrendering weekly to the Afghans. Afghan SOF have not lost a battle, they are skilled operators that can

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<sup>298</sup> Miller.

<sup>299</sup> Tierney “Black Hawk Up.”

<sup>300</sup> Tierney.

conduct precision night raids and then hand out humanitarian aid to children.”<sup>301</sup> Furthermore, former U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis told Congress that the Afghan forces were gaining ground, albeit slowly.<sup>302</sup> He noted, “the Taliban movement has declared that it cannot win militarily.”<sup>303</sup> The increase in terrorist attacks in cities “is the normal stuff by people who cannot win at the ballot box, so they turn to bombs” instructed Mathis.<sup>304</sup> Analysis of terrorist attacks from ISIS and al-Shabaab compared to their land holdings demonstrate this principle: unable to compete in conventional warfare over territory, these organizations revert to guerilla warfare or bombings to spread terror.<sup>305</sup> Though progress might be slow, it is undeniable that Western intervention initiated a virtuous cycle in Afghanistan which will lead to the eventual destruction of the Taliban.

Not only do rivals of nation-building wildly understate the achievements of failed humanitarian/nation-building operations, they often disregard the successes altogether: Namibia, Timor-Leste, Mozambique, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, El Salvador, Japan, Germany, Liberia (the second time), and Sierra Leone (which came back from the brink of failure). As Professor Paul Miller from the National Defense University explains:

Few of those countries are fully rebuilt, modern, stable liberal democracies. Civil unrest still occasionally flares up. Most are not particularly nice places to live. But the international interventions *changed their trajectories*. None have reverted to large-scale political violence. Their peace agreements have held. They have all held relatively open and competitive elections. Most have seen positive postwar economic growth. A few have shown improvements in the quality and accountability of their governance, according to the World Bank’s governance indicators, probably the hardest task of postconflict reconstruction.<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Howk, “The Taliban Have Been Defeated.”

<sup>302</sup> Ali, “Afghan Security Forces.”

<sup>303</sup> Howk.

<sup>304</sup> Ali.

<sup>305</sup> Anzalone, “The Resilience of Al-Shabaab.”; Lister, “ISIS: 143 Attacks.”; “Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall.”

<sup>306</sup> Miller.



In a post-Cold War existence, few would advocate for a costly military dominance of a state for 30+ years to impose revitalization as in the case of Germany or Japan. Even if pursued, such rapid nation-building is typically superfluous to the objectives of the international community and rectifying the crises in the country. The bottom line is to recognize that a critical juncture of intervention and nation-building shifts the trajectory of nations from a vicious cycle to a virtuous cycle. The monopolization of government power to ensure foreign investment and the safeguard of human rights, coupled with anti corruption measures, may be all that is required to deem an operation successful. “These days,” writes Mark Bowden, “that might be as good a definition of ‘victory’ as we can get.”<sup>307</sup>

Sometimes, total victory was never the intention either. Humanitarian missions frequently get conflated with nation-building missions in the public’s mind. Humanitarian missions seek to immediately obstruct mass human rights atrocities and temporarily safeguard further violations while international politics applies political and economic pressure to thwart the leaders from continuing after withdrawal. These are not long term solutions to upending underlying extractive institutions; rather, they are temporary humanitarian measures. As previously mentioned, the US never attempted fully to implement a nation-building operation in Somalia, it simply attempted to execute a humanitarian relief mission consisting of enforcing basic security for the aid to be safely delivered. Admiral Howe never attempted to install an entire government throughout all the extreme complexity of interwoven issues in a land roughly the size of France. His ‘Rambo’ policies with a mere 1,000 soldiers strictly sought to eliminate the warlords hoarding food. Still,

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<sup>307</sup> Bowden, “The Legacy of Black Hawk Down.”

adversaries contest “the deployment of the most inept UN [humanitarian] mission to the world’s most failed state” somehow indicates the inevitable failures of all future nation-building operations.

The final misconception is the sheer duration of violent creative destruction necessary for national stabilization and development. When nations undergo a critical juncture, creative destruction removes the previous institutions and holders of power and replaces them with new ones. Upon the formation of new nation-states, flares of violence due to the growth pains caused by creative destruction often ensue in decades following. Within the United States’s own history for example, between 1783 (the end of the American Revolution) and 1800 the United States experienced three major rebellions--Shays’s Rebellion (1786), The Whiskey Rebellion (1791), and Fries’s Rebellion (1799)--as well as the Newburgh Conspiracy (a potential military coup in 1783). Only arbitration by George Washington and a demonstration of military force were these uprisings suppressed. Then “four score” later, the creative destruction of ousting the power of the Southern aristocracy culminated in a Civil War which could have very easily broken the Union if not for certain fortuitous events like the discovery of General Robert E. Lee’s Special Order No.191 by an Indiana Sergeant.<sup>308</sup> The history of the United States as well as any inclusive country today thus serves as “vivid illustrations that history is not destiny.”<sup>309</sup> The development of nations, preeminently ones which involve nation-building is “neither automatic nor easy.”

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<sup>308</sup> Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 351-357; “General Robert E. Lee’s ‘Lost Order’ No. 191.” Special Order 191 was General Robert E. Lee’s messages to his divisional commanders instructing them where to march during the 1862 Maryland Campaign. A copy of these were fortuitously discovered by an Indiana Corporal and given to Union General McClellan, who upto that time, failed to act against Lee and risked encirclement in his present position. The orders gave him the confidence and knowledge needed to confront Lee and thwart the Maryland Campaign at the Battle of Antietam and others.

<sup>309</sup> Acemoglu, 426.

Additionally, “some luck is key, because history always unfolds in a contingent way.”<sup>310</sup> A confluence of factors stretched across decades alters a state’s evolution; therefore, early setbacks or the lack of immediate results should not deter the international community when judging the success of a nation-building mission.

Embedding stable institutions within Somalia will not prove as straightforward as other missions. A centralized government supported by reliable infrastructure already existed within Germany and Japan; therefore, simple mass cash injections from programs like the Marshall Plan, allowed these nations to rapidly reindustrialize their economies.<sup>311</sup> Somalia possesses neither inclusive institutions nor infrastructure; the issue is not state failure, but rather the lack of a unifying state altogether. Yet, inspired by Lockean philosophy, the RTP, and other realistic motivations that will be discussed in the following Part IV, Somali’s neighbors, as well as states across the globe, remain fortified by steadfast purpose to endure hindrances in Somalia’s national fruition. The institutional progress in Somaliland, Puntland, and even Somalia itself is undeniable. Not a single land in the world has undergone its history without a robust government at some intersection. Somalia may require a voracious amount of strife; but no country is immune from a critical juncture of inclusivity.

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<sup>310</sup> Acemoglu, 427.

<sup>311</sup> “Marshall Plan, 1948.”

Part IV: The Remedies

The surreal footage of bullet-riddled naked servicemen paraded through the streets of Mogadishu on CNN left policymakers, and the American public, perplexed as to the viability of nation-building as well as questioning its justification at the expense of American taxes and blood. The whirlwind of media fury that ensued shattered President Clinton's resolve to uphold and implement the humanitarian ideals he once advocated along the campaign trail. The United States "has no obligations elsewhere," he declared in a press conference in the days following, and it was not America's duty to "rebuild Somalian society."<sup>312</sup> Soon thereafter, the Clinton Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), declaring that future peacekeeping action must pursue "clearly defined objectives" with "concrete political solutions...specified timeframe...[and] an integrated political/military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts." The directive concludes by noting "peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states -- crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests."<sup>313</sup> While this affirmed the necessity of nation-building operations, it thwarted open-ended humanitarian missions. Clinton attempted to ensure that no citizen would ever encounter news of American sacrifice in a distant land and think: why?

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<sup>312</sup> Clinton, *My Life*, 551; Hyland. *Clinton's World*, 58; Moeller, "Locating Accountability," 375.

<sup>313</sup> Clinton Administration Policy (PDD 25); Dotson. "Successes and Failures," 186.

Nevertheless, this question still consumes American foreign policy discussion. Touching upon recently botched missions such as Somalia along with lengthy campaigns with muddled results like Afghanistan, surface analysis has led many from the higher echelons of politics to common civilians to alter their altruistic notions and proclaim nation building is either unachievable or simply not worth it.<sup>314</sup> Continually, such missions beg the question as to why thousands of Americans have died in the Middle East in the defense of objectives irrelevant towards the US's national security strategy.

Throughout the previous three parts, this paper has explored the complicated circumstances which shaped Somalia into the violent "graveyard of foreign-policy failures," and why the United States must pursue a nation-building enterprise in "the most dangerous place in the world."<sup>315</sup> Howbeit, "the U.S. cannot be the world's policeman," nor should it be expected to perform open-ended humanitarian missions and suffer the consequences Clinton attempted to avert in PDD-25.<sup>316</sup> Therefore, Part IV further contends that the vitalization of Somalia, to at least a stable degree, would reap vast benefits for U.S. security interests and for its economy. Assuming a realist<sup>317</sup> lens, each chapter presents a rational assessment of Somalia's syndromes and root causes, and then confronts the vexing foreign policy challenge by defining clear, targeted approaches to the topic at hand.

Part Four is divided amongst three chapters. The first, *A Long Road Ahead*, suggests strategies to induce a sorely needed national reconciliation in a post-Barre/civil war era. Next,

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<sup>314</sup> Miller, "The Case for Nation-Building."

<sup>315</sup> Fergusson, *The World's Most Dangerous Place*.

<sup>316</sup> Clinton Administration Policy (PDD 25).

<sup>317</sup> Baylis, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 102-103, 105. Realism in International Relations Theory is often considered the pessimistic twin to liberalism. The theory originates in the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbs, and Otto Von Bismark with his 'realpolitik.' Realists stress "statism, survival, and self-help," asserting international politics is an endless, anarchic power struggle between nations or factions in a quest for clout.

*The Emporium of East Africa*, analyzes the history of Somaliland since its declaration of independence in 1991 and recommends how Somalia and international actors should interact with the de facto nation to promote progress. Finally, *Shall not Perish* proposes methods by which the political measures, coupled with business growth and cooperation, will generate inclusive institutions to ensure a prosperous future.

Nation-building in Somalia need not be an entirely charitable act; rather, overtime, the relationship between the two states may transform into a flourishing symbiotic existence built upon stable governance and lucrative foreign investment.

This is how Somalia could cure its syndromes and “form the foundation stones of a more stable and prosperous future.”<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>318</sup> Keating, *War and Peace in Somalia*, 6.

## Chapter 11

A Long Road Ahead

Diffused among rustic dirt and tattered rags sprawl numerous skulls and bones protruding from their shallow graves. Teeming with maggots feasting on the bloated flesh blistering in the piercing sun, the indeterminable remnants of human existence lie scattered near to a place once called home. Eventually a scarce community of survivors will return to bury the dead; yet, there are no faces to discern, no relatives to identify, only rows of ominous pits marked by sticks shoved into the mud. An official might pass by one day and gaze upon the simple rows and columns of mounds, quickly multiplying and then scribbling down his simple calculations onto a cheap pad and depart, only to never return again. As he drives off, he recalls other fields, other towns, other cities, in which the rubble, bodies, brush, and blood intermingle in hideous forms to the human eye. ‘Trivial compared to those,’ he mentally assures himself. Later, when reporting the statistics of his excursion to his superior, the commander asks him, “Anything notable?” “No,” the man would reply, “nothing significant.” But for those bones, and those who laid them down, that tally represents the only significant thing they have left to remember.

Though fictitious in nature, this scene is indicative of thousands of similar events occurring in the aftermath of the turbulent Barre and ensuing civil war years. Men were hacked to death for weighing too much. Children were executed for being unable to perfectly recite the Koran. Women were raped because soldiers were simply bored; oftentimes family members discovered their discarded and dismembered bodies among the weeds in a nearby ditch. Murder

was so commonplace that Somalians coined these *nesibso*, or ‘try-your-luck’ killing. “The stories of evil perpetrated by their countrymen offered glimpses of the dark side of their own Somali souls,” wrote Fergusson, “and who among their generation didn’t have a tale of suffering to tell?”<sup>319</sup> “If you see a 70-year old watering his camels, it is because he is lacking a 20-year old.”<sup>320</sup> Yet, Somalia is not the only African country which this story describes. Merely 30 years ago, Rwanda bore witness to the greatest human rights atrocity since the Nazi Holocaust; however, today it has ascended to the 51st safest country in the world according to *Global Finance* magazine (the US ranked 65th by comparison).<sup>321</sup> This transformation stands as a testament to the ability of survivors to reforge a significant community which rises from the mud and ashes like a phoenix.



<sup>319</sup> Fergusson, *The World's Most Dangerous Place*, 221-222.

<sup>320</sup> Keating, *War and Peace in Somalia*, 90.

<sup>321</sup> Getzoff, “World’s Safest Countries.”



### Aftermath of Rwandan Genocide<sup>322</sup>

Before any consideration can be given to the construction of a stable government and justice, Somalians must cleanse themselves from “the taint of civil war,” and learn to forgive each other or risk “recontamination.”<sup>323</sup> Throughout this chapter, analysis of the root of the obstacles to Southern Somalia’s consolidation are explored and then supplemented with tenants of the Rwandan reconciliation process to construct recommendations for how Somalians may tend to the emotional wounds and learn to trust each other once again as countrymen.

The pursuit of prosperity for Somalia as a nation-state is only achievable if fundamental trust of power structures between the various clans is established; without it, Somalia remains destined to exist as a patchwork of fiefdoms forever locked in conflict while the rest of the world progresses into the postmodern age. The prohibitors to national reconciliation are twofold. First, as demonstrated in Part II, the extractive institutions that dominate clan structures entrench leaders in their positions of power who stimulate clan-based nationalist sentiments to encourage distrust or ‘otherness’ of other clans and utilize their influence to maintain a vicious cycle of authority. This is only further exacerbated by modern, foreign-backed political institutions which grant legitimacy to the actions of powerful individuals. This is not to assert that Somalians desire war. When James Fergusson traveled to the “world’s most dangerous place” in 2011, his Somaliland associates expressed “peace was a privilege to be treasured and defended at any cost.”<sup>324</sup> Rather, as also supported by the analysis presented in *History Rhymes*, politicians, who after a fair election still command the respect of a militia (like the prime minister) during their term or who were already in a position of power, like clan elders, are naturally subject to

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<sup>322</sup> Welch, “Rwandan Genocide Revisited.”

<sup>323</sup> Fergusson, 222.

<sup>324</sup> Fergusson, 222.

infighting to retain or increase their power base. Electing economically or militarily influential individuals does not present an issue; the US's founding fathers all were members of high society. However, the critical aspect to understand is that none of the founding fathers possessed a base of political, military, or economic hegemony out of office while nearly all Somali politicians possessed considerable personal clout outside their office. As a result, this explains the rampant corruption syndrome among Somalia that wasn't as wide scale in the US political history.

The other barrier to state formation is the ingrained Somali notions about government. In international relations theory, Social constructivism suggests human *identity* and *notions* about the power of actors factor into the actual power that actors actually possess. When formulating how power structures interact, Constructionists typically use normative structure which alleges "collectively held ideas such as knowledge, rules, beliefs, and norms...constitute their identities and interests, and define standards of appropriate conduct."<sup>325</sup> As American political scientist Alexander Wendt superbly illustrated in 1995, "500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than five North Korean nuclear weapons. These identifications are not caused by the nuclear weapons (the *material structure*) but rather by the meaning given to the material structure (the *ideational structure*)."<sup>326</sup> When related to history, this theory explains why revolutions spread throughout regions so quickly. During the Arab Spring, despite no tangible changes between the dynamic of governance, the very legitimacy and power of six states was suddenly undermined by the populous believing in their own strength overnight.<sup>327</sup> Applied to Somalia, the perpetuation of militant notions, ineffective and oppressive past governments, and

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<sup>325</sup> Baylis, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 147.

<sup>326</sup> Theys. "Introducing Constructivism."

<sup>327</sup> "The 'Arab Spring': Five Years On."

prevalence of al-Shabaab still terrorizing the countryside predispose Somalians to a natural hesitancy and suspicion towards ceding power to hierarchical structures above the clan level. The syndromes of the constructivist theory at play in Somalia has been noticed before; Jeffrey Gettleman concludes in his article by stating, “nearly an entire generation of Somalis has absolutely no idea what a government is or how it functions. I’ve seen this glassy-eyed generation all across the country,...Kalashnikovs[AK-47s] in their hands and nowhere to go. To them, law and order are thoroughly abstract concepts. To them, the only law in the land is the business end of a machine gun.”<sup>328</sup>

Somalia’s precarious circumstances only further degrade the prospects of national reconciliation. “The absence of the rule of law, state enforcement mechanisms, and the abundance of weapons in civilian hands has meant that minor quarrels escalate into violent confrontations among groups, which then draw in their respective communities.”<sup>329</sup> For millennia, Somalia’s customary interclean oral law, or *xeer*, remained the main justice system throughout the land. Though Acemoglu and Robinson note in *Why Nations Fail* that the code was ineffective at long-term peacekeeping, and only provided a temporary resolution (as no higher entity could thwart a clan or individual from performing the unlawful action again).<sup>330</sup> Still, any code enshrined into society is better than no code at all; and unfortunately, a variety of circumstances have limited the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) ability to institute justice. As a result, vast numbers of Somalians are reverting to their traditional code, but the heightened ability to devastate other clans with 21st Century weaponry, compounded by

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<sup>328</sup> Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place.”

<sup>329</sup> Keating, Michael, 84.

<sup>330</sup> Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 239-243.

additional reasons to conduct war within a new political structure, means this must not persist less Somalia regress its political system back into the Middle Ages.

As evidenced throughout the plethora of examples brimming this report, the syndromes of fundamental distrust has produced terrible effects upon the Somali people. However, these reactions do not stem from some desire of clans to *want* conflict; rather, it is the merging and consolidation of extractive political institutions, which by their very nature, challenge any opposition to its power. Reinforced by constructivist ideals, when actors *feel* their power base or quality of life undermined (by ineffective governance and dictatorial warlords in Somalia's case), they shall not want to cede any influence over their domain. Like similar ends of magnets, the natural hostility of merging extractive "regions with diverse clan composition and opposing armed militias into one federating unit [under the FGS system] realigned long-standing power dynamics in newly delineated member states, ignited competition for political positions and representation among clan elites, and was further complicated by the role of avowed outsiders like Al-Shabaab, as well as other armed groups."<sup>331</sup> Mediated dialogue is therefore necessary before cooperation.

Somali politics is not a "zero sum game," as most leaders might believe, as the prosperity of the clans is inherently linked to the prosperity of the Somali nation-state (and the prosperity of the United States as well). When the nation prospers, clans and individuals prosper; when actors fail to cooperate under a single government, Acemoglu and Robinson suggest that is indeed a cause of *why nations fail*. Therefore, the objective of reconciliation is to convince everyone

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<sup>331</sup> Keating, Michael, 95.

building inclusive institutions is not simply slicing the metaphorical pie of power equally; but also constructing a bigger pie as well.<sup>332</sup>

Averse to common perceptions, Somalis understand this process, and its required preceding nation-building too. After the disastrous merging with belligerent clans, elders from the Hawadle and other clans in the new Hiran province wrote a letter to the FGS requesting “the government to support reconciliation among clans in Hiran before state-formation.” It further concluded by stating “the government...drove a wedge between the clans and divided them instead of uniting and reconciling them,” pursuing “the state formation process at the expense of reconciliation.”<sup>333</sup> Simply characterized by conflict-analyst Najum Mushtaq, “state-building without reconciliation is hollow, and in some cases, counterproductive.”<sup>334</sup>

Constructing a viable inclusive political system to adequately distribute power democratically among a broad cross section of Somali society, with respect to its unique socio-political circumstances, will be the focus of chapter 13, *Shall Not Perish*. But before designing institutions is possible, reconciliation must happen. So what better way to create a framework than by studying the most successful reconciliation process in history: Rwanda.

Centuries ago a ethnic group known as the Tutsis settled into the area labelled today as Rwanda. There, the Tutsis assimilated into the local Hutu population: adopting their culture, customs, and language. Due to their herding heritage, the Tutsis typically performed better economically than their farming counterparts; nevertheless, by the time of colonization, the twin terms colloquially referred to ‘rich’ and ‘poor.’ Yet, the Europeans instilled the Tutsis as an unnatural aristocracy, leaders of extractive institutions possessing greater access to education,

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<sup>332</sup> Keating, Michael, 94; Wright, “Progress is not a zero sum game.”

<sup>333</sup> Keating, Michael, 101.

<sup>334</sup> Keating, Michael, 101.

capital, and political power. When a plane crashed containing the Rwandan and Burundi Presidents--both Hutu--the oppressed Hutu population, assisted by government lists of Tutsi residences and persons, meticulously slaughtered a millions. Then, ensuing wars to restore peace decimated what remained of buildings and human existence, with the final death toll reaching upwards of 5 million from 1994-2003.<sup>335</sup>

Upon the restoration of peace, the Rwandan judicial system faced an insurmountable task of trying over 2 million individuals for genocide. UNSC's International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) only prosecuted the most notorious figures, thereby seeming distant and failing to resolve local, personal justice in the shattered communities. To overcome the predicament of both the exuberant number of trials and reconciliation, the government devised the *gacaca* system.



Gacaca Court<sup>336</sup>

<sup>335</sup> "Rwanda Genocide: 100 Days of Slaughter."; "Rwanda: Justice After Genocide-20 Years On."

<sup>336</sup> "Rwanda 'Gacaca' Genocide Courts."

Literally translating to “sit down and discuss an issue,” the *gacaca*’s objectives included not only solving the two aforementioned issues, but “revealing the truth about the genocide” through open discussion and punitive justice, or retributive justice--where perpetrators serve equal punishment to the crimes they commit. The judges were elected by the population with no prior legal training being a prerequisite. This posed two advantages. First, justice would derive from within the community, not some foreign or distantly imposed legal code, adding to the sense of personal resolution. Second, given the majority of legal professionals were Tusti, and foreign nations could not possibly supply enough professionals, it allowed for countless more trials which could commence closer to the community and the spot of the crime, expediting the process. Then, during the trials, judges tried “cases in front of members of the local community, who were expected to speak out about what they knew regarding the defendants' actions during the genocide.”<sup>337</sup> From pilot tests starting in 2002 to its finale in 2012, *gacaca* courts “processed almost two million cases.”<sup>338</sup> The system was not perfect, however, and the courts produced a mixed legacy:

Its positive achievements included the courts’ swift work in processing a huge number of cases; the participation of local communities; and the opportunity for some genocide survivors to learn what had happened to their relatives. *Gacaca* might also have helped some survivors find a way of living peacefully alongside perpetrators. However, many *gacaca* hearings resulted in unfair trials. There were limitations on the ability of the accused to effectively defend themselves; numerous instances of intimidation and corruption of defence witnesses, judges and other parties; and flawed decision-making due to inadequate training for lay judges who were expected to handle complex cases.

Additionally, intimidation, personal ties, fear of greater punishment, and corruption prohibited the revealing of the whole truth. The government’s failure to provide compensation as promised

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<sup>337</sup> “Rwanda: Justice After Genocide.”

<sup>338</sup> “Rwanda: Justice After Genocide.”

to the survivors further frustrated the sense of justice. These deficiencies meant the lasting impact of the gacaca is that, while it “may have served as a first step to help some Rwandans on the long path to reconciliation, it did not manage to dispel distrust between many perpetrators and survivors of the genocide.”<sup>339</sup>

Still, the process of open, personal, community-based justice delivered by locally respected figures, not a distant government or international body, proved invaluable in the reconciliation process. South Africa’s Truth & Reconciliation Commission during the turn of the 21st Century experienced similar results as well. The open dialogue, and the admittance of perpetration by people, as well as the harrowing tales of apartheid, induced forgiveness and reconciliation. Its pitfalls lay in its failure to properly prosecute, provide compensation, or undo the present circumstances of the victim; in other words, issues with the government, not the trial process itself.<sup>340</sup>

Since the collapse of the Barre regime, a dozen Somali reconciliation conferences have ensued. Though producing ‘results’ at the summits, these are often high-minded affairs, originating from foreign proposals, without any mechanisms of retributive justice which Jonathan Haidt, acclaimed modern philosopher and social psychologist, claims is central to thwart humans from recommitting immoral action.<sup>341</sup> To ensure proper reconciliation and justice in Somalia, a system must be designed which accomplishes the following roles: (1) induce dialogue among clan leaders (heads of extractive institutions) to promote similar corporation within the same political system rather than operating independently; (2) reduce militarism; (3)

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<sup>339</sup> “Rwanda: Justice After Genocide.”

<sup>340</sup> Magistad, “South Africa's Imperfect Progress.”

<sup>341</sup> Haidt, “The Moral Roots..”



provide justice on a personal level among communities ;(4) safeguard against coercion of the courts; and, (5) ensure compensation to those afflicted and injured persons or parties.

To achieve this the FGS and the international community should undertake the following proposals:

- 1) Establish national and regional forums for the purpose of discussing the quadaries of power-dynamics, coercion, crime, government failures, and other topics of concern prevalent while promoting the benefits and necessity of cooperation and benevolence for the purpose of reaching an agreement on how to possibly demilitarise and reconstruct the federal state system and state borders.
- 2) Establish a *written* legal code which combines aspects of the *xeer*, Sharia law, and UN statutes and crimes against humanity which should be instantly implemented and publicized among all levels of Somali government and society.
- 3) Utilize a task force commanded by the central government, composed of Somalis from every clan and station in life, to arrest notorious criminals in the country.
- 4) Establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Somalia (ICTS) to try the nation's infamous criminals.
- 5) Establish community-based courts, with a tribunal of clan elders presiding who are versed in the new legal code, to openly try and prosecute individuals within the community, determining punishments as dictated by the code.
- 6) Establish a Somalian police force agency committed to witness protection which will be funded and trained by foreign actors as well as FGS funds.

- 7) Establish a liquidity account supported by funds from the international community which may be distributed to the injured parties following the verdict (with appropriate compensation stipulated by the legal code).
- 8) Invest in community and regional based infrastructure projects constructed by the cooperative effort of neighboring clans.
- 9) Strengthen the Federal Affairs and Reconciliation Agency of the Somali government through foreign training, operational and technical expertise, and funding.



Local reconciliation discussion in Somalia<sup>342</sup>

“Despite the setbacks, the chances to advance national reconciliation in Somalia are probably better than ever before since the beginning of the civil war in the 90s” wrote The UN

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<sup>342</sup> Gundel, “Reconciliation in Somalia Is Possible.”

backed Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers. Amidst debate at a recent conference, one member rose and proclaimed “Somalis are very easy to reconcile, they are tired of hating. They crave for reconciliation.”<sup>343</sup> This progress will be imperfect, tedious, and painful. “Achieving peace will require a change of mindset and way of thinking. Across the country, we must seek to resolve conflicts, avoid confrontation, to find and build on shared values, and even be prepared to engage in dialogue with those we see as adversaries. We must also talk and listen to all those Somalis who are affected by the decisions of those who hold power” added President Farmaajo.<sup>344</sup>

No society, or pair of societies from South Africa to Rwanda, Kosovo to Bosnia, Japan to Korea, Germany to the Jewish population, and even the United States to the Native Americans have ever been completely reconciled. Nevertheless, all of these nations possess inclusive institutions and progress in reconciliation as time ticks on. “The process is slow,” Acemoglu and Robinson write, but not insurmountable.<sup>345</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> Linnoinen, “Is National Reconciliation Possible?”

<sup>344</sup> Keating, Michael, ix-x.

<sup>345</sup> Acemoglu, 461.

## Chapter 12

### The Emporium of East Africa

When the region now known as Somaliland formed the gateway for African products to enter the lucrative Silk Road, travellers from across the four corners of the world called it “the emporium of East Africa.”<sup>346</sup> To this day, this title remains relevant not only because it captures the image of bustling bazaars brimming with products of every variety hung high “like the harem in a folk tale in *Arabian Nights*,” but also the high degree of political independence this de facto nation possesses.<sup>347</sup> This chapter considers the status of Somaliland’s institutions and diplomatic process to determine the proper course to proceed on regarding Somaliland nationhood.



Hargeisa Market, Somaliland, 2011<sup>348</sup>

As Mohamoud characterized, the unique conundrum with Southern Somalia and Somaliland is that, unlike so many other failed states that suffer from dangerously political centralization and national extractive institutions, the issue for the two remains the lack of firmly established national institutions. In an attempt to save themselves from local extractive institutions and personal insecurity due to tribal conflict during the “The Chaotic Democratic Years”<sup>349</sup> from 1960-1969, Somalians allowed Barre’s authoritarian hegemony to dominate power dynamics. This proved disastrous for the former British colony which experienced unparalleled atrocities at the hands of sadism. In February 1991, after a decade of “Barre’s Holocaust,” a grand council, comprised of clan elders, 80% of whom came from the Isaaq Clan, collectively declared “No More Mogadishu” and founded the Republic of Somaliland along the British colonial borders on May 18.<sup>350</sup>

While Southern Somalia endured an increasingly vicious cycle of authoritarian regimes (Adid, the SCIC, and al-Shabaab), along with recurrent famine and international intervention, Somaliland remained isolated from the chaos. At a conference in the city of Borama in 1993, the militant independence group SNM ceded power to the civilian administration. Though this might appear surprising for Somalia, as noted in Parts I and II, Somaliland retained the British process of pluralistic governance coupled with conflict resolution by rule of law. Drawing from their past again, the Borama delegates established a Presidency, “a Cabinet of Ministers and a bicameral Parliament, comprising the *Guurti* and the House of Representatives, each with 75 members.”<sup>351</sup>

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<sup>348</sup> Lafforgue, *Customers At Hargeisa Market*.

<sup>349</sup> Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs*, 29.

<sup>350</sup> Mullin, *A View From The Foothills*, 504; Wiafe-Amoako, *The World today Series*, 238.

<sup>351</sup> Njoku, *The History of Somalia*, 168.

The *Guurti*, “an unelected upper house of elders, somewhat similar to Britain’s House of Lords,” is primarily entrusted with settling disputes between the country’s subclans while the House debates legislation. This Parliament may never be dissolved by the President, nor have its power consolidated by political parties or clans because when an elder is incapable of serving, their replacement must come from the same sub-clan. “It’s the elders who really made this peace,” Mohamed also declared.

The 1993 summit achieved other remarkable feats as well. It reestablished written law combining traditional Somali codes, and basic Islamic law.<sup>352</sup> Perhaps most importantly however, actors at the conference agreed to demilitarization, with heavy weapons “surrendered voluntarily and often stored unguarded;” a testament to the peaceful state.<sup>353</sup>

Throughout the late 1990s, the transitional government attempted to construct a permanent Constitution and, similar to the formation of the US Constitution, deliberations remained scattered and subject to failure. Just as George Washington safeguarded against the collapse of the enterprise, so too did interim President Mohamed Egal, who attended post-secondary education in Britain and skillfully managed a region torn between possible reunification and total independence. “Remembered today as a generation of Somalis who were strongly opposed to any form of ethnic politics based on clan or religious sentiments,” Egal endorsed legislation to thwart impediments or reversals to the democratic process.<sup>354</sup> He championed a provision of the new constitution requiring that “any new parties are not based on religion or clans.”<sup>355</sup> Then at the critical moment, Egal, opposed to the 14 other attempted

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<sup>352</sup> Njoku, 168.

<sup>353</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 238.

<sup>354</sup> Njoku, 168.

<sup>355</sup> Njoku, 168-169.

governments in their Southern counterpart, held a Somaliland-wide referendum for “every citizen [to] cast his vote for or against the Constitution.”<sup>356</sup> Amazingly, with “international observers from Britain, the United States, and Switzerland” monitoring the election, the Constitution was passed and ratified with 97% of the vote. On May 31, 2001, the region declared itself the sovereign and independent Republic of Somalia.<sup>357</sup> Although receiving applause from the international community and possessing official diplomatic missions from 10 nations, including the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia (four of the five UNSC permanent members), not a single government has recognized Somaliland sovereignty.<sup>358</sup>

Nevertheless, Somaliland “made remarkable progress on its own” preserving the sanctity of its inclusive institutions. Lightly regulated business thrives, the crime and terrorism are some of the lowest in Africa, and the political sphere is unabridged by outside forces.<sup>359</sup> Yet, no matter how inclusive Somaliland’s political institutions are, it is argued that its elementary administration would void any progress; but this is not the case. As described by foreign policy analyst Joshua Keating upon his touchdown in Hargeisa, this state in legal limbo possesses a robust bureaucracy:

When you are in Somaliland, there is never any question that you are in a real country. After all, the place has all the trappings of countryhood. When I arrived at the airport, a customs officer in a Somaliland uniform checked my Somaliland visa, issued by the Somaliland consulate in Washington DC. At the airport, there was a Somaliland flag. During my visit, I paid Somaliland shillings to drivers of cabs with Somaliland plates who took me to the offices of ministers of the Somaliland government.<sup>360</sup>

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<sup>356</sup> Njoku, 170.

<sup>357</sup> Njoku, 170.

<sup>358</sup> Felter, “Somaliland: Breakaway State.”

<sup>359</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 238.

<sup>360</sup> Keating, Joshua.



Additionally, the would-be nation has founded “two universities and several vocational colleges.”<sup>361</sup> By stripping it of sub-clans of their powerful militias and weaponry while redistributing the power equally among them through a democratic process, Somaliland has contrived a stable, inclusive political systems inline with the perplexing power dynamics within Somaliland. Zimbabwe's UN representative classified their politics as “unique and brilliant.”<sup>362</sup> For Somalilanders, it’s not a Jeffersonian democracy, it’s better.

The virtuous cycle is also viable. Since 2001, the would-be nation has undergone several peaceful elections including a gracious cession of power to an opposing party. The business institutions are expanding, albeit slower than normal as explained later.<sup>363</sup> Furthermore, it has managed to maintain government hegemony. Akin to Washington during the Whiskey Rebellion, Egal arrested clans leaders who attempted to gather without notifying government authorities (a crime). However, like Washington, he did not sentence them; rather, he granted them pardon after they pledged to “henceforth respect the laws of the land as enshrined in the Constitution.”<sup>364</sup> This tactful maneuver safeguarded three critical aspects necessary to developing a stable government in Somalia. First, President Egal guaranteed that no alternative actors possessing power formed besides the government. As noted in Part II, hegemony of power by the governmental is paramount in creating inclusive institutions. Second, it reinforced the notions of outlawing militias and demilitarization.<sup>365</sup> Thirdly, it calmed Somalilanders’ natural assumptions

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<sup>361</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 239.

<sup>362</sup> Fergusson, 222.

<sup>363</sup> Wiafe-Amoako, 238-239.

<sup>364</sup> Njoku, 170; “The Whiskey Rebellion.” In 1791, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton proposed levying a tax on whiskey. By 1794, Western Pennsylvanian farmers, many of whom relied on whiskey production as their only source of monetary income to supplement their subsistence farming rebelled. Rapidly becoming violent, Hamilton suggested swift force. After negotiations failed, Washington agreed and dispatched 13,000 militiamen. The rebellion promptly collapsed and two leaders were convicted of treason. However, Washington pardoned them knowing he had demonstrated the government retained the power and executing them would be viewed a tyrannical.

<sup>365</sup> Njoku, 170.




about their government's despotism, as it demonstrated benevolence and forgiveness on behalf of the state: absolutely critical for reconciliation. Though Somaliland maintains inclusive systems, several issues continue to plague the new adolescent region.

Due to a lack of recognition, Somaliland is unable to assert its status to receive international aid or determine its own borders. "Ineligible for loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund," paired with scarce natural resources, foreign investment, remains low. Seventy percent of Somaliland's economy is reliant on the livestock business which booms during the Hajj as Saudi Arabia feeds the nearly two million pilgrims. "The economy of modern Somaliland arguably depends, like that of no other in the world, on the growth of Islam" wrote journalist James Fergusson. Furthermore, the New World bank notes the administration's "tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in Somaliland (approximately 7% in 2012) is less than half the sub-saharan African average;" therefore restricting the government to funding public infrastructure or expanding security measures. All of this means if Somaliland were a country, it is estimated to be the 4th poorest in the world with a GDP per capita of \$348 in 2012.<sup>366</sup> Moreover, corruption, though not as prevalent as in its Southern neighbor, persists an epidemic. Still, growth is undeniable. In recent years, many nations have eyed Somaliland as a potential location for military bases seeking to be on the Gulf of Aden. Largely untapped oil fields and gemstone mines beget a promising source of income, but the absence of large capital and foreign investment has stunted extraction of those resources.

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<sup>366</sup> Felter; Keating, Joshua.



Map of Northern Somalia displaying the disputed regions<sup>367</sup>

The lack of international recognition continues to undermine Somaliland's political stability as well. Though within the former British colony, the eastern third consists of members of the Darod clan (predominate in Northern and Southern Somalia) , not the Isaaq one.<sup>368</sup> As a

<sup>367</sup> "Map of Northern Somalia," Map.

<sup>368</sup> Ferguson, 226.

result, these two provinces serve as a battleground for a border skirmish between Somaliland (Isaaq) and Puntland (Darod) that “risks breaking out into open war.”<sup>369</sup> To ensure the support of the people, the government now harasses and arrests journalists who report on the war.<sup>370</sup>

Despite this, historical events teach us economic woes and uncertain borders do not bear a state’s admittance into the community of nations. In the decades following the signing of the 1783 Treaty of Paris for example, the United States engaged in a series of treaty signing with European powers and in border skirmishes with the Native Americans to further assert and define its sovereignty. Similarly with its inclusive political and economic institutions “rooted in popular consensus and embedded in society” on a virtuous cycle, Somaliland has demonstrated the propensity to develop into an exceptional nation that deserves every right to be recognized among the nations of the world.<sup>371</sup> The reversal to colonial borders is not unprecedented either, as “Egypt and Syria were briefly joined together as the United Arab Republic from 1958 until 1961, when Syria seceded;” Senegal and Gambia also merged into Senegambia from 1982 to 1989 but were later permitted to revert.<sup>372</sup> The inhibitor upon Somaliland independence lies beyond the question of viability, but rather the notion of self determination in the 21st Century. Keating perfectly characterizes the conundrum:

International organisations such as the African Union and the Arab League are hostile to the idea of recognising further territorial divisions. Countries wary of their own separatist movements don’t want to establish any sort of precedent. The UN, which has invested enormous resources in promoting stability and unity in Somalia as a whole, views Somaliland as a hindrance to those goals rather than any sort of beacon of stability. Somaliland’s neighbour Ethiopia mostly supports it, but given Addis Ababa’s wariness about its own Somali separatists, it likely

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<sup>369</sup> Keating, Joshua.

<sup>370</sup> Keating, Joshua.

<sup>371</sup> Njoku, 172.

<sup>372</sup> Keating, Joshua.

prefers the status quo – a weak and divided Somalia – rather than a strong independent Somali state on its borders.<sup>373</sup>

In essence, numerous African and Middle Eastern States, not to mention China's membership in the United Nations Security Council which could veto the resolution altogether, believe "formal recognition would embolden other secessionist movements on the continent" and the wider world.<sup>374</sup>

The formation of the Republic of Somaliland does not simply disturb the outside order, but the internal affairs of Somalia as well. As the sole recognized authority in the whole of Somalia, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) retains a duty to treat every federal state equally. "In particular, if an asymmetric arrangement is tabled as a possible solution," writes the Swiss-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, "the FGS will need to initiate parallel dialogues with the Member States in order to have their backing" so that it "does not precipitate a political crisis between Mogadisu and Member States."<sup>375</sup> Puntland would particularly be perturbed as the self-governing region asserts it does not want independence; rather, it will remain a loyal federal state. If the FGS enter into negotiations with Somaliland, it will appear as both unfair treatment as well as possible betrayal, with the FGS not thoroughly siding with Puntland in the border skirmish. Despite eagerness among both administrations to renew talks, negotiations between the two entities might also be considered negatively by Somali public opinion. Deliberating with an unthreatening organization could appear as a waste of resources while a wide array of internal Somali crises rage. As a result, the FGS has only devoted a small amount of capital to negotiations, which in turn has resulted in poor long-term planning.

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<sup>373</sup> Keating, Joshua.

<sup>374</sup> Felter.

<sup>375</sup> Keating, *War and Peace*, 235.

For the United States, resolving this precarious situation could yield massive economic benefits. As previously noted, the lack of international and legal agreement greatly impedes Somaliland's ability to stabilize and reinforce security measures. If decided, the United States and other powers could bolster Somaliland government initiatives to promote democracy and thwart piracy on land on the Gulf of Aden, "a major sea-lane through which almost one-third of the world's shipping passes."<sup>376</sup> Settling the dispute would further allow Somlailand to focus on security measures to protect foreign capital and enterprises which could reap sizable profit margins by tapping into Somliland's undeveloped oil and gem industries. Lastly, amidst intense trade wars and human rights violations committed by China (the world's producer that accounts for 3% of personal US spending), an alternative source of cheap labor is required.<sup>377</sup> Though locations such as Mexico, India, and Vietnam serve in this capacity, Western firms could thrive off of the cheap labor, extremely low taxes, and manifold untapped human and resources capital within the quasi-nation before it falls to China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Therefore, the United States and other Western neighbors should invest and facilitate the resolution of Somaliland's legal and financial predicaments in following ways:

- 1) Form an international body (so as to not appear imperialistic or reassert anti-Western sentiment) called the International Council for Peace in Somaliland (ICPS) to be dedicated to facilitating and supporting peace negotiations between Somaliland and the FGS (where Puntland would have a major role similar to how the National Liberation Front acted with regards to the North Vietnamese Government) through expertise and technology.

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<sup>376</sup> Felter.

<sup>377</sup> Goldstein, "How Much Do We Buy?"

- 2) Have the ICPS coordinate with administrations of Puntland, Somaliland, and FGS to design a long-term strategy for future discussions that involve financial incentives and/or punishments, as well as possible arbitration by the member bodies for parties either violating or concurring with the terms of negotiations or implementation.
- 3) Ensure that any treaty agreed upon by the three parties will be voted upon by the populations of both Somalia and Somaliland.
- 4) To justly resolve the border crisis, pose a referendum among the whole of Somaliland voting whether each district should remain with Somaliland, join Puntland, or form their own federalist state within Somalia, and to enforce the results through the ISPC's previously mentioned means and AU forces.
- 5) Have the ICPS reinforce the Somaliland army, police, and coast guards with training advisors (who will not patrol) and with capital to bolster their anti-piracy, terrorism, and crime, as well as supporting further demilitarization.
- 6) Have the ICPS collaborate with the Somaliland government to construct robust, labor laws and business regulations and encourage foreign investment.

Though potentially viewed as somewhat vague, establishing the ICPS to support Somaliland and Somalia would not repeat the mistakes of previous humanitarian missions that attempted to 'engineer prosperity;' rather, it would assist and expand Somaliland's virtuous cycle and skilled conflict resolution leaders to design proposals agreeable to both sides. Instituting a foreign or foreign-constructed system has previously proved unsuccessful. If a single lesson is to

be learned from the history of Somlialand, it is that grassroots democracy supported by the broad society manifests greater prosperity than any pre-designed entity.



Somaliland Independence Day Parade<sup>378</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> Tubei, "7 Reasons Why Somaliland Deserves Recognition."

## Chapter 13

Shall Not Perish

Common folklore recounts how all Somalians trace their ancestry back to the mythical ancestor Samaale, who during the first century CE, traveled across the Gulf of Aden to Somalis' modern homeland. There he had nine sons, who, like the 12 sons of Israel, established the nine clans which formed the basis for the clans of today.<sup>379</sup> Over the course of the next 20 centuries, powerful forces, ideas, customs, and happenstances drove a wedge between Somalia's kin and pummelled the society until it ranked 5th to last on the Global Peace Index.<sup>380</sup>

Throughout this report, the limitlessly convoluted structure of Somalian society, tormented by numerous syndromes that prohibit the prospect of its prosperity, is scrutinized. However, as determined, the origin of this state's uniquely violent and prolonged period of human atrocities is neither the fault of the individuals who sought to lead, nor an incomprehensible quagmire; rather, it is an interconnected system of independent, extractive political institutions that fueled clan identity, militantism, and innate suspicious of power-sharing due to unreconciled historic atrocities. *A Long Road Ahead* described how Somalis on a personal level may attempt to override these hindrances to achieve state-consolidation, and therein prosperity. *The Emporium of East Africa* portrayed how, on par, one descendent tribe of Samaale attempted to overcome the aforementioned challenges and embarked upon the formation of inclusive political institutions. Now, this chapter, building upon the recommended reconciliation process, paired with potential precedents for strategies, explains the intrinsic illness plaguing 15 million souls, and how actors might cure not just the syndromes, but the ailment as well.

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<sup>379</sup> Fox, *The Roots of Somali Political Culture*.

<sup>380</sup> "Vision of Humanity."



The key to constructing a viable political system capable of distributing power among the various actors, with the long term goal of equal distribution among the people, is to understand the four key elite Somali classes which control the population and then eight types of conflict in which they engage (four abstract and four concrete).

In a dynamic as old as time seen throughout the histories of human existence, Somali society is divided among the old and the new, the spiritual leaders and the political leaders. The rapid imposing of modernization has sectioned elites into four categories: traditional clan elders, traditional Islamic scholars, modern political figures, and radical Islamic activists (predominantly members of al-Shabaab).<sup>381</sup> The old guard, composed of clan elders and islamic scholars, are increasingly impaired in their influence over the people. This has forced clan elders to become modern political elites commanding militias and/or seeking political office; while Islamic scholars are compelled to either join the radical leaders or fade into irrelevance within an increasingly secular society which progressively now favors written law instead of the customary *xeer* due to the lack of the government's ability to serve justice.



Traditional Islamic scholar consulting a man<sup>382</sup>

<sup>381</sup> Keating, *War and Peace in Somalia*, 221.

<sup>382</sup> Leite, "Reinvigoration of Somali," photo.

Dr. Abdurahman Abdullahi, co-founder of Mogadishu University, notes the rivalry occurs in four abstract ways which are correlated but distinct, “each one generating the next.” First, there persists a “state-society conflict between the modern state and traditional society.”<sup>383</sup> The clash between the 21st Century, Western system, is naturally at odds with Somali societal structures and power-dynamics, explaining the subpar results generated by attempting to force a ‘Jeffersonian Democracy’ upon a Muslim clan-based people. Second, because their power derives from the dominance of the new FGS over the old clan system, conflict ensues between the modern political figures and clan elders (with their clan members). Then after the eventual downfall of clan elders and a quest to control the ensuing institutions, Somali secular political figures engage in political, economic, and military conflict--essentially warlording. Secularism does not imply the individuals themselves are secular in belief; rather they do not utilize religion to construct their power base, favoring the three aforementioned modalities. Lastly, the foreign influenced modernization, which allowed for the creation of the new brand of areligious leaders vying for power, therein causes conflict between secular elites and the two types of religious elites attempting to preserve the traditional Somali values grounded in Islam.<sup>384</sup>

The Peace Development Research Center’s report *Achieving Local Reconciliation in Somalia* identifies the four types of concrete conflict, which are manifestations of the ideological and abstract rivalries among the four elite classes. These battles stymie the mechanisms urgently required to prompt reconciliation and state consolidation. The first is rural conflict. With 71% of Somalians ‘employed’<sup>385</sup> in the agriculture industry, this group, mostly nomadic herders,

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<sup>383</sup> Keating, Michael, 221.

<sup>384</sup> Keating, Michael, 221-222.

<sup>385</sup> As other preindustrial societies, farmers and herders often had little choice of their occupation.

constantly move and battle to control the increasingly “shrinking pasture and water resources.”<sup>386</sup>

Without a government to enforce law, little prevents communities from settling too close to one another or committing a *tragedy of the commons*.<sup>387</sup>

Second, “in respect to urban areas, the study identified two major sources of conflict: land grabs and politically motivated conflicts.”<sup>388</sup> Such competition is typical of what was described throughout the previous history chapters--the vicious inter/intra militia fighting highlighted in the movie *Blackhawk Down*.

Further strife stems from political conflict stemming from the new democratic power-sharing model instituted and perpetuated by international actors during postcolonial age. Before the arrival of European militaries, Somalian clans never united under a single government except for the rare situations when they had to battle the Ethiopians--even then the sultanates were simply city-state confederations with no authority to rule over clans. Citing constructivism and institutional theory, Somali leaders remain hesitant and see no personal benefit to ceding some of their authority to an incompetent government in a power sharing model. This ensues mass appeasement on behalf of the FGS (recall how the president’s cabinet possesses 79 members) to the point of inefficiency, and induces clans to form coalitions “to secure powerful positions in public leadership.”<sup>389</sup> Fourth, the report notes the “decision-making process, which used to be conducted in simple ways, usually under trees, have transformed into a complex

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<sup>386</sup> Keating, Michael, 86.

<sup>387</sup> Chappelow, “Tragedy Of The Commons Definition.” “The ‘tragedy of the commons’ is an economic problem in which every individual has an incentive to consume a resource at the expense of every other individual with no way to exclude anyone from consuming. It results in overconsumption, under investment, and ultimately depletion of the resource. As the demand for the resource overwhelms the supply, every individual who consumes an additional unit directly harms others who can no longer enjoy the benefits. Generally, the resource of interest is easily available to all individuals; the tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals neglect the well-being of society in the pursuit of personal gain.”

<sup>388</sup> Keating, Michael, 87.

<sup>389</sup> Bruton, “Somalia: A New Approach,” 7; Keating, Michael, 88.

political arena, with individuals and groups of elders vying with opposing agendas.”<sup>390</sup> The verses of “Me and Somalia against the world; Me and my clan against Somalia; Me and my family against the clan” rein true in this vicious cycle of political conflict derived from a lack of trust and brutal realities of power dynamics which persist on the individual, clan, and federal state level.

Lastly, all of these conflicts are perpetuated by the ancient perversion of revenge killing. As previously mentioned, though the *xeer* provided a manner by which the communities compensated each other for the crimes committed, there existed no higher structure to completely thwart further perpetrations. The cession of 20 camels for one man’s life from one group to another neither incarcerates the perpetrator nor thwarts them from committing the crime again. The prevalence of revenge kills certainly bolterers Somalia’s position as the “most dangerous place in the world” opposed to other nations as the Peace Development Research Center describes here:<sup>391</sup>

It typically starts as a minor incident between two individuals or groups, but quickly escalates to devastating conflict between two communities along family and clan lines. As the participants in the consultation reported, the majority of revenge killings tend to drag on, sometimes for generations. Individual and communal sense of pride inflames the cycle of vengeful violence, creating permanent hostility and fear among communities.<sup>392</sup>

Dangerously, revenge killings are quickly exported from town to countryside and vise-versa, erupting the entire region over a single death. (The irony of WWI with interconnected family trees each with their own militant states going to war after the death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand serves as a great analogy to aspects of Somalian conflict.)

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<sup>390</sup> Keating, Michael, 88.

<sup>391</sup> Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place.”

<sup>392</sup> Keating, Michael, 89.

In light of all of this, still the question remains: why should the US or Western actors care? Beyond the moral imperative and intertwined fates of nations contended in Part II, the most commonly cited concern remains disrupting the terrorist safe haven that failed states create. Indeed, the fall of the Barre regime and ensuing power vacuum allowed for the rise of al-Shabaab. Yet, as of 2010 Bronwyn Bruton claimed, “There’s little to indicate that the group shares al-Qaeda’s larger transnational goals.”<sup>393</sup> In the past decade, devastating attacks by al-Shabaab on neighboring countries refute that claim; still there is little evidence to suggest al-Shabab desires to attack the US domestically.<sup>394</sup> Nevertheless, journalist Robert Wright described the necessity to counteract the “growing lethality of hatred.”<sup>395</sup> Applied to Somalia, opposed to centuries or even decades ago, the ability for actors to cause destruction through political, economic, or terrorist means on distant targets multiplies as human civilization globalizes and progresses technologically. If two dozen men from Minnesota can be radicalized at home and join al-Shabaab, the chances appear great that one might return to attack the ‘problem of American interference’ at its root, with increasingly easier capability to do so.

Linked to the notion of tolerating a safe haven for the exporation of terrorism is, “the potential for the Somali conflict to ignite a wider regional conflict.” Bruton asserted in 2010 regional instability is “real but should not be exaggerated.”<sup>396</sup> Again, there is truth in her claims. Though riddled by al-Shabaab attacks, neither Kenya nor Ethiopia, nor Somaliland have become more radical. The “domino effect” is simply inapplicable in this situation as these actions merely

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<sup>393</sup> Bruton, 16. Al-Shabaab is technically an affiliate of al-Qaeda.

<sup>394</sup> “Al Shabaab.”

<sup>395</sup> Wright, “Progress is not a zero sum game.”

<sup>396</sup> Bruton, 17.

attack, not overturn the institutions (inclusive or extractive) these nations possess.<sup>397</sup>

Furthermore, she notes the precarious situation and tenuous grip al-Shabaab actually holds:

Most Shabaab fighters are illiterate neighborhood youths, some of them recruited at gunpoint, prone to defection, and possessed of little military training. Many more of the recruits have been opportunistically drawn to the Shabaab from Somalia's many clan and bandit militia factions. A Shabaab-held neighborhood in Mogadishu, for example, may host as many as seven separate militia factions, all of whom identify themselves as Shabaab, but nevertheless compete violently against one another for taxes and territory. The ability of the central Shabaab leadership to exercise command and control of these factions is limited.

Al-Shabaab's potential for forming into a united entity and launching a full-scale invasion remains dubious. Furthermore, given al-Shabaab consists of militias (and many impressed soldiers) striving for political power within the conflict types cited previously, elimination of all its members is not required to eliminate the organization. In spite of their delicate structure, if allowed to devolve similarly to the late 2000s/early 2010s, the organization would prove a formidable military entity with the capability to wage brutal guerrilla conflict on Somalia's institutions as well as neighboring states.

A third interest US actors have in Somalia relates to the economic realm. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Somalia's developing economic institutions provide cheap labor which, paired with meager business taxes, ensures considerable profit-margins. Indeed, several foreign companies, including American Coca Cola and Dole Fruit Corporations have invested in Somalia with remarkable success.<sup>398</sup> Opposed to certain other failed states which deny external investment, the FGS has demonstrated a high degree of cooperation with outside firms and remains steadfast in their resolve to eliminate the nation's economic hardships.<sup>399</sup>

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<sup>397</sup> Caplan, "The Domino Theory Reconsidered."

<sup>398</sup> "Coca Cola in Somaliland.," Wiafe-Amoako, *The World Today*, 237.

<sup>399</sup> Bowden, "The Legacy of Black Hawk Down," 77; Keating, Michael, x.



Armed Pirate, January 2010<sup>400</sup>

The economic appeal is not limited to capitalist monetary gain however; as Somalia's vital location on the cross roads of Eurafasia, with the Gulf of Aden forming the gateway to the Suez Canal, imbues the nation with twin strategic interests imperative for Western nations to control. First, 10% of global shipping passes through Somalia's waters' unguarded; these vessels proved easy targets for pirates, often forced into the profession after failure of legal fishing enterprises or simply needing a source of income.<sup>401</sup> Piracy arises from economic necessity, not innate desire. At its peak in the early 2010s, the World Bank estimated the economic cost to the global economy was over \$18 billion annually.<sup>402</sup> The "human trafficking, arms trafficking, funding militias and money laundering through trade in the stimulant known as khat, particularly in Kenya, as well as other illegal activities that divert money from the legal economy that would

<sup>400</sup> Kermeliotis, "World Bank Report: Somali Pirates."Photo.

<sup>401</sup> Shay, "Iran Deploys New Warship."

<sup>402</sup> Kermeliotis.

otherwise promote economic development,” the report stated.<sup>403</sup> With the Maersk Alabama Hijacking--commonly known as the Captain Phillips Incident--gaining international concern to the deteriorating situation in 2009, an array of Western alliances and organizations such as the EU and NATO, combined with immense unilateral support from nations like the China, US, and Iran, all but destroyed the piracy threat by 2020.<sup>404</sup> However, these forces remain expensive to maintain and cannot occupy the Gulf forever; furthermore, the offshore operations do not terminate the universally stipulated *onshore* issues which the syndrome of piracy stems from.

Overcoming this hazard proves similar to resolving many of Somalia’s other problems. Inclusive political institutions provide security and thwart pirates before they leave port. In 2017, American agencies and NGOs coordinated with Puntland’s “local forces and tribe elders. They trained the Puntland militias but offered no air or ground support. Working entirely on their own, Somali forces moved from southern Puntland up to a northern port” occupied by the Islamic State. “Those villages are holding today,” stated US Brig. Gen. Don Bolduc, former commander of Special Operations in Africa who directly oversaw the action.<sup>405</sup> Mark Bowden reported that previous US Ambassador to Somalia Stephen Schwartz chimed in on the situation:

Schwartz says this success can be replicated throughout Somalia if the United States invested a fraction of what it has been spending on special operations and drones. “The budget of the Somali government is comparable to the salary cap for the Washington Nationals baseball team,” he said. “They’re both around \$210 million.” He said that less than half that amount would be enough to enable the president to pay the salaries of Somalia National Army recruits and other government employees. That step alone, he says, “would make our investment on the military side more successful.”<sup>406</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> Reuters. “Somali Pirates Are Hurting The World.”

<sup>404</sup> “Operation Ocean Shield.”


<sup>405</sup> Bowden, “The Legacy,” 76-77.

<sup>406</sup> Bowden, “The Legacy.”



Rooting out piracy shall not be as difficult as eliminating Somali's other syndromes. Yet, if the dangerous institutions generating the piracy threat are not resolved properly, attacks will multiply exponentially, descending into a dangerously vicious and expensive cycle.

Amidst the proto-Cold War currently waging between the United States and China, dominance of economic influence is essential for the US's position as a global hegemony. Hence, the second strategic interest the US possesses in Somalia is halting the spread of China's clout on the continent of Africa. Though the FGS officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, China's investments, especially in a post-COVID-19 world, have stalled, providing the Western World with a critical window of opportunity to reassert dominance.<sup>407</sup>



Somalia's location is critical in connecting the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean<sup>408</sup>

<sup>407</sup> Lei, "Somalia Expects More Chinese Investment,"

<sup>408</sup> "Where's Africa in China's Mega Belt and Road Project?" Map.

Somalia remains distinct from nearly every other nation on Earth because, unlike the nefarious governments of Syria or North Korea which possess long-established extractive institutions, it still suffers from the lack of them. Mohammed Ahmed Mohamoud, “a civil society activist and director of the Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum,” noted that while other African nations languished under harsh dictatorships, “for us, we have so many things. No limitations, no restrictions.”<sup>409</sup> Though the political structure within the clans of old (where every man was enfranchised to vote on clan affairs) was egalitarian, in the 21st century these clans have become an increasingly militant organizations perceived as an indispensable defense against a tyrannical government and radical Islamists.<sup>410</sup> By containing a state populated by a patchwork of independent extractive institutions headed by four distinct elite types suspicious of FGS authority, the government is unable to institute inclusive reforms necessary to promote good governance or protect economic investment that would eliminate the eight distinct conflict types plaguing both Somalia and the international community.

Respecting the perplexing state of affairs, and in conjunction with reconciliation measures as proposed in the *Long Road Ahead*, Somali society yearns for a revolutionary approach to governance: one which allows and encourages participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that make best use of their talents and skills and that enables individuals to make the choices they wish. To be inclusive, economic institutions must feature secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing field in which people can exchange goods and establish contracts. To achieve this, the FGS and foreign actors should undertake the following proposals:

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<sup>409</sup> Keating; Josh, “When is a nation not a nation?”

<sup>410</sup> Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 239-241.

- 1) Convene a constitutional convention attended by members of all four elite types (including al-Shabaab leaders) to discuss the redistricting of Somali's federal states (preferable among clan lines), standardize and bolster the legal system as well as its enforcement power, and define clear boundaries of authority administratively and territorially.
- 2) Institute a bicameral Parliament similar to Somaliland's. One, a House of Representatives chosen by population of the states composed of predominantly secular politicians. Two, a House of Elders drawn from every subclan where once a member is incapacitated, a traditional elder from the same clan will take their place so as to restrict inter clan political conflict.
- 3) Redirect the primary power of the FGS to the federal states stipulated by the convention so they can more efficiently develop mechanisms and execute measures needed for governance, security, economic development, and reconciliation.<sup>411</sup>
- 4) Stipulate the political and military authority each government job possesses paired with a robust system of prosecution should it be violated.
- 5) Further promote the rule of law through a multimedia campaign and other measures "to end the pervasive culture of impunity."<sup>412</sup>
- 6) Develop a capital, monetary, and expertise pool composed of foreign actors to effectively train state personnel "how best to diffuse tensions, intervene in active

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<sup>411</sup> M Keating 91.

<sup>412</sup> M Keating, 91.

conflicts, and enforce ceasefires” in a grassroots, rather than a top-down manner.

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- 7) Continue the aerial and naval operations against Islamic extremists and pirates until the root cause is properly resolved.
- 8) Ensure the Somali National Army (SNA) is composed of members from all clans so as to dissuade sectionalism (similar to the Lightning Brigade).<sup>414</sup> Furthermore, have foreign actors continue to train and supply these forces.
- 9) Have foreign actors monitor corruption within the Somali National Army and create a clear mechanism for addressing any violation.
- 10) Have foreign actors develop and teach effective tax collection methods.
- 11) Have the FGS cooperate with the business sector to effectively cultivate clear economic regulations and invest heavily in infrastructure and capital/investment security.
- 12) “Organize national conventions on Islam in order to unify interpretations of Islam among Islamic scholars and organizations” and promote their funding through multi-media to dissuade people from joining radical Islamists.
- 13) Continue disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs through joint action between the SNA, AMISOM, and foreign advisors and their aerial support to undermine the militarism and destruction capabilities while also pursuing it through legal or voluntary means.

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<sup>413</sup> M Keating 92.

<sup>414</sup> Rempfer, Kyle. “US Troops, Nonprofit Trainers and a 'Lightning Brigade' Battle for Somalia.”

Albeit daunting, “civil institutions and associated party organizations can be built from the ground up” claim Acemoglu and Robinson.<sup>415</sup> The task is momentous, requiring “a truly national effort to rebuild our country, restore trust in one another, and repair the deep cultural and historical bonds that draw us together as a nation,” in the words of President Farmaajo.<sup>416</sup> And yet,; a century and a half ago, in a cemetery, that forever branded the ground as a testament to the atrocities of a civil war, proclaiming humanity’s moral and strategic imperative “to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced.” To courageously pursue “the great task remaining before us--that from these honored dead we take an increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion--that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain--that this nation, under God [or Allah], shall have a new birth of freedom--and that government of the people, by the people, for the people,” shall be forged in Somalia and “not perish from the earth.”<sup>417</sup>



Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shakes hands with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, 2013<sup>418</sup>

<sup>415</sup> Acemoglu, 460-461.

<sup>416</sup> Keating, Michael, ix.

<sup>417</sup> Lincoln, *The Gettysburg Address*.

<sup>418</sup> Watkins, “After More than 2 Decades,.”Photo.

### *Conclusion*

George Orwell once wrote, “In our age, there is no such thing as ‘keeping out of politics.’”<sup>419</sup> Amidst our exponentially globalizing world, the welfare of nations is increasingly positively correlated to one another. The long-held butterfly effect reigns now more pertinent than ever. Though humanity’s capability to promote prosperity across the globe advances, so too does the “growing lethality of hatred.”<sup>420</sup> The vicious cycle proves that terrible situations only deteriorate: the vast inequalities in Russia, Germany, China, and even Somalia prompted unparalleled human suffering on a global stage which the international community sorely regretted failing to act earlier. My stance is neither an altruistic Western/white savior stance, nor a condemnation of Somalia itself; rather, it is an educated assessment of human history, sociology, and philosophy which recognizes that the faults of humanity now are bound to cascade into the cataclysmic tragedies of tomorrow.

Nevertheless, pursuing the proposals set forth in this report in Somalia’s exceptionally chaotic socio-political environment, which retains a reserved distrust against the United States due to its historic failures, will prove exceedingly difficult. Any chance of succeeding, moreover being exceptional, will require everyone to enhance their understanding of the global issues and trends, as well as develop a clear ethical code to confront the morally ambiguous situations actors will encounter. This paper has explored the means by which the United States could help to heal Somalia's syndromes.

Yet, the first step for us to truly defeat all of Somali’s syndromes is to solve *The Somalia Syndrome*. US Army General Tony Zinni describes in his book *Before the First Shots are Fired*

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<sup>419</sup> Price, *Politics in 100 Quotes*.

<sup>420</sup> Wright, “Progress is not a zero sum game.”

that in the wake of the Blackhawk Down disaster, “the euphoric anticipation of humanitarian missions all over the third world” reverted to isolationism and indifference to the atrocities of Rwanda, Kosovo, and Haiti. Vietnam, Iraq, Somalia: “they have become more than wars, they have become ‘syndromes’ --a lasting legacy to remind us of the catastrophes well-meaning intervention can lead to.”<sup>421</sup> But, the atrocities of history remind us of the greater catastrophe that will result if we succumb to our fears and fail to try again.

Overcoming *this* syndrome requires optimistic pragmatic humanitarianism rooted in cynicism for “the world’s most dangerous place.”<sup>422</sup>

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<sup>421</sup> Zinni, *Before the First Shots Are Fired*, 220.

<sup>422</sup> Fergusson, 382.

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### Outcomes

“We are visitors on this planet. We are here for ninety or one hundred years at the very most. During that period, we must try to do something good, something useful, with our lives. If you contribute to other people’s happiness, you will find your true goal, the true meaning of life.” -- His Holiness, The 14th Dalai Lama<sup>423</sup>

Why Somalia? That is the question. National Geographic reported only 17% of young adults in the United States could locate Afghanistan on a map.<sup>424</sup> It’s dubious Somalia fairs remotely that high. But can you blame these young Americans for being ignorant on the matter? I doubt as a freshman I understood where Somalia was; if so that was certainly the extent of my knowledge on the country. Besides the Blackhawk Down incident in 1993 and the brief Captain Phillips incident in 2009, Somalia has never appeared in Western headlines: a seemingly distant, uneventful place to Americans unexposed to the vexing story of this land. Still, the question remains why Somalia?

The origins of this paper come from Dr. Dubie’s AP US History (APUSH) class two years ago. Initially, I considered writing a paper on policy towards China or Iraq; yet, I reasoned that the enormous complexity of those nations, paired with the ever-shifting global power dynamics predicated upon such policy towards them, would prove a bit too much to chew for a high school paper due in a month and a half. Over the weekend, I watched the movie “Blackhawk Down” and the idea dawned on me: here was a nation classified as “the most dangerous place in the world,” which previously experienced US intervention, and demanded international significance, albeit currently does not merit significant attention among the world’s

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<sup>423</sup> “Dalai Lama Quotes.”

<sup>424</sup> Trivedi, “Survey Reveals Geographic Illiteracy.”

powers. Therefore, policy recommendations could actually be implemented without fear of retaliation by powerful global actors. My APUSH paper, also entitled *The Somalia Syndrome*, ended up being an objective analysis of how the CNN Effect<sup>425</sup> impacted US foreign policy towards Somalia in the 1990s which resulted in the Blackhawk Down Affair, an event that continues to have ramifications on US Foreign Policy today.

While writing this paper, something struck a chord in me when I first encountered images of starving Somali children carrying AK-47s. Though I had encountered such images before, the Hobbesian state of nature stirred a sense of action within me as I recalled Dr. King's maxim, "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." When I shared my despair with my father during a late night kitchen conversation, he paused for a moment and said, "So what will you do about it?" That is how the odyssey of writing this report began.

Due to my terribly busy schedule, work on this report stalled until early March 2020. Nevertheless, over the course of authoring these two papers, I discovered not only the rich history of Somalia, but also the challenges of constructing a large foreign policy-based report.

The foremost difficulty I encountered was the lack of concise current information. In a nation where allegiance, political borders, corruption and other issues constantly arise, it proved challenging to uncover the current situation. With my historical and journalistic background, either the facts are known, or I discover them. Yet, I was restricted from conducting fact finding on Somalia by virtue of being a high school senior in Indianapolis. This forced me to rely on as many recent articles as possible. Still, a little frustration occurred without precise information. In

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<sup>425</sup> The CNN Effect is a concept that in the era of 24-hour news, even more so now with the internet and mobile devices, the media possesses more sway in determining foreign policy than the government officials themselves.

the end, I believe I performed the best research under the constraints and am proud of the work I produced.

A further challenge arose from the discipline required during my last semester, as well as having to work throughout the pandemic. The challenge was not simply the discipline or work, but also the motivation to cite sources and footnote properly in the course of my rigorous research. This project is nothing but ambitious as it takes on the research question of “how to fix Somalia?” As a result, the dedication and discipline to never be satisfied with a surface answer, instead to dig deeper and reflect on the issue from different perspectives, was the only way I was going to uncover the true underlying problems facing Somalia, not just the surface level syndromes.

Furthermore, Global Scholars humbled me to the painstaking work necessary to accomplish foreign policy analysis. I certainly am leaving with a greater respect for the academic community, as well as those on the frontlines who attempt to overcome complex, dangerous situations with the resources and knowledge at hand. “Peace is not the absence of war;” wrote Jane Adams (the first American woman to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize), “it is the presence of justice.” I discovered obtaining true peace proves far more difficult than implementing a truce.

If I could have altered my approach to this paper, it would’ve been starting earlier. With more time to prepare, contemplate, and discuss with professionals in the field, my recommendations section would’ve been more thorough and well-reasoned. Yet, I do not regret beginning sooner as my other school endeavours and activities proved just as important to my

personal growth. I will continue to work on this project in the years to come: solidifying my understanding of the current situation of Somalia and refining my recommendations towards it.

Lastly, this experience further refined my thoughts about human rights. The more I discover about our world, the less rational it appears. War, famine, and oppression engulf the globe, and I have but one life to stop it. Though I had always considered world inequality an overlooked issue with unrecognized implications, reading the mountains of information, both strategic and philosophical, gave me the knowledge to now offer clear and succinct reasons why humanity should pursue humanitarian action.

I may never be able to end the wars or oppression that engulfs the globe, but I do know that, in the words of Jim Rohn, “How long should you try? Until.”